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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

NATIONALISM: A PRESENT ABSENCE AND AN ABSENT PRESENCE

©

BY

Gürcan Koçan

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Edmonton, Alberta

Fall 1993

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June 14, 1993

If you stare into the sun, you spoil your eyes.... If you
put on glasses to look, you spoil the sun.

The wind even without the sail is still the wind. Yet the
sail without the wind is merely a piece of cloth.

(Özdemir Asaf 1982:232)

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled Nationalism: A Present Absence and An Absent Presence submitted by Gürcan Koçan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Laurie Adkin

Fred Judson

Fred Judson

Raymond Morrow

May 31, 1993

For modern strangers who experience foreignness in the margins of national societies.

ABSTRACT

Nationalism, a profound element of our daily lives, entered the continuity of human history as a process of rupture. While promising solidarity, freedom and liberty and appearing as a progressive force for modernity, it has also become source of discrimination, exclusion, cultural monism, oppression and violence. The discourse of nationalism produced new forms for the subjective formation of the self in terms of the collective representation of the *us* and the *them*. Nationalism is both the foundation and the instrumentality of the symbolic construction of imaginary world. Every nationally constructed imaginary world implies a chain of registered meanings and traces on the psychological structure of the self. This nationally constructed imaginary structure of the self allows one to identify oneself with *otherness* as one is identified by others (as *us*) or as one acts against other (as *them*), by being located in a shared yet divided and fragmented world.

The cultural and ideological agency of nationalism has been imposed upon both individuals and their social habitat, gaining an autonomous power that generates the conditions for furthering nationalism's implicit presuppositions on the basis of putative differences. Since nationalism may function as trace or as representations, identification of a nationalist autonomy of signification requires that one understand the discourse of nationalism not as a monolithic phenomenon or self-contained structure representing only singular political and historical discourse but rather as an intertextual and differential structure which transforms and is transformed by other discourses. Finally, these intertextual structures of nationalism are shaped not by structures of presence or immanent time but by symbolic traces with their divergent play of different temporalities, by its presence within its absence.

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This work is dedicated to modern strangers who experience foreignness in the modern lands of nationalism.

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INTRODUCTION

Towards the end of the twentieth century, in the wake of a multitude of economic, political and cultural crises, many have come to view nationalism as a panacea for the bleak condition of modern life. In the ascendance of modernization, nationalism is experienced as a form of rebellion against the dominating, segregating and exclusionary functions of the rules and regulations of modern cultural and political organizations. This nationalist revolt may be one way to eliminate some of these segregating and discriminating conditions, however, they simultaneously reconstruct new guiding modern principles of domination, conduct and subjective reflection. The discourse of nationalism is not truly linked with liberation or freedom (the opportunity to choose) but rather either destroys or severely limits them within national regimes of conduct and discipline.

In the postmodern period, what is at issue is the very nature of humanness, for which nationalism would substitute various modern subjective images and representations. The discourse of nationalism, with its emancipatory politics, is not for the dissolution of imprisoned subjectivity but rather is for the construction of new limits and subjective identities within pre-established orders of impossibilities.

However, nationalism as a constitutive element of daily life is not only founded in the movements of aggressive sectarianism, but is also a global phenomenon diffused throughout almost every aspect of modern daily life. Nationalism can express itself as an idea, a perception, a justification, a value, a truth, a love of country, a policy of the state, language, an organization of mass media, educational institutions and so on.

In this thesis I will discuss the discourse of nationalism which has a continuous seductive influence over the masses through construction of mythical structures (emancipatory and sacrificial) and structural forces (capitalism, industrialism and colonialism). Legions of policy makers and years of intellectual discussions have elaborated its construction while scores of cultural symbols and signs have enhanced its scope through everyday communicative practices. Nationalism is simultaneously ambivalent and ambiguous, emancipatory and oppressive, egalitarian and discriminatory, imaginary and symbolic. Thus, the first problem in the nationalist cultural and political construct is that nationalist traces or characters are forever receding. The structures and discourses of nationalism are neither fixed nor stable. In theory, nationalism remains in a conceptual complexity or fuzziness and its regimes or practices are unstable, and fluid, with much differentiation from one social period to another.

In the first chapter, I will argue that nationalism is not an ancient phenomenon, but rather is a product of the most profound rupture in human history, the rise of modernity. Put differently, rather than representing the continuity of human history, nationalism represents "a principle of discontinuity" or interruption of the traditionalist discourse.[1] Nationalism was, and is, built on discontinuous practices in traditional ways of life and expanded on with the discourse of modernity. The structuring operations of modernity constitute and transmit power over nature, chance events, and people in the name of development. Since the eighteenth century, nationalism has been the product of certain forms of rational rules and organizations which are embedded in the practices of modernity (capitalism and colonialism). These determine how individuals will act and express themselves toward the world in a rational and simultaneously irrational way. Thus, the critique of nationalism is considered in relation to the criticism of the structures of modernity and in demonstrating how the two discourses intersect. Throughout the first chapter, I will attempt to show how they share the same economic, cultural and political structures constituted in the myth of *progress*.

---

[1] See for the "principle of discontinuity", Foucault (1981:67).

Nationalism through modern practices is manifested in various discursive regulatory or disciplinary regimes that have invented different referential domains for each individual. In other words, nationalism is a discourse of control over the production of imaginary identities and life systems. Nationalism fixes limits and borders for people by the action of identity which takes the form of a continuous performance of values, meaning systems and subjective constructions.

In the first chapter, nationalism is conceptualized as a differentiating discourse which operates primarily as a signification process on individual identities (it is something that develops in ongoing social interactions). Nationalism is implicitly understood as artificial symbolic signifiers that mark and subsequently transform the very nature of individuals. Nationalism in relation to modernity represents the differentiation of the very nature of people and a shifting of intersubjectively shared traditional world views, as well as of the totality of interpretations of contemporary reality. That modernizing shift is bound up in the societal shift from use value to exchange value.

Exchange value is the transformative logic of nationalism as well as of capitalism. In the economic and cultural spheres, exchange relations strengthen symbolic and subjective significations. Tied as it is to the capitalist mode of production, the shift to exchange value has permitted the eventual breaking down of traditional ways of meaning formation through the infusion of symbolic value into the objects of exchange. The symbolic is a meaning system unique to exchange relations between individuals or between the objects of commodity/symbol exchange. Thus, capitalism's logic of exchange is a subjective order of representation and through it the relationship between the signifier and signified has played an important role in unleashing the expansion of nationalism both locally and globally.

Nationalism is not only a discourse constructed through exchange relations but also a constructive discourse. It supports, sustains, upholds and nourishes imaginary limits, contradictions, conflicts and inconsistencies in everyday life. In symbolic exchange relations, the individual gains an imaginary sense of national identity; meaning and presence for the individual comes from the multitude of signifiers as well as from the ideologies of nationalism. This sense of identity constitutes the way one perceives oneself and others and the experiences that are available to one. Nationalism is an imaginary order that operates within us on levels of conscious and unconscious communication, determining who we are, and convincing us that we are free and better-off than others.

In the second chapter, I will present the discourse of nationalism as part of the construction of a dualistic mode of subject formations--that of binary oppositions and differences: us/them, national/international, state/individual, culture/nature, man/woman, private/public, city/country. Nationalist identities are an aspect of this system of dynamic oppositions which divide, fragment, repress, discriminate and transform individuals.

I will attempt to show that nationalism is not an intrinsic quality of humans but rather is a symbolic and imaginary order which is produced by people. Specifically, it is a symbolic and imaginary order which is ultimately bound up with the discourse of modernity. It is important that we recognize this, because, as Baudrillard has argued, the symbolic order, which is the connection between representation and reality, has become disconnected from the reality which it represents. Thus, national identities have become a second order of signification reproduced by symbolic representations (national imaginary identities which refer to the symbolic order which, in turn, refers to reality) (Baudrillard 1983:23-26). Nationalism is not just an ideology or regime of simulation, but rather is a structure of power reproduced in symbolic and imaginary forms. A national structure of power fabricates symbolic order. It is no longer necessarily operated by a central coercive apparatus, but rather it invests symbolic signification in the imaginary identity of each individual who in turn conforms to symbolic orders under the guidance of a pre-registered and imaginary identity. Insofar as they are constructed by nationalist discourse, individual subjects live out imaginary and symbolic relationships in their real conditions of existence.

In the third chapter, I will discuss the relationship between the discourse of nationalism and individual identities by looking at the shared intersubjectivities shaped in the processes of social interaction. I will argue that there is no integrated, singular nation; rather a nation exists as an imagined, unified, and coherent community. Nationalism operates through the production of intersubjective habitual understandings and actions in the lives of individuals, associating and integrating them into distinct social ideals. As members of distinctive *imagined communities*, they are divided from the *others* beyond the national boundaries. Furthermore, developed over time, each imagined community is constitutive of a distinct, ongoing combination of cultural codes and cognitive structures that later become the underlying bases of individual actions and expressions. Such constructed habituality often represents essential parts of individual identities, e.g., defining an *us* against a *them*. These constructions create national individuals with distinct places, functions and attributes. These attributes play important roles in the nationalization process as they are constantly opposed by new constellations of individuals representing different imaginary communities.

I will also discuss the implications of the split between nationalistic and universal interests as manifested in Western philosophy. Nationalism has come to refer to the conscious unity of the particular (nation and citizen) and its interests, an ideal civilizational subject embodying the ideal of the destruction of differences. To put it another way, nationalism is discursively (if non-reflexively) a part of a

European civilizational project representing modern progress and intellectual colonialism for substitution of those primitive cultures with Western cultures. Civilization is to be introduced to other countries by the exemplary body of a European nation as a example *par excellence* of civilization. In the essentialist and foundationalist views of twentieth century European theory, nationalism comes to represent the denial of the 'right to be different' *vis-a-vis* others. Paradoxically, universalism (humanist discourse) is dissolved by nationalism into a welter of particular points, each seeking to protect the particular through the construction of an ideal type.

In the fourth chapter, I will refer to nationalism as a regime of truth. Because the rationality of nationalism is directly associated with truth claims, nationalism has no foundation apart from such claims. The truth regimes of nationalism function most effectively, not only through coercion but also through modes of social and moral regulation. Thus, regimes of nationalism presuppose truth regimes for the chosen and the excluded peoples of different nations. These national truth regimes--which produce unchallengeable axioms, opinions and beliefs among the people as part of its distinct imaginary culture--sustain barriers to communication between different members of imaginary cultures.

In the fifth chapter, I argue that nationalism has many faces, which are never identical to their visible representations. In the daily practices of life, every discourse of nationalism has its signifying effects only in relation to the significations of other discourses. Thus, their meanings are radically unstable because they are the outcome of the continuous play of meanings or significations articulated in *other* discourses. As a result there is no single reality of nationalism. Therefore this project also presents various poststructuralist readings of the differential structure of nationalism. For example, utilizing Derrida's theory of *differance*, the last chapter analyzes the structures of nationalism not as structures of presence shaped by an immanent time, but as the multitude of traces and marks determined by the play of divergent temporalities. The structures of nationalism and their resultant identities represent both repetition and transformation of the complex network of traces and representations of other discourses.

In summary, my analysis of nationalism utilizes three interrelated approaches. First, I discuss the discourse of nationalism as imbedded within the general structures of modernity. The specific articulation of nationalist elements to modernist discourses takes innumerable, often contradictory, relations and representations. Second, I will argue that this complex relationship between modernity and nationalism should be placed within a broader framework of analysis which seeks to explain how social relationships and identities are constructed. For this task, we need the deconstructionist tools of Derrida, and the psychoanalytical concepts developed by Lacan, among many others. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, I will argue that the meanings and representations of nationalism, are not self-contained constructions but rather are a system of differential relations. As Derrida argues, there are no positive presences, only presences as the differentiating relations of a system shaped by temporalities.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY

*They [*Old Shoes with Laces *a painting of Van Gogh] will have travelled a lot, traversed all sorts of towns and territories at war. Several world wars and mass deportations. We can take our time. They are there, made for waiting. For leading up the garden path. The irony of their patience is infinite, it can be taken as nil. So, we had got to this public correspondence and I was saying that, sealing a disagreement, this sealed exchange was holding, under seals, another correspondence. Secret, this one, although it can be read right off the other. A symbolic correspondence, in accord, a harmonic. In this communication between two illustrious professors who have both of them a communication to make on a "famous picture by Van Gogh".*

(Derrida 1991:71 "Restitutions of the Truth in Pointing")

INTRODUCTION

Today, the world is experiencing another period of turbulence produced by the return of aggressive sectarianism, xenophobia, racism, ethnocentrism, fundamentalism and most importantly, the fictitious emancipatory identity of nationalism. We also seem to be witnessing a deep crisis of contemporary culture, accompanied by collective and individual identity crises emanating from the multitude of contradictions of modernity. The depth of this crisis is tied to the whole modern way of life. Various writers refer to crises of the political, economic, industrial, distributive, productive, moral, juridical, ethical, artistic, relational, religious, and of ideologies.[1]

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[1] The term crisis is the most popular word among scholars since the beginning of the eighteenth century. Lately, many scholars articulate the condition of postmodernity or late modernity as a state of crisis. The idea of crisis suggests structural origins. Different theories presently associate the crisis with internal contradictions of capitalism, (intensive accumulation, postfordism, rise of cycles, rationalization) or discontents of modernity, see, Hobsbawm (1992); Fukuyama (1992); Lasch (1979, 1991); Gorz (1985); O'Connor (1984); Habermas (1976); Bell (1976); Sorokin (1941).

Evidently, at the end of the twentieth century, the crises are advancing toward a juncture where, people will face either an environmental and social catastrophe, or, (before this particular turning point within the jungle of modernization) they will decide to adopt new forms of political, social and cultural life.

A precondition for achieving such ends as the elimination of militarism, deadly weapons and polluting industries is the breaking down of the dominant types of organizing logic, myths, and discourses which underpin systems of domination. This means deconstructing the ideologies which are the major obstacles to the realization of individual autonomy, community and world peace. In this regard, new political and cultural discourses against the hegemonic order can be seen not only as a rejection or deconstruction of dominant discourses[2] but also as the reconstruction of alternative discourses, representations, and redefinitions of the systems of meanings.[3]

---

[2] In the midst of a discussion of crises of modernity, identity and nationalism, two French thinkers,--Foucault and Derrida--insert the idea that writing or conversation is always entrapped in a modes of power because prevailing discourses, language prescript perspectives, meanings and impose strict limits on what can be thought or said. Here Derrida's and Foucault's ideas pursue a postmodernist strategy which is associated with aims of demythologizing or decoding foundational codes of current dominant discourses of politics, society and culture. What this consists of is construction of counter discourses which oppose the modes of power and authority diffused in prevailing modes of discourse. At this point, postmodernist strategy becomes more radical than any existing political movement because it resists discourses of those who control knowledge. In this sense, the main radical act empowers subordinated minorities called *others* (women, ethnic, racial, religious and aboriginal groups) to construct their own counter discourse against those of the dominant discourse which establishes their subjugated situation. See Foucault (1980), Derrida (1981a).

[3] In 1958, in an interview about the French Crisis, Merleau-Ponty expressed his desire for "reconstruction" in these terms:

> The French crisis is a result of the fact that if there is a solution to our

In seeking alternatives to a given totality of the representations and discourses, nationalism is a rising global sentiment in response to the crises and discontents of modernity. As a faltering, impulsive and contradictory response to the conditions of modernity, at the society level, nationalism that is directed against a particular nation state or employment of force and domination, has been largely referred to irredentism, ethnic movements or secessionism. In other words, through legitimation crisis of political and economic regimes, the masses attempt to replace a particular dominant state structure with one that, in their national view, more closely represents the general will. In contrast, in recent days, oppositionary formal parties policies and state strategies are also being produced to absorb and accommodate independently developed civil national movements in order to prevent legitimation crises of political and economic regimes.

However, the crises or discontents of modernization cannot be alleviated by particularism, divisive individualism, ethnocentrism, irredentism or secessionism which are continuously manifesting themselves in present-day ideologies of nationalism. From this point of view, existing theories of nationalism (seeking to explain its functions of cognition, organization, programatization, evaluation; its social bases, or idealist analyses) do not foretell the extent to which nationalism is part of the problem rather than part of the solution of current crises. If we seek to

---

problems it is a liberal one, and there is no longer any theoretical or practical freedom in France. We are living on the leftovers of eighteenth-century thought, and it has to be reconstructed from top to bottom (Merleau-Ponty 1964:348).

survive the crises of modernity we have to start contemplating the meaning of being by continuously destroying the walls of our imprisonment built by the modern rationalist, totalizing and oppositionary epistemologies of knowledge\power. In order to do that we have constantly to ask what is the meaning of we, I, you, them; who I am, who he or she is, who we are. When and how we turn away from the process of being in the face of cognitive, social, economic and cultural conditions.

The structure of the subject or the identity of individuals can be viewed at least in part as a relationship with alterity or the microcosmic cultural, political and social reflection of their surroundings. For this reason, nationalism not only exists in external domains of subject as a discourse or culture, but also as an internalized reflection, a reference between external domains and the individual.

Thus, my first argument is: the conditions of nationalism are intrinsically related to modernity in the spheres of theory and practice. Underlying modern structures which signify and differentiate the temporal and spatial functions or limits of nationalism, which include the economic, cultural, political, and individual spheres of creative social practice, actions and expressions. Since nationalism is a changing or relational product of the interactive processes of life, it is necessary to take into account the conditions of modernity.

I wish to examine a dimension of nationalism which generally receives little or no treatment. That is, that nationalism is centrally a part of the imaginary and symbolic world in which subjectively fabricated, representative opposing forces within the same unity contend for signifying control and differentiation of the development process. Thus, in the conditions of modernity and nationalism, knowledge and subjective existence is constructed within a dualist system of dynamic oppositions such as nature/culture, city/country, modern/traditional, national/international, man/woman, particular/universal, individual/society, citizen/state and so on. In these terms, I will argue that the expressions and actions of nationalism are discursive curtailments of dialogue and they are essentially linked to structuring hierarchical organizations of binary opposition that are inscribed by the western texts and discourses in the processes of modernization.

From this point of view, the following pages discuss and call into question one of the significant presuppositions of our modern era--the non-problematized and privileged discourses of nationalism. By the term nationalism I refer to internality as an imaginary existence (the identity or state of mind) as well as the more common conception of nationalism as an externality or, a historical social phenomenon, characterized by particular elements of discourse. Nationalism is an abstract chain of ideas, imaginary significations, collective sentiments, beliefs, and emotions, which continuously reproduce and define themselves through time, space and political-cultural communities; nationalism is symbolic signification that actually or potentially signifies oppositionary constituents that sets people intolerantly against one another through the hierarchical fragmentation and divisions of humanity by rigid boundaries.

Nationalism as a symbolic signification or the chain of abstract ideas, steadily constructs and reconstructs people in rational and irrational forms from generation to generation. But nationalism is also a social process which fabricates national culture, societal relations, and the structural organization of the state, and that constantly imputes subjective identity forms, (e.g., a set of meanings, motives and value orientations) to newly-born individuals. Nationalism also bears an ensemblic-identitary organization of references which allow individuals to define themselves as chosen people of a particular societal group. On the other hand, in the reflective social processes of interaction, every individual participates in signifying actions at various levels to reproduce or to differentiate the very meanings or forms of nationalism, thereby enabling the national process to maintain itself and to achieve its specific instrumental and organizing purpose.

The ideas of nationalism are not God-given or nature-given but human creations which mould a significant conceptual part of our identity--*weltanschauung*--and form everyone's representations throughout their life-cycles. The ideas of nationalism determine our consciousness and unconsciousness in the formative stages of our life; only later do we act rationally to reconstruct the ideologies of nationalism and their organizing logic. It is therefore only through a deconstructive introspection that we can uncover our making. Nationalism as an idea is a part of ourselves and it forms us; it develops and stays within us and outside us. Nationalism refers to (in-itself, through-itself and throughout-itself) a chain of abstract ideas which forms its own world. It constitutes both collective formations and layers of our identity with various signified meanings which determine the individual's actions and expressions in the totality of subjective experience; nationalism has concentrated its function chiefly on the rational discursive aspects of reason, which claims to be authoritative, and which remakes the masses through symbolic significations. Nationalism is a rational action which necessarily involves an actor relating to the external or subjective world, where the subjective world represents the totality of national symbolic structures which either exist or can be made to exist through the purposive intervention of the power holder. It follows that, such a relation can support a purely imaginary or cognitive stance, and national action or national expression becomes strategic through the power holders on the interventionary structures.

In addition to the strategic representation and rational discursive aspect of nationalism functional in the identities, in a given normative context, nationalism also refers to consensual and repetitive activity among the chosen people of the nation, that is, to act in accordance with accepted cultural norms, rules and values, where the nationalism expresses identificatory consensus among the societal members.

In the late twentieth century, the ideas of nationalism carry the essential ingredients of modernity. They underpin a particular organizational and institutional politics--the nation state--within its various representations, status and roles. In the following pages, I will attempt to explain the expressions of nationalism on structural, functional and instrumental grounds. I will argue that nationalism has to be conceptualized within particular interlaces between structures of identity and specific economic, cultural and political contexts of the modernity. In this sense, the discourse of nationalism refers to a multitude of ideas and sets of signs which are necessary for the existence of the whole social political system of late modernism. I want to emphasize here that it is impossible to *fix* nationalism as an object of portrait, in the sense that as a discourse of difference or phenomenon, it assumes innumerable, different forms. Its structures are between the conditions of possibility and impossibility, between continuity and discontinuity and between unification and destabilization. These continuously de-centralized structures of nationalism are visibly and invisibly invested in the identity of the individuals of the given societies and it either binds their representations with imitated reflection of nation as a unity of oneness, or it breaks their representation from the unity of oneness as an *other* or stranger. In the discourse of nationalism, there is no final authority or centre whatsoever that defines its limits or borders. Therefore, any attempt to conceptualize *nationalism* is merely the attempt to reconstruct the outcomes of a play of differences, transformations and instabilities (Derrida 1981b).

Through an analogy, the conceptualization of the play of differences and transformations as inherent activities of the structures can be seen in the physical and subjective representation of the church. First, the church is a relational totality which is constituted by the positioning of various physical materials and it's object seen by people; its function of cannot be deduced merely by considering the bricks separately from their relations to each other. In the general structure of church, the status of its bricks is determined only in relation to one another and in relation to the general physical totality of its building. In this sense, one starts by understanding the structure of the whole in order to explain the roles and functions of the individual parts in the general totality of building. The function of the church as well as those of its individual parts, are more than the physical relation or quality the assembled parts reveal. People also continuously invest new subjective meanings in the church to differentiate it from itself: shelter, holy place, place of power, knowledge, justice ..etc. For this reason, the church does not release a single physical relation through the materials which compose it; rather, it is a multidimensional space built on the physical relations which comprise it. It is also representative of various symbolic and theological meanings that is continuously invested within discontinuous practices of imaginary relations in the various different and juxtaposed discourses.

As in the case of church, we can find only non-originary origins. Its structure and theological functions are constantly determined by and physical relations of materials and social discourses. We *know* what a church is because of an already constituted holding of meanings and relationships. The two worlds of the church uniquely refer to reflective representations: that is, both by its physical reflections from relations of materials which compose it and subjective reflections rooted in symbolic exchange relations inscribed as a reflective medium of interactions. Thus the representations of the church are never present to itself, but are produced and constructed in the relations.

In the symbolic system, the church has no inherent meaning. The symbolic and actual existence of the church depends for its meaning on its relations which exist between its constituent elements and believers and non-believers. In these symbolic and actual relations, the meanings and reflections of the church are not stable entities but are continuously being created and differentiated by chains of referral or signification.

Through analogies, I will argue that nationalism, as a determined and diffuse relation, is produced and becomes a reflective object of social interactions in which all its manifestation are also continuously differentiated with modern doctrines of economics, politics and cultures. Therefore, nationalism has to be understood both as a consequence/signified of various relations and as the actor/signifier which determines the other discourses and relations. Nationalism as a discursive discourse is continuously subjected to the mediating influence of the state, the intelligentsia and the individual's own identity and the possibly very different notions and meanings (economic, cultural and political) which they bring to the existing structure of nationalism. Thus, nationalism does not exist in human nature, or as a fixed object and condition identical across time and space, but only for the reasons which are utilized by the various entities or groups in pursuit of their interests.

Nationalism is a potentiality, an object of exchange, an us/other constructed in relation to many other symbols and significations. The discourse of nationalism reflects the possibilities implicit with the hidden play of differences, traces of the life world in which it is produced and makes reference to history, as well as a mark for the future that may now exist as a differentiating factor in the present. In other words, the structure of nationalism is inescapably rooted in cultural, economic and political conditioning which determines the innumerable meanings of nationalism.

Moreover, the determining structures of nationalism--the way it functions and is shaped--are never free from the theoretical and practical discussions which also influence its development. And finally, what matters with the phenomenon of nationalism are the order and signification it helps to constitute or serves, rather than its elusive *essence*. For these reasons, the category *nationalism* has to be deconstructed into specific relationships and functions.

This chapter seeks to provide a general economic explanation of the phenomenon of increasing nationalism within contradictions of modernity. Therefore, at the beginning I will attempt to highlight the most important elements of modernity and to expose its main contradictions.

NATIONALISM AS A WEB OF MODERN REFERENCES

In recent days, the modern sentiment of nationalism has been rising again, gaining momentum through its range and variety. Nationalism as a sprawling discourse is now the agent favoured to invoke a sense of *emancipation* and *better world*. In theory, considerations of nationalism tend also to be incomplete, full of sweeping terms and ambiguous evaluations. But the discourse of nationalism may be analyzed as a narrative, in relation to key conflicts, closures and transitions. In other words, whatever its invisible structures, the discourse of nationalism reminds us of what needs to be understood and analyzed before it can be overcome, constituted and fabricated, namely, the present period, its structure and identities. To conceptual nationalism in relation to modernity, it is helpful to highlight the way some its discourses and formations were manifested. First, the discourses of nationalism can be articulated as the political ideal of nation formation, as an ideal community, or as national liberation in the struggle for sovereignty/self-determination against other nations. It is also articulated as a domestic process of assimilation or the creation of political community with a high degree of homogenization. Differences are subordinated to norms and a common tongue in order for societal cohesion and solidarity to be created within the national political structure. In the realm of social relations, national discourse is a real concentration of power that strives to reorganize and reconstruct the state, community and more generally the subjects of its discourses. In most cases, nationalist discourse produces its domination through the use of the state to establish fixed boundaries between populations, to reform their religious beliefs through secularism and a new sacralization of nationalism, to constitute loyalties, and to define nation and its membership within the frameworks of citizenship. In this sense, the discourse of nationalism is necessarily essentialist and foundationalist in regard to authority, repression of differences, and an institutional and discursive desire for stability. Also, nationalism is more oppressive and intolerant in nature and practice with regard to ethnic, cultural, and religious differentiations than many pre-modern types of state. Before the nineteenth century, in the Middle East, Eastern Europe or Africa, boundaries between religious and ethnic communities were far more fluid and the identities of communities which lived next to each other were more overlapping and intermingled. The absence of constructive homogenizing national and cultural politics in a particular territory allowed the development of multicultural and multiethnic relations without the expression of aggressive conflicts. The examples are the Ottoman and the Hapsburg empires mentioned by Wolfgang Mommsen, which ruled "in an authoritarian manner over many extremely variegated territories, but which, as a rule, had tolerated a great deal the ethnic, religious, cultural and national differentiation provided that the essential demands of the authorities were met" (Mommsen 1990:213-214). Likewise in cities such as Istanbul, Jerusalem, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh, various ethnic cultures and religions were able to coexist within the same social and cultural space until the beginning of the nationalization process; until there arose, with sporadic state support, the ethnocentric prejudgments which were the basis of the violently imposed *we* or national identities.

Disciplinary organizations, the construction of new social relations or rules, and exclusion, are at the heart of national discourses, and are also the products of a conflictual and contradictory synthesis of enlightenment values and identities (individualist, particularist, universalist, humanist, capitalist and eurocentric), pre-modern identities, and other ideologies and identities forged in the nineteenth century development of modernity. The nation state provides the institutional and ideological framework for citizenship rights which are accessible to exclusive groups defined in relation to historical and territorial claims, ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities, and economic interests. Thus, nationalism is inherently a discourse of exclusion as well as inclusion, of difference as well as sameness, of inequality and fragmentation as well as unity. In other words, nationalism may embody enlightenment ideals, in the form of the socio-political heritage of European liberal democratic societies (or those seeking to emulate European *modern* societies), yet it does so always in relation to particular groups whose identities are defined in other than universal of humanist terms (e.g., on the bases of ethnic, linguistic, or religious affiliations). The nationalism of modern European societies--which has been imported by numerous elites on the peripheries of advanced capitalism--is therefore an inherently contradictory discourse, one which embodies the more general crisis of modernity, one that it fails to fulfil the humanist goals of the enlightenment.

The complex and changing conditions of nationalism (which means a given normative and rational context specifying the totality social interactions and organizations) is operative within the frame of references of modernity. Throughout the nationalization process, the divisive and controlling standards of rationality have long functioned to dehumanize and subordinate individuals to a national bureaucracy or superior rationality. The bureaucratic and superior rational logic of nationalism demand continuous internal and external rational reference which bring about hidden structures of control and determination of human action and creativity. For example, in Germany, during the Nazi era, the barbaric form of nationalism in this twentieth century was not an isolated phenomenon peculiar to *Germanism*, but is embedded in the very foundations of bureaucratic rationality upon which modern political and social systems have developed. In the Second World War, bureaucracy and rationalism so amazingly seduced the individual or collective awareness and moral integrity as to make individuals incapable of acting against the forces of nationalism that calmly practised atrocities, brutalities and genocides throughout the world (Bauman 1992a:30-52 and Bauman 1989).

From this point of view, Weber's conception of rationality or the *disenchanted* *world* can also be linked to the mystical entity of nationalism in which the citizens of nations are imprisoned.[4] For Weber, the expression *disenchanted world* portrays the extreme development of rationalization within the rhetoric of bureaucracy, science, politics and economics. The development of scientific and bureaucratic rationality as a structure of order has transformed individuals' lives to the conditions of *otherwise than being* and their reference points, and has made it increasingly impossible for them to conceive the world as having an objective meaning beyond the subjective constructions (Levinas 1981). In this *disenchanted world* bureaucratic rationality is a significant force in reorganizing and redefining people's emotions, desires and belief systems.

From this point of view, nationalism is partly a process of bureaucratic rationalization, one of whose functions is to manage and alleviate the deprivations created by modernity classifying as irrational all those elements that seem to deviate from enlightenment and bourgeois notions of order, morality and identity. Thus, the nation-state becomes responsible for managing the new irrationalities of modernity. These new inequalities and deprivations may be alleviated by the emancipatory rhetoric of nationalism for the short term but they multiply in the long term.

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[4] Max Weber showed particular concern for the growth of rationality in his concept of *disenchantment of world*. According to Weber, the rationalization of world firstly refers to the development of a serious threat to creativity, freedom and individual autonomy with the relentless extension power of control such as bureaucracy, science, and politics. Secondly it represents radical transformation of the defining patterns of the meaning of life. Thirdly, it represents an establishment of the new belief system, cults and *regime of truth* through the extreme development of *zweckrationalitat* (instrumental rationality) such as science, politics and charismatic authority (Weber 1946, 1949, 1978; Swatos 1984:201-217; Kalberg 1980:1145-1179).

As a result of bureaucratic rationality, it is likely that the individuals will derive the meaning of their existence from the generally accepted conceptions of their social, national and religious groups. Therefore individuals are subject to divisions that define their belonging and differences *vis-a-vis* other groups. In periods of social upheaval, various *real self-generated* emotions, feelings and desires may be substituted with those religious and national sentiments; substitutes which fulfil individuals' emotional and intellectual needs and provide them with meaningful existence. Modern politics actively encouraged people to internalize national and religious mystical notions through national rites, myths and symbols. Under the effects of national ideologies, otherwise unmotivated individuals become important social forces capable of producing conflicts, and divisions, and even unity, by appealing to their similarities or their differences.

It is this modern referral or functional relation that produces the meanings of nationalism in ambivalent or transformative forms. That is to say, the meaning and the presence of nationalism is not given by its apparent elements, but rather by the elements that are concealed in the symbolic representations and globalization of exchange relations expanding its signifyingness to every world community.[5] Thus, nationalism as a function and as a web of references is an omnipresent chain of symbols and codes (presence of absence) and it is also absent through its representation by the symbols and codes (absence of presence).[6] Blurred existence nationalist discourse also increases the possibility of explanations or understandings to more than one category or schema, because its meaning is a representative and relational product in the system of significations which also continuously differentiates and transforms its structures and discourse.

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[5] Globalization is an intensification of economic, political and cultural relations at the global level. Globalization represents a particular linking of distinct local ways of life; it connects them with each other and shapes them by the cultures, events, ideas or ideologies far away from the particular locality. Globalization taken the form particularly of the diffusion, expansion or hegemony of Western culture and institutions across. It is important to realize that cultural and economic images of globalization actually develop with globalization of basic institutional, representative and meanings of modernity. In other words, globalization is a fundamental consequence of modernity. That is to say globalization is expansion of modernity.

NATIONALISM AND MODERNITY

The discourse of nationalism exists only in relation to the discourses of modernity. They share the same narrative structures which are established on the myth of progress and which underlie historical change or rupture. Today, this historical rupture or change is evaluated in the most controversial terms: positive development or advance *versus* retreat and decline. In the accounts of the break with past, the controversial evaluation is also voiced in response to current changes that are

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Thus we must recognize that globalization was one of the development which produced particular circumstances for expansion of Europe's nationalist ideology, institutions and values. Western hegemonic culture disseminates only the rhetoric of universality. Modernization requires the regulation and coercion of nation-states in order to organize time, space, people and nature (Giddens 1990:63; Hall 1991:41-69).

[6] Derridian deconstructive analysis considers the meaning of text, not with isolation or restrictions on the mobility of text but with larger contexts or other elements in system of difference. Deconstructive analysis extends the range of concern to larger contents of meaning. At the same time, deconstruction rely on not *presence* of meaning as a substance but *presences* consists of shadows on wall and illusory phantoms. For this reason Derrida calls: "Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent" (Derrida 1981b:26).

defined as *postmodern.*[7] To identity the contours of nationalism in the conditions of the modernity, it will be helpful to clarify the meanings and functions of *modernity.*

The terms *modern*, *modernism*, "modernization", "pre-modern", "high modern" "low modern" "late modern" and "postmodern" have become salient in contemporary thought and are frequently applied to describe some characteristics of contemporary cultures and societies. It is unclear when, where or how the term *modern* emerged and gained a common currency in discourse. Generally, the term modern comes from the Latin word *modo*, expressing "just now" and it has been conceptualized as present or contemporary in respect to differentiation, ruptures and changes that are born in the conditions of the past. According to some scholars, around 500 AD. the Latin adjective *modernus* was employed for the first time as a means differentiating the Christian present from the pagan past (Calinescu 1977:4, Habermas 1981:3). Later, such predecessor as *modernus* is found in the medieval period both as a then current designation and as a historical awareness that a new epoch was dawning. Around the eighteenth century, however, Latin begot the very word *modern* and it was used to refer to the "generic" present or recent times, as distinct from the Middle Ages and ancient times. With the emergence of the Enlightenment, the term "modernity" appears to situate the present as a unique better world and superior historical period of human development. Although the term "modern" means different things to different people it is commonly used for a wide variety of phenomena in relation to politics, culture, economics and aesthetics as well as for conceptualizing distinctive historical periods. In other words, the emergence of societal rationalization, homogenization, specialization, mass media, and rapid technological development are ruptures which characterize "modernity", "late modernity" or "postmodernity".

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[7] Towards the end of the twentieth century, it has been argued by many scholars--Jameson, Lyotard, Bauman, Featherstone,--that we are witnessing a transition in modern modes of life and organisations as revealed by new type of social and economic system based on information, knowledge and postfordist production modes. The terms *postmodernism*, late modernism and postindustralism refer various sociological and economic claims to identify transition with new centrality posited for explosion of commodification and mass consumerism in every aspect of daily life, the dehumanizing postfordist production methods with its increasing influence to specialization, mass media, new information technology, knowledge/power and production of simulacrum or subjectivity with identities. The term postmodernism is also associates recognizable critical and theoretical stand against foundations of modernity in culture, politics, aesthetic and theory. Postmodernist ideas and theories in social studies derives their critical stance essentially from the French structuralist and poststructuralist schools particulary from Lacan, Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, Baudrillard and from the German Frankfurt school such as Adorno and Horkheimer (Habermas 1981; Jameson 1984:52-95; Lyotard 1984; Bauman 1988; Featherstone 1988).

Today, the complexity and fuzziness of the modernity concept is most acutely felt in the academic world; it is difficult to describe the complexity and characteristics of differences in the present economic, cultural and political life, compared to the previous era. However, whatever label scholars employ to conceptualize the contemporary culture, economics and politics, we live in an epoch that is significantly distinct from the epochs that developed before it. To prevent conceptual fuzziness in the current discussion, the term "modern" applies to general features of contemporary culture, politics and economics.

In making a distinction between premodern and modern or between modern and postmodern, the discourse of nationalism implies a major structural change or recognizable shift in the psychological spheres of the individual and in the organizational realms of life worlds. Nationalism is, in effect, one of the most important characteristics of this differentiated era, and the ideological rhetoric of nationalism is scrutinized by bureaucrats and intellectuals around the globe. In other words, nationalism emerges in the movement of rational invention, as a movement of affirmation with important political consequences, exposing social repressiveness, and seeking to serve as a vehicle for projects of modernity. Consequently, since the nineteenth century, nationalism (and its companions, nation-state, nation, national, nationality) constitutes the prime principle of modern organizational politics. In determining practices of modernization, a peculiar myth of nationalism became a relational concept which registered as an identity maker in the spheres of the unconscious and the conscious. Nationalism is not only a substantive organization of life but also a discourse of consciousness and unconsciousness, and it determines positions between object of seeing and object of the understanding, looking and acting. Thus, the canonical correspondence of nationalism in the discourse of the unconscious and the conscious shapes borders and limits for the individual (as object of the seen and object of the looking) through the disclosure of meanings, values, and norms. Nationalism, through disclosure of its meaning systems on the structures of the self simultaneously implies putative solidarities and repressive social hierarchies. Naturally, the great controversies and severe conflicts of our time are manifested among the various nations or individuals imposing differently defined national meaning systems. In these systems, actors understand and see the "other" in particular ways. In other words, nationalism is discursive phenomenon which is also discursive to structures of one's identity through the registration of its signifier. Thus, it is a threat to the stability of peace through its construction of the one's knowledge of the "other".

Nationalism can thus be seen as a unique form of both individual and collective identity which is ambivalently manifested in modern situations, actions and confrontations. Three phenomena--modernity, nationalism, and individual and collective identities-developed under the structuring influence of the ideologies of the Enlightenment, and all three phenomena have, in many ways, been interrelated and intermixed in the course of history. The unity of all these historical social configurations can also be understood in juxtaposition with specific cultural, economic, and political paradigms: for example the French revolution, World Wars I and II, and the policies of imperialism of Germany, France, Britain. From the point of view of these modern configurations, and in order to explore the functions and the structures of nationalism through modernization, some clarifications and redefinitions of some strongly established concepts of modernity are necessary.

Modernization produced many abstract conceptualizations; the notions of liberal state, citizen, law, equality, and freedom are some main examples. And, as the growth of abstract rationality increased it divided the totality of the individual. New forms of crises for individuals were created by divisions among private and public life, formal (rational) and informal (emotional) life, between real self and the projected image of the self to the world. A direct and indirect determinant of these changes was the growth of bureaucratic ruling models that aimed to control the very nature of people by establishing guiding principles of conduct and providing homogenising images to individuals.

It should be noted that the development of modernity and rationality since the eighteenth century has been responsible for improvements in many spheres of life. Increases in life expectancy and productivity in farming, advances in medicine, improvement in the organization of non-violent politics, i.e., unions, associations, and pressure groups, should not be undervalued. However, these improvements have been accompanied by intense inconsistencies, contradictions and dilemmas.

Of particular importance to the discussion of the contradictions of modernity is J. Baudrillard's conception of a regime of "simulation" which represents a state in which our understanding of reality stays within the symbolic and imaginary worlds.[8] The regime of simulation is indeed our invention of the world (reality). Our invention of world (reality) also invents us, for the simulation is always symbolic and imaginary of the world in which our identities are always to be invented.

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[8] According Baudrillard, symbols and codes--as a part of the culture of signification or of exchange relations assign subjects to positions in a hierarchical social order and lock them into discourses of simulation or the regime of symbolic representations which also allows imaginary relation between the real and representations. Later, Baudrillard describes "hyperreality" as a world of self-referential of symbols through the disintegration of the imaginary representation between the real and symbol. In the world of self-referential symbols, the "hyperreality". Hyperreality as a symbol referred to symbol is a production of a new reality more real than any shreds of a memory of the real itself. For him, Disneyland in America is the illustrative case of hyperreal world. The Disneyland represents imaginary simulation which imitate neither real version America nor representative version of the America, but it operates as a imaginary to enforce illusion that the America beyond the Disneyland is real (Baudrillard 1983:1-4 and 23-26).

Throughout modern society, a regime of simulation continuously renews itself within discursive significations of language and it is characterized by formalized rules of conduct, values and life styles in a particular society. The regime of simulation is the multiple signifier within language and it determines our selves as signified, producing unique or common individual behaviours, and changes the patterns of interpretation and understanding. Generally, individuals are not able to escape from this world of dominant significations within modern communicative practices. From this point of view, the ideologies of nationalism emerged from within the regime of simulation as an important collective and individual representations, exposing symbolic constitutions to identities. Within the regime of simulation, the logic of national identity is imitated determination through knowing who I am, who we are, and who the "other" is, and is continuously transformed in the spheres of economics, politics, and culture.

In the realms of culture, economics and politics, nation-states attempt to create and reproduce national identity and sovereignty within fictitious structures of simulation. However, there are competing claims to the definition and construction of such identities, sentiments, and ideas, which are constantly in a process of transformation. There are varying degrees of consensus; Norbert Elias provides an interesting example for the meaning of national identity: "The questions 'What is really French?' 'What is really English?' have long since ceased to be a matter of discussion for the French and English. But for centuries the question 'What is really German?' had not been laid to rest" (Elias 1978:6). The ongoing Canadian constitutional crisis is also another example of the institutional and discursive difficulties of constructing a relatively homogeneous national identity. The content is often contested, particularly by minorities which may be excluded or disadvantaged by the dominant view of nationalism; what is meant to be a "unifying" discourse may instead unleash a plethora of claims based on difference.

NATIONALISM AS CODE AND CANONS OF THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY

Nationalism is an integral part of nineteenth and twentieth century capitalist economic relations with the construction of the objective and global conditions of capitalism. Within the highly developed exchange relations, capitalism or modern economic trend played the most important role for replacement of the ethnic and communal with national and societal. Nationalism produced in the capitalist economy engaged the structures of state, culture and language, a symbolic process that formed certain mechanisms of national representations and meaning.

In the capitalist economy, the increasing changeability of signification with commodities promotes a certain homogenization and shared cultural identity and establishes a specificity of given particular culture in time and space. In exchange relations, the commodities functioned as a determining mechanism for the national conventions and codes for a peculiar national identity. With the intensification of capitalist competitions and rivalries throughout the world, the idea of protection the economic value of "national" commodities from the products produced in "other" parts of the world, is expressed as the protection of national cultural emblems which operate as indexes of national identity. In the economic sphere, the idea of nationalism is closely associated with the idea of protectionism which is either an assurance to maintain the highest possible standards of living through the protection of the kind of production in which a nation has advantage, or the protection of national identity from the symbolic signification of the various products which float to the national territory from "other" parts of the world. With the influence of the national economic motives, the idea of nationalism also runs closely to the concepts of enforcement and power. The regime of nationalism that sustains claims to the interests of the citizens of the nation against the inroads of other national groups deploys military means, national tariffs, import quotas, subsidized national industries, discouragement of the flight of capital, and so on.

Today, almost every country uses national tariffs and quotas as the means to encourage the kind of production which maximizes the self-interest of the national bourgeoisie as well as the citizens of the nation state. Within the capitalist economy, the bourgeoisie acquires hegemony because its interests coincide perfectly with the realization of the nation-state, and because in saturating the nation with the rhetoric of national solidarity and its mythologies, it sublimates its interests in the deepest forms of national seduction. In simpler terms, the interests of bourgeoisie are often identified with the national interest. The proliferation of national economic doctrines across the nation runs parallel to the desire to control both production and major benefits of wealth. Doctrines of capitalist economics convince the people that their welfare and security is linked closely to "national objectives", (i.e., national wealth and resources, national industry, national productive capacity, and favourable balance of trade). Nationalism favours as extremely important the control of national and international markets in order to prevent destruction of the mechanisms of national representations, and meaning, and the privileged positions of the citizens of the nation in contrast to the others; and it is also necessary that the dominant social class have the politically controlled or united, and culturally homogenized territory which ensures them the continuation of the benefits of the globalization of capital. In fact, in every society, the dominant class forms a backbone for nationalism as a rule of economic and political illusion.

The intensity of nationalism depends mainly on capitalism and its economic doctrines. In the economic sphere, capitalism develops as a regime of simulation which reconstructs the relations of production and market at the global level. The industrialization of much of the world within rational development models, the creation of global markets, the continued expansion of commodity relations, the exploitation of nature and labour, and constant technological growth are the main elements of these development doctrines. Capitalism is therefore intertwined with modernization ideals or goals, as well as claims about material and moral progress in the world. Industrial capitalism, as it was combined with the broader processes of modernization, created new state orders, new societies, and new social beings.

In order to grasp the signifying function of the discourses of modernity and nationalism it is necessary to understand the construction of the modern nature of the self on the basis of the alienated inauthenticity of "exchange value". In Marx's analysis of the capitalist economy, alienation is explained in relation to the splitting of labour power (capacity) from the individual (labourer), which under capitalist relations of production, means the separation from self-creative activity. According to Marx, alienation results from the development of various relations between people and their product (commodities) or in the acts of market exchange which disintegrate the authentic nature of people and of use values.[9]

Under market relations, exchange value as a single form of equivalence,

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[9] In modernity, the issue of identity or selfhood is partially identified with consumerism, which is perceived as a desire for obtaining and using commodities. In the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx, writing about commodity fetishism, underlined two features of a commodity: use value and exchange value. Later these concepts were extensively used by Ferdinand Saussure in his conception of system the of linguistic exchange, by Jean Baudrillard in the idea of symbolic exchange, by Terry Eagleton regarding the ideology of aesthetic and by Luce Irigaray in the theory of feminism (Saussure 1966; Eagleton 1990; Irigaray 1985). According to Baudrillard's discussion of exchange value, the total domination of exchange value in modern societies corresponds with a system of signs and symbolic order. A commodity, in the sphere of production and exchange value, sustains non-economic value (symbolic value) which forms the new activity of the commodity through the fabrication of new subjects within the regime simulation. In other words, symbolic value appears here with the exchange and use value as a signifier which shapes identities in terms of market relations and advertising. In the mass media, through advertising, or within market relations, commodities (e.g., cars, stereos, washers, houses) are invested with various meanings and associations that help to interpret life in mechanistic regulative processes and beyond the essence. Another paradox also appears here in the sphere of use and possession of commodity goods which reconstruct very the nature of human being through signification of identity in the symbolic exchange process. Baudrillard argues that modern identities are a grotesque *simulacrum* which are produced out of exchange and symbolic value. In this sense, the processes of identification of modern men and women are diminished from being-in-itself or being-through-itself (their relationships) to identification with the quantity and quality of their commodities or consumption. Therefore, the commodification process of modernity sustains the fabrication of identities, and the reconstruction of the self and of relations with others through exchange value, namely the money nexus (Baudrillard 1975, 1981).

(capable of measuring the relative value of everything else in monetary terms), first disintegrates selves (being no longer for itself), then dissolves them within social existence and organization. Throughout the modernization process, social orders and institutions which are founded upon the logic of exchange value, dictate the exclusive and general valorization of individuals through exchange relations. Through exchange of signifier in market relations, the individual is born into alienating forms of competition, transformation, transaction, transition and mediation. Another way of saying this is that modern individuals or their identities are being used and circulated like commodities. In Baudrillard's terms, the modern individual (identity) is a grotesque simulacrum, produced out of signification in the exchange relations and thus its alienation is sustained and produced in the sphere of integration with the symbolic signifier; or identity mirrors the values of products. The development of homogenized exchange, symbolic and economic relations, and new individual identities or intersubjectivities, is locked in to an infertile economy of sameness or likenesses, and individuals are denied their authentic and creative capacities because of subjective regulation. These identities separate one individual from another, but at the same time liberal ideology attempts to create societal solidarity through conceptions of citizenship based on the formal equality of rights. The ideology of nationalism reserves such abstract rights for particular groups; entitlement is linked to belonging.

Thus, people's lives and their social relations are reproduced within the major transformations of capitalism and modernity. On one hand, these historical processes create political and cultural behaviours characterised by individualism, egocentrism and profit mentality, and feelings and notions of togetherness disappear at the community level to reappear artificially and abstractly at the national or family level. Thus, nation-states and capitalism created distinct political beings or "abstract" and "artificial" individuals through the connections of commodity relationships and national citizenship rights (Sayer 1987:83).

In the light of nationalist ideologies, the transition from community (*Gemeinschaft*) to nation or society (*Gessellschaft*) raised the aspirations of all social classes for the creation of an ideal community through notions of popular sovereignty and self-government. Revolutionary, anti-colonialist movements have also conceived the new ideal community (nationhood) as a utopian vision of nationalism, a new egalitarian order based not on exclusive interest but on universal principles (general will, societal solidarity, and abstract bureaucratic ideology). In this utopian framework of egalitarian order, a people might free itself from capitalist exploitation or despotism to become a self-governing community, a member of an international community built on the equality of nations. In other words, nationalism is articulated as an instrument of social emancipation, freedom, or solidarity. The new nation-state with its bureaucratic apparatus is legitimized as the authority which will guarantee the creation of and survival of an ideal community (guarantees equality, liberty and popular sovereignty).

Such aspirations are rarely realized in the current practices of states or in the regimes of nationalism. However, the emancipatory discourse of nationalism has legitimized the struggles of workers' movements for an egalitarian democratic order. The creation of nation and nation-state with a vanguard role for the working class is no longer equivalent to equality, freedom, and popular sovereignty, but has legitimated domination, inequalities, utilization of the power for control, capitalist enterprise and militarization. Because of nationalism, the struggle against exploitation, domination, and inequalities, has been confiscated by nascent elites.

Marxism also misinterpreted or misunderstood nascent ideologies of nationalism because of the then emphasis on abstract equality, societal solidarity, and universal measures of class struggle applicable to all proletariat groups in the nation. Thus, the subjugated status of minority groups in the general categorizations of the proletariat and the idea of equality were either dismissed or downplayed. Thus, the practices of nationalism intermixed with doctrines of marxism. Today's minority groups are not only victims of capitalist exploitation but also victims of the subordination, exclusion and discrimination in the one category of the nation. The regimes of nationalism with their emphasis on the formal and abstract equality of citizens (above class, ethnic, religious and gender differences) in national constitutional law continuously produce a smokescreen for existing inequalities. Therefore, the struggle for authentic being or freedom starts with the elimination of illusions such as national equality and solidarity.

Another important element which can be elaborated in the economic discourse of nationalism is the existence of common or subjective traits between people. For among other things, the level of national prosperity is one of the important factors for the maintenance of modern, national, universal, liberal, collective identities and for the continuation of the national illusionary world. When economic and political institutions fail, individuals often attempt to relieve deprivations and insecurity by resurrecting older particularist collective identities. But the revival of an old identity may be linked to various political discourses. New forms or syntheses incorporate pre-modern identities which may be religious or ethnic. Other individuals seek to escape from the crisis by emigrating.

The effectiveness of nationalism in a particular territory also depends on shared traits, which can also be regarded as a national source of wealth. In facing others, a nation's "national wealth" forms a kind of status group of distinctiveness which produces internal coherence and superiority *vis-a-vis* outsiders. The superiority or pride in being "American" or "German" e.g., is associated in part with a belief in economic achievement and superiority.

The global operations of capitalism as a continuous drive towards the accumulation of capital with unequal distribution of investment or wealth creates institutionalized as well as non-formalized polarizations and stratifications from the hegemonic to the most subordinated and impoverished nations. These differences are conceptualized in such terms as high or low modern, developed, developing and less developed. As Zygmunt Bauman points out, the uneven development of capitalism globally not only ranks nations, ethnicities and social classes along a continuum of superiority and inferiority but also constitutes the domination of a system of ideas and images which construct and transform others' identities.

> 'Superiority' of one rank over another (and of corresponding ways of life) was hence a category of comparison, and not a concept standing for a specific task the 'superior' rank bore in relation to other ways of life. Such a task, on the other hand, is the essence of the thoroughly modern idea of 'hegemony': the role of the 'superior' way of life and its carriers as the moral mentor, missionary and pattern to be followed by all the others (Bauman 1992a:7).

The political framework of institutionalized stratification has taken the form of an interstate system in which nations are defined by cultural, historical and territorial distinctiveness, and by constraints on membership. One principal consequence of this reality is that some nation-states and their members exercise enormous privileges at the international level. The utilization of privileged positions creates more opportunities and alternatives for particular nation states and their members to determine their life processes and those of others. Parallel to the development of an unequal distribution of power among nation-states is an increasing tendency to restrict, limit and exclude the members of subaltern societies from tasting the "freedom of choice" extended to the citizens of "superior nation-states". These tendencies are readily observable in a variety of contexts such as visa requirements for members of subaltern countries, and here again nationalism as a means of imposing restrictions is primary producer of the international division of labour.

In capitalist economic relations, the ideologies of nationalism closely relate structures of various economic regimes based on exploitation of a subordinated labour force within the general unity of nation. They enforce political regimes by constituting cultural and economic differences and by maintaining unequal international divisions of labour, capital accumulation, and access to natural resources. All of this ensures not only the privileges of one group, class or nation over others (less developed countries) but makes the subordination and exploitation of other nationalities the very basis of capitalist wealth and accumulation. That is to say, while nationalism may be presented as a discourse of cultural distinctiveness it is functions to legitimize the Western economic global development of capitalism through the continuous insurance of cheap labour and subordinated victims.

Ironically, the other side of nationalism also carries conflictual and contradictory framework for the global expansion of capitalism, for example, there is always the major contradiction arising from the superimposing of a modern, nation-state political system upon an inherently unequal system of global capitalist accumulation. National identity becomes a frame for resisting a global system of capitalist competition which ensures that a small part of world has wealthy living standards, while the vast majority of people suffer either the threat of general starvation, or the failures of modernist development. Clearly, nations are not only distinct, but unequal; national economic system are hierarchical in many respects, the high modern\low modern, developed\less developed divide is conceptualised by modernist ideology as a developmental logo (civilized *versus* primitive; modern *versus* traditional). This nationally constituted hierarchical system of global capitalism is a key to the development of the crisis of modernity and ethnic conflicts in the various part of the world, and at this point, nationalism essentially becomes an ideological expression of social struggle against hierarchical practices of global capitalism advanced or revived in the policies of nation-states.

NARCISSISM AS THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLE OF SUBJECTIVITY

Every modern and national identification is subjective. Subjectivity is the new name for the symbolic reality which has always existed in various forms, and subjectivity also represents symbolic reality through systems of differences such as nationalism. Subjectivity compels individuals to occupy subject positions signified by discourses such as nationalism (by controlling their desires and framing them in controlled identifications), for this reason, the issue of subjectivity is deeply bound up with the politics of domination and issues of power. Today, there is a continuous politics of subjectivity, one which between the West and the subaltern societies has taken the form of particular subordinated identities. With the development of modernity, social control of the other's identity--including national identity--has become the crucial means of domination.

In the subaltern societies, the general perceptions of modernism as a magnificence constitutes a dependency on the "other", from which, a so-called "state of narcissism" arises in subaltern societies as an imaginary identification with the reflections of the Western modern societies.[10] The western relation to subaltern identities is both a historical, colonial matter and, an internalized reflexive identity structure. Here the base-line for subaltern subjectivity is the state of narcissism which represents a double reference to both subaltern and modern identity in the Western reflections which first refers to the other or modern (reflected modern image) and the second desire for the other (integration with their reflected subaltern image from the Western modern societies). The members of subaltern societies imagine themselves to be the other (modern) in the sense that all represent the other's mimetic reflection. The transference of mimetic reflection is operative through internalization of the desire for the West (modern) (the subaltern societies' own desire to be modern as well as national in the presence of Western mirror).

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[10] In Freud's analysis of narcissism, the subject is essentially constituted in two stages. Firstly, Freud used "primary narcissism" to explore the dependence of the infant on the mother (concept and identification with internalized representations of parental authority). In this state, the world outside of the infant exists but the infant can only experience reality, and his or her needs, primarily in relation to the mother. Basically in this stage, the experience of subject is belong to the other since makes the child no separation between him or herself and the mother. Likewise, the culture of narcissism represents a particular disposition to see and understand the world in the mirror of the other instead of in one's autonomous, imaginary experience. According

Subaltern experiences of colonization and globalization have prompted the illusionary desire of subaltern societies to see themselves through their reflected image in the mirrors of the "other" (West). Hence subaltern identities too are drawn into the fantasy of enlightenment, nationalism, and modernization through imitation or

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to Freud, in the second stage, if separation or distinction is not introduced between self and the mother, narcissism will continue to exist in the later phases of life (if the self fails to develop its capacity to conceptualize and the form the world for the maintenance of its own needs). The subject continues to see its reflection through mother. In this sense, secondary narcissism is a particular kind of socialization where individuation fails to express itself. If the split happens between the subject and the other (infant and mother), the identity of subject develops as difference to the mother united in the first stage. Freud analysis of narcissism has provided conceptual ground upon which many subsequent understandings of subjectivity are based. To conclude, today, within the conditions of modernity or postmodernity, subaltern identities stay in the initial stages of narcissism or imaginary control in which they fail to develop their autonomous identity in discourse and they see themselves through an image which is continuously reflected from the mirrors of "the Other" (Freud 1953: 423-463; Lacan, 1977a:1-25; Fromm 1991:30-36; Lasch 1984; Friedman 1992:331-366).

through their illusionary reflected images from the West. Put another way, nationalism in subaltern societies is constituted throughout in the mirror image which is reflected by other (Western societies) and they are determined to display or constitute their societal identities subject to that seen in the mirror of other. In this sense, the modernity and nationalism which is an illusion, can never become the own discourse of the subaltern. Through the looking-glass of the other, seeing itself and other (modern), the subaltern always remains alienated in the other; without destroying the mirror images, autonomy for them is impossible. In the state of narcissism through transference of nationalism and modernization, more subaltern communities are disintegrated and separated from their partially autonomous development processes. Today, neither invasion nor visible repression occurs, as the narcissistic rage of modernity explicitly defines the Western political and cultural rule of the globe, materially and institutionally in a new colonial expansion. In the modernist spirit of narcissism through denial of separation from mirror images or globalization, nationalism becomes an agent to confirm one's modern perfection and grandiosity.

At both the personal and societal levels, modernity as a distinct organization of life implicitly and explicitly sets out the global as well as the local relations between various forms of life in a narcissistic way. In the state of narcissism, modern development as a globalization with the capitalist regime of simulation undermines one's capacity to conceptualize the life-world, or to define one's needs and identity formation. In particular, members of subaltern countries live in a world that eurocentrically continues to define their understanding and partially controls their identity formation. Although, they can speak of their distinctiveness or autonomy, they do so only in terms of nationalism that are permitted by global capitalist order. It is in the case of orientalism, that once again, the globalization of capitalist production and its simulation regime construct globally a mirror or the "other" transformed and internalized into national identity formation.

This establishment of a new mirror stage for the self identification process leads to new definitions and understandings of the exercises of racism at various levels, and of national conflicts and tense relations between the member states of privileged and subaltern groups. By granting privileged rights to the citizens of similar states, (presenting them as sufficiently superior and civilized), the excluded are identified as inferior. The same rights are denied to "others" who either are not allowed in to the system or who choose to define themselves by criteria of development, civilization or achievement. Thus, inequality and superiority at the global scale are institutionalized and perpetuated through the maintenance and enforcement of a nation state system. The apartheid ideology of modernism--of "development" and "progress"--embodies in its political form (nation-building) the same paradoxical impossibility as its economic forms (capitalism). Despite, the modernist social ideal of universal coherence and solidarity, the world stands divided by international capitalist development and the agonizing framework of nation-states.

Thus, there is a logical, spiritual necessity as well as a practical urgency to deconstruct these conditions of world society; this is essential if one is to maintain one's freedom with less poverty, less misery and free from national and individual hatred, if one is to live as an integrated being, united with others.

SUMMARY

In the preceding chapter, I have focused on some of the methodological, theoretical, and political concerns associated with conceptualizing nationalism. I have argued that modern nationalism is not the continuation of an ancient phenomenon but a polymorphous effect of specifically modern processes. Particularly, nationalist identity has been a vehicle for the interests of various modernizing elites whose national orders dragged humanity into the obscene mockery of national wars, xenophobia, and identity crisis. In other words, nationalist discourses can be explained as products of modern systems of meanings (economic, cultural and political) in which subjects and agencies are fundamentally transformed including individuals whose identities are formed within these signifying dialogues through social interactionary process. The "non-originary" origins of nationalism make it an intertextual construct--a product of various economic, cultural and political discourses on which it relies for its meaning.

There are strong moral and theoretical reasons for rejecting the centralization of the meanings of nationalism or limiting the boundaries of study or understanding of nationalism. The idea of nationalism is a portentous reflection, developed out of the analysis of capitalist production relations, which connotes mobility to de-stability and constitutes new relations inimical to the existence of man or woman. Nationalism does not have only one meaning or form, it is a relational concept, a multiple product of systems of signification (which operate in the exchange relations).

In capitalist economic relations, there is a function and activity, that function is indispensable to the system of exchange value which constitutes or transforms the social order and the very nature of people. In other words, nationalism represents a systemic reduction of the importance of human existence for the interest of some larger system, nation, capitalism or state order. Yet a human, in economic relations appears as an agent, practising exchange and power relations whose significatory development are a necessary conditions for any development of nationalism. It should also be noted that nationalism as a continuous fixed referentiality is the real social foundation of capitalist economic relations. It secures national consent, ensures enthusiastic national support of the interest of the bourgeoisie and creates an internationally differentiated labour market. Nationalism is an inherently manipulative and constructive discourse, serving the needs of capitalist order for control of the social realm.

Nationalism also successfully moulds identities and relations by producing special symbolic significations. The symbolic significations of nationalism are concealed by the economic exchange relations in which such "national" and "non-national" are eliminated through ambiguities and reciprocal and diffused exchange relations. Thus, because of continuous exchange relations on marks and meanings of nationalism, there is a continuous difficulty on the analyze of nationalism in various categories such as Western, Eastern, economic, racist and cultural nationalism.

At the intertextual level, sharing the utopias and the eurocentrism of the Enlightenment period, discourses of modernity produced a non-critical and foundationalist knowledge of nationalism also linked to the modernist project of historical and universal progress. The conditions of modernity are manifested by a more material and social level, by technological change, and by demographic transformation and capitalist accumulation. Modernity not only transformed Western Europe, but also changed the way of life across the globe. However, the local "syntheses" of this globalization differ fundamentally from modern philosophies' universalism. They range from increasing homogenization, to national movements of particularism, diffusion of the Western ideologies and various reactionary movements.

Throughout the linked modernization process, ideologies of nationalism incorporated promises of prosperity, emancipation, popular sovereignty, equality and solidarity. Thus nationalism became the new vehicle for the legitimization of not only those in the privileged or dominant positions of certain institutions, religions or ethnic groups, but also of inequalities, oppression, exclusion, subordination and colonization. In the discourse of nationalism, nation as an "imagined community" is placed upon the highest stand and its functions reside in the legitimating agency of its meaning system and justifications. However, in the late twentieth century, the nation remains an essentially illusionary notion, from Germany to the U.S.A. or from Somalia to the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The emancipatory promises of modernity/nation-states are belied by the haunting images conveyed by electronic and printing media: starvation, genocides, ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, racists attacks on foreigners, poverty and homelessness and so on. Within all these movements, nationalism operates as a force for disruption in the name of particularist identities. Thus from World War I to today's catastrophic conflicts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the process of nationalism continuously enforces the rational and irrational foundations for racism, exclusion, oppression and the human destruction of humanity.

CHAPTER TWO

MODERNITY AND NATIONALISM

INTRODUCTION

Through expansion of modernity, nationalism is diffused and attributed to the basic structures of global culture. Global culture refers to the entire social environment of people; it is a structure for the conduct or the control of a people and of nature. Global culture as a regime of conduct is the determining factor in the rise of nationalism. In this chapter I will argue that nationalism is a vehicle for the homogenization of global cultures which, however appear as images uncannily juxtaposed spatially and temporality (i.e., in the experience metropolitan cities, travel opportunities, and modern information technologies).

Yet in the world of jumbled and juxtaposed cultures, nationalism also stresses particularism and a hierarchical western view of civilization. For this reason, nationalism may easily become integral tendencies of assimilation, aggression, exaggerated egoism, or racism. Nationalist tendencies within the discourse of modernization may become destructive of particular traditions, languages, cosmologies and values, and may reinvent them in oppositionary tendencies. In closing, the relational meanings of nationalism in culture are at once coercive, destructive and inventive.

In this chapter, I will also link my examination of nationalism to the tense relations of dualist constructions (the way in which nationalist logic subordinates nature, community, tradition, presence, relativism and foreigner in the transformation of previously existing life styles, values and identities). The clearest way to illustrate this tense system of binary opposition which is developed within the national discourse is to the consider citizen/foreigner or particular/universal tensions that nationalism reproduces. The discourse of nationalism is, at one level, the discourse of exclusion, prohibition, rejection or subordination and moves from religious conception of universality to nationalist conceptions of particularism. Through identity politics, how one reflects representations of these dualist formations reveals much about how one's identity is constructed by the discourse of nationalism. In comparing dualist values of nationalism through citizen/foreigner, particularism/universalism we find privileged and subordinated constructions that are represented in the treatment of the qualities of each dualist pair. The discourse of the foreigner or a member of a marginalized minority group can not have the same political currency as the discourse of citizens. Their existence may be considered with suspicion and inadmissibility, whereas the citizen or a member of the dominant ethnic, religious and racial group can be seen as having full societal rights in the political regimes of nationalism.

Although this duality of evaluation is evidenced in the ambiguity of the modernity, I want to emphasize nationalism as the way in which the high value placed upon innovation, change, and newness in the modern era has created new contradictions. I will argue that modernity and nationalism contain both progressive-emancipatory and regressive-oppressive potentials for individual development.

Throughout this chapter, my main point is to emphasize the meaning of nationalism as a discourse of justification for subtle forms of violence inherent in the fixed foundation of our knowledge, as well as for bureaucratized and rationalized state structures. The discourse of nationalism as justification, is a matter of deduction from modernist premises of foundation as well as from the discourse's legitimation of violent hierarchies and a segregatory attitude toward others who are always labelled strangers or aliens. Nationalism pervades politics in the seeking to fix or as a rationalizer of citizens social interactions and conduct. In effect, in the politics of rationalized society, nationalism is often represent to a power to establish as an abstract image of ourselves and others within legislated categories of subjectivity.

The tragedy of the individual is in the symbolic construction of citizenship. When the individual calls him/herself a citizen of a particular nation, he or she separates him/herself from the play of nature animality, primitivism, differences, and madness. Here, what is decisive is the symbolic destruction of the dimensions of human existence by citizenship, abstraction and formalism.

Modern intellectuals with subordinated positions dream up enthusiastic nationalism as the path to democracy, equality and popular sovereignty, but still, full democracy through the will of the people remains the ultimate goal of the historical process. New subjects are raising new questions about the relationships among the concepts of nation, democracy, equality, peace and freedom.

THE DUALITIES OF NATIONALISM IN THE DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY

Modernity, besides being characterised by capitalist economic development and market relations, is also typically a cultural system. Modern cultural systems develop through a play of differences which refers to visible and invisible independent variables--free from control--as well as to the dependence of reason on the controlling structures of rationalism throughout societal relations. Modernity as a complex and continuously transforming cultural system (in its dependent and independent variables) also represents the development of common core codes or repetitive reflections which give rise to collective societal shift or transformation in terms of social and political identities and social relations, especially in the form of specialized occupational status, class relations, gender divisions, racial relations and national relations.

The construction of the modern world by societal and cultural differentiation is in essence the creation of a new world of meanings, of imaginary significations which may organize the natural world and the social world within a hierarchical binary opposition. Modernism, in other words, reproduces dualist tensions in its discourses, urban/rural, society/community, reason/spirit, rational/irrational and culture/nature. In conditions of modernity, the stories of nationalism not only represent transformations and differentiations in the practice of life through the movement from the structures of community (*Gemeinschaft*) to the structures of society (*Gesselschaft*) but also give rise to dualist representations. In comparing the values of the community and society, we can find an ambivalence that is reflected by various critical qualities in each of the two societal structures. The society which is later called a nation can be seen as place of a cosmopolitan, formal, distant, competitive, hostile, contractual and alienating relationships. At the same time, society can be seen as an emerging nation which is disrupting previous categories and relations; it weakens and destroys the bonds and habits of communal life (which is defined as having offered traditional, warm, intimate, spontaneous, primary, shared and close relations among its members) (Tonnies 1963:246-259). Society enforces national homogenized culture, forms of symbolic expression and actions that are manifested in this national, atomized and secular world. The emergence of nation can offer only mobile, flimsy, unreliable and ever-shifting social relations through the breaking of the old primary group ties of community.

Modern dualities of life are evidenced in the ambiguities of nation construction in which the ambiguities represent a world which is fully ordered either externally or through its inherent development; "reason" is the sovereign operant of social life. The latter signifies a disordered world associated with spontaneity and spirit. This key characteristic of the modern nation--its formation by imaginary significations in opposition to the natural world--emerges from rationalist, positivist and capitalist discourses that express the desire for "progress" and truth. Progress, and the accumulation of "wealth", and the scientific desire for power and control, are limitless, thanks to the rational application of knowledge and science. In the modern era, the relationship between human beings and nature is transformed, simultaneously affecting social structures and the position of the society. In other words, nationalization as a part of modern development is inscribed with increasing *anomie* or symbolic differentiation of the life worlds, that is, the division between the three dimensions of objective, social and subjective worlds. Translated into subject/object and symbolic/real categories, nationalism signifies the growing isolation of the subject from the object world in terms of the relentless subordination of nature by modern subjects and also the isolation of instinctual and emotional drives from the individual identity or of association networks from social solidarity. In the domains of social separation from nature, nationalization yields an increasing formalism and abstractness of social bonds and identity structures, a formalism sustained entirely by the material contents of capitalism. Yet, (the insertion of) material contents also includes not only the forms of alienation and subjective human difference but also contains more anxious, less meaningful human existence through the loss of organic coherence at personal, social and natural levels. At this point the modern atomized individual who is cut loose from the communal connections, becomes a chronic, nostalgia seeker of communal relations and experiences, longing for coherence and reliable systems of meanings, and one is easily manipulated by the ideologies of nationalism, swayed by national propaganda of contradictory, fluctuating and false images, seduced by slick promises of nationalism e.g., emancipation, salvation, freedom and solidarity.

The overall effect of modernity also represents a transition from a predominantly reciprocal relation of people living in nature to a more totalitarian mode of control over natural events and the conditions of everyday existence. Consequently, modernization is equivalent to the rational application of science to dominate nature and social groups identified with "nature" i.e., the colonized aboriginal people. What we call sciences are primarily the fixing of our reference points in the name of "development". In other words, science is the ideology of modernity as well as nationalism; it functions to constitute the essential foundation of disciplinary practices, power and the identity of modern subject.[1] In other words, science, which is integral with the politics of truth, knowledge/power allows the complete, disciplinary, homogenizing penetration of modernity as well as nationalism into all corners of societal culture. Today across the globe, modernity which is expanded as scientific products and scientific life styles (health oriented), penetrates the most distant parts of the world and alters the structures of the perceptions on the individual identities. It is a eliminative force through the banishment of cultural differences and traditional institutional forms and it is also a constructive force through replacement of cultural differences with a homogenizing and hierarchical order of scientific rules, ideas and organizational forms. The crisis or contradictions of development we face today, is also the crisis of these scientific assumptions and of their associated rational construction of the state, the societal structure, and the constitution of the subject through ideologies of nationalism (which incorporate, and are incorporated by, modernity). For example, in the 1940s, Germany provided a form of legitimation for Nazism. As is well known, the Nazis made widespread and systematic use of science and new technologies to support and justify German nationalism. National politics today, uses different scientific justifications than those of Nazism.

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[1] For Foucault, scientific discourse which operates through power/knowledge relationship, play outs totalizing disciplinary regimes, discursive and repressive practices in society. In opposite to scientific discourse, he offers genealogy as a anti-scientific way or a attempt for restraining the use of science for domination and power:

> [I]n contrast to the various projects which aim to inscribe knowledge in the hierarchical order of power associated with science, a genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledge from that subjection, to render them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse. It is based on reactivation of local knowledge, ... in opposition to the scientific hierarchisation of knowledge and the effects intrinsic to their power (Foucault 1980a:85).

Nationalism requires science for total constitutions of individual and collective identities, and for the mobilization of the masses for nationally determined purposes. Scientific practices or scientific institutions are essential to the regimes of truth and to the practices of power in modernity. Truth, power, science and modernity have become so interwoven that any attempt to question any one of the notions seems irrational, unacceptable. Thus the highest purpose of science may easily become an activity of justification of "truth claims" about the world. Furthermore, the science which produces the regularized pattern of representational images manifests dominant functions of rationality and reason.[2] The regularized pattern of representations provides a resource for the regimes of nationalism which seek to individual identities and to control the masses. In other words, the national representations imbedded in individual and collective identities are a reflection of established knowledge and truth claims which are generally comprised by scientific practices. Modernism's conception of development as scientific and cultural progress places high value on the *control of nature*.[3] Nature is a basis of capitalist accumulation which seeks to maximize production (in contrast to traditional ways of conceiving development as cyclical and naturalistic). The central theme of modern development is the continual drive for newness, change and progress against which traditional ways of life like nature are viewed as obstacles. According to Philip Cooke, "To be new, to think new, to admire newness, was the fate of the modernist mind" (Cooke 1991:15). One may add to this that the price of this destiny is the destruction of all non-modern life systems, including untouched nature. This can be seen throughout North and South America, where the culture and life and the indigenous populations have been destroyed in the name of "progress", "civilization" and "nation-building". Many traditions and life systems of indigenous people are coercively eliminated and their identities are reconstituted in the complex, modern and dualist contexts.

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[2] Some critics, notably Paul Feyerabend, intended to regard the current practice of science as being authoritarian, oppressive, antidemocratic and discriminatory. He regards science as a model of justification and also wishes unequivocally to separate the science from the state as religion is separated from the state in the modern political regimes of secularism (Feyerabend 1988:8, 264-269, 284-288).

However, in the uncertain and shifting circumstances of modern life, there is also resilience of non-modern cultures (traditionalism) which coexist with modern cultural and representative forms in the same conceptual, historical and environmental spaces. They are bound together in that peculiar binary relationship which provides the potentiality for increasing conflictual or hierarchical affiliations and separations among individuals through constructions of antithetic "others". In other words, while modernity is sustained and globalized, it encounters a world of differences resulting in a juxtaposition of peoples, traditions and values within the same space. Particularly in metropolitan cities, cultural differences are closely connected, to be encountered in the adjoining neighbourhood, on the street, in the office, perhaps in our kitchen.[4] Consequently, modernist homogenization is not complete and cultural differences are not "exotic otherness"; but modern culture encompasses conflictual and reactive relations of "we" and "Other" within the nation. In the global space of metropolitan cities, one who is conditioned within a system of dynamic opposition, always deals with the antithetical other.

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[3] This concept "control of nature" in Adorno's and Horkheimer's writings on the Enlightenment the formation of modern subject through growth or progress links to the domination of nature Adorno 1973:11, 1972:83).

Modernity, or its by-product nationalism, is a vast totality of meanings, values, norms and representations; that is, technology, science, rationality, secularism, the state, justice, public affairs, metropolitan life, and so on, are diffused into pre-existing coherent cultures. In other words, modernization involves the production and reproduction of a modern culture based on technology, science, a rational view of life, bureaucracy, a secular approach to social relations, and nation states as the primary organizing units. Second, modernization assimilates different cultural units to the world culture. This involves world-wide representations of the culture of the hegemonic world power. Third, exceptions or contradictions to the dominant culture become increasingly isolated (labelled traditional, backward, etc.).

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[4] Today, the sum of those cultural elements such as Russian vodka, Scotch whisky, French perfume, Italian spaghetti or the American culture of fast foods represent a world culture. In this sense, a greater homogenization of a world culture is occurring in which elements of heterogeneous local cultures are related or connected to one another not only spatially but globally (Robertson 1991:61-91).

The systemic cultural inconsistencies and contradictions are furnished by the key characteristics of modernity: change and differentiations. The cultural system of modernity incorporating European ideological and cultural systems has diffused the ideologies of nationalism to the rest of the world in the form of the western conceptions "emancipation" and "civilization". However, as the works of Edward Said (1978) and Partha Chatterjee (1986) demonstrate, these ideologies are revised and transformed by the cultures with which they interact. The pre-existing societal type called orientalism has profoundly transformed the structure of nationalist thought in the East.

As Chatterjee argues there is also an inherent contradiction in oppressed peoples adapting European nationalist ideology, because this ideology is deduced from the Western set of representations, categories, ideas, and classifications (the discourse of western modernization) that is linked to the very constitution of power on the domains of neo-colonialism which nationalist ideology seeks to reject.[5] That is to say, in the postcolonial societies, nationalism is not a given reality of their cultural production but it exists simply to distort or to describe their realities since it is produced within the Westernization processes. Nationalism comes to represent the exercise of power over postcolonial communities in the modernization processes by which active Western knowledge determines the formation of others' realities. Nationalism is in effect, then, a demonstration of the dynamic relationship between Western representation and postcolonial reality. It refers to the ways in which postcolonial societies set up their reality according to the West and it exposes the function of power inherent in the representations of distorted reflections from the other (West).

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[5] Chatterjee argues that third world national movements' identification with modernity or the West in the area of practical and theoretical knowledge undermines their ability to represent their own peoples. In Chatterjee's view, the problem with ideologies of nationalism is the way in which they continue to define societies, along the lines of Orientalism and Eurocentrism. For Chatterjee, it is crucial to develop emancipation from colonization or the hegemony of the West not only in the political sphere but also in the cognitive, representational and epistemological areas. Therefore, the postcolonial subject has to engage in the production of critical and deconstructive knowledge about the discourses of nationalism, to develop a new subject, a new and free sense of agency in connection to universality (Chatterjee 1986; Wamba Dia Wamba 1991:217-235; Said 1985).

As a Western reflection of knowledge, nationalism determines the ways in which the West governs and dominates the postcolonial politics of emancipation, freedom and solidarity. In other words, nationalism developed in the West and brought into the colonies in the frameworks of power/knowledge, is a Western way of structuring, regulating and situating the other (colonized). The knowledge carried from the diverse Western fields of science, culture, politics, and economics, is invested in every level of postcolonial life and constitutes a new sense of existence and subjective reality. Western knowledge creates the subjective conditions for keeping postcolonial societies in the margins of history in possible new interpretation of life processes. What is manifested through the imposition of Western knowledge is the symbolic signification of the whole culture and societal meanings which are so structured as to seem natural and thus rules yields essentialist manifestations or expressions of signified cultural meanings. In particular, through modernization processes, the other (postcolonial) has been the focus of Western interest. Such knowledge has created the invisible condition for the distortion of life worlds, and dependence on the diverse Western fields of knowledge. The emancipatory political forces and activities which were motivated originally by such Western knowledge (for emancipation from domination, oppression or exploitation, modernization and nationalism), have aided in the construction of their subjective identities in the hierarchical relationship: the West and the East. In short, the discourse of nationalism as the expansion of knowledge from the centre to margins has fundamentally come to represent the diffused forms of power and domination between the West and postcolonial countries.

Within postcolonial societies, either pre-modern cultural practices exist as uncompromising opponents of Western expansion, or these have been reinforced, deconstructed or transformed into a modern national culture with European bureaucratic systems. A variety of outcomes of the interaction between modern nationalism and postcolonial societies may be seen in a national ideological emphasis on cultural distinctiveness, or the homogenizing power of modernity, or the reactionary revival of fundamentalist movements against the modernization process.

Within modern cultural practices, there are many contradictory elements which can appear to be integrated spatially. At the same time these elements cannot integrate as meaningfully consistent and non-contradictory unities. For instance, the universalism within modern scientific or religious (Christian or Islamic) discourses and conceptions may co-exist with particularism based on national, ethnic, racial group or traditional identities.(Laclau 1992:88). An individual may claim simultaneously membership in a particular religion, an ethnic or national group, and/or occupation. In one relationship in an institutional context, there may be a (modern) assumption of equality (e.g., students in a classroom), but in another, hierarchies and privilege are asserted (gender, racial, social, national). Likewise, church-goers are urged to love their "enemy", "neighbour" or "peoples". Outside of the church, as a businessman or woman, individuals may act as a profit-maximizer, as a soldier, or as a religious adherent, and may kill their enemies in the name of national defence.

There are identities within identities in modernity; there are individual and collective cultural practices which refer to more than one subjective construction at once. More and more, modern life insists on people (temporarily) taking up multi-identities within multi-layers of existence. Multi-identities are the inconsistent or contradictory constructions in which the strict dichotomies of national/international, particular/universal are contested. In other words, the aspects of both particularism and universalism are layered in every individual and societal identity. For example, one can simultaneously represent universality through Islamic or Christian religious identity and particularity through the believes, national, ethnic, communal, group and family references. In short, the identity of the human individual is produced and stays within an oppositionary dialectic between specific and general, or particular and universal.

These multiple constructions of modern cultural identities are manifested more tensely in everyday life than ever before. The multitude of identities reinforces and secures the regimes of nationalism from the increasing threat of globalization or humanist universalism. By facilitating a hierarchy between nationally divided positions, (or particularism operated in identities), and universal identities e.g., Islam and Christianity, this fragmentation of identities easily enables the national regimes as well as individuals to adjust to capitalist economic pressures (for globalization) without undermining national distinctions or particularism within the universality of modernity.

The ideologies of nationalism are one of the major forces among modern representations, images, and meaning systems to transform local cultures within the global cultural trade. Insofar as the theories of nationalism refer to separate cultures within particular territories, and distinctiveness at the global level, modernist cultural practices seek to create imaginary national identities among the masses. The process of nation formation emphasizes shared cultural identity, a solidarity ethos, and the desire to fabricate collective distinctiveness through cultural practices.

Another way in which nationalism constructs differences which may legitimate or conceal oppression is within nation-states themselves. Within a national territory, internal differences (cultural, ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc.) may correspond to relationships of exploitation and subordination. In the socio-political arena of a nation, cultural differences may be used to legitimate the treatment of certain individuals in discriminatory and exclusionary ways such as Arabs in Israel, native people in South and North America, and blacks in South Africa. Cultural, religious and racial differences have "legitimated" economic exploitation and state discriminations among the groups.

Therefore, the homogenizing elements of the national and global development of modernization paradoxically coexists with inconsistent and contradictory social, economic, cultural integration. There may be articulated to exploitative relationship at the national and global levels. Local allegiances and identities are thereby strengthened, and exist in permanent contradiction to the universalistic discourses of modernity. Modernization has thus been characterized by increasing national and ethnic fragmentation of the world population. Yet, at the end of the twentieth century, under the influences of global mass communication and capitalist development, unique life systems and their specific attachments to local frameworks of identity are being destroyed; specific structures of localised communities are dislocated and replaced by the homogenizing structures of modern metropolitan cities.

In the course of global modern development, people are also caught up in a vicious circle in which a great wealth of cultural aspirations are condemned to obsolescence by the imposition of new modern life forms. In many parts of the world, people are more determined to resist such processes/changes which are externally imposed on them. For instance, every fundamentalist religious, ethnic national and separatist movement, such as those in Lebanon, Iran, Croatia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia corresponds to the penetration into traditional and patriarchal societies of capitalist market relations which are supported by elites desiring to become modern. These homogenizing processes also meet particularistic resistance in already "modern nations" such as in Germany, France, Britain, or Italy where the universalist discourse of modernity co-exists with racial identities or discourses. In this nationalist reactionary circle, refugees, immigrants, guest workers and asylum seekers become permanent targets on the visible and invisible borders of racism and xenophobia. The organizatory subjects of modernity often seem to be wearing the masks of universality and neutrality to legitimate power relations. Those whose masks do not conform to the dominant norms, suffer domination, humiliation and oppression. The paradox of modern nationalism is that particularistic discourses and universalistic discourses emerge and are defined only in opposition to one another.

The global systems of modernization have simultaneously come to a period of intensive integration (capitalism) and disintegration (nationalism). The aggressive particularism that we are recently witnessing, is not only provocative aggression, but is in part a reactionary response to the integration of capitalism and the disintegration of the old state order. The loss of cohesion and local cultural orientation not only increases demands for reorganization of the life worlds, it challenges the modernist human conduct. In the expansion of modernity, what gets lost along with community relations is the conceptual forms of traditional life and the celebration of universal qualities of life that serve as moral landmarks in the daily multicultural round of life.

Once these points of orientation have shattered or obscured the realm of human and social relationships, various social groups seek meaning in national, ethnic and religious identities. The current international balances of politics seem to be very fragile given the nature of cultural contradictions within the global village, in that almost every ethnic group would like to exhibit its uniqueness and distinctiveness *vis-*

a-vis the others. This argument can be conceived more specifically in terms of the epochal relationship between universality and particularity. For example, on the one hand, European colonial or neo-colonial expansion among modern cultural lines, presents one of the significant universalistic bases for the development of the reconciled world society. On the other hand, within a shared modern cultural space, the European "civilizing function" enforced national cultural practices, spatially creating unity by differentiating one "national" group from another.

Thus, nationalism refers to means of ordering within the cultural practices of modernity, and it provides both the connecting threads for certain associations, and the exclusionary or dividing lines among individuals and among societies. In this sense, the construction of national particularist principles may become a mode of expression for refusal of universality in the forms of supra-rational or national identities. The governing discursive principle of nationalism which organizes everyday life is that which bears a negative relation to interest of the whole in the particularist construction of identities; the more national a position or decision making is, the more likely it is to be rational and a challenge to the universal principles of commonality or the general interest of humanity.

To the extent that the ideologies of nationalism state separate "we" identities they inhibit the world wide development of universal responsibilities, obligations or commitments. The national discourse is historically, geographically and socially particular, and defines or separates the responsibilities of the individual through representative relations particular to a social group. For example, the particularist structuration of societal and individual responsibilities and commitments in nationalist discourses currently prevents many nations from taking effective action to stop atrocities in Bosnia, or, in the case of Global warming, every nation denies its responsibility for what is happening to the climate of the Earth and relegate to the blames the other.

Through the global insertion of nationalist ideologies, the resistance of non-dominant cultures within a national space against assimilation, exclusion, or subordination, is not only a struggle for the right to determine their selfhood, but also a struggle among particularist identities. A particularistic approach to the development of social relations may inevitably increase possibilities for conflictual relations among culturally distinct groups, while necessarily repressing the full and autonomous development of universal or globally shared values. Many modernists mistakenly viewed the globalization of Western cultural forms as the vehicle for the development of "universal" principles. However, "universal" principles must be differentiated from European universalism which carries with it the categories of the underprivileged, hierarchies, an exploited nation, marginalized minorities, colonialism, capitalism, patriarchy, positivist epistemologies and scientific paradigms.[6] Ernesto Laclau expressed the ethnocentric nature of European universalism in these terms:

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[6] The hypothesis of "universalism" is the favourite theme of traditional Western thought which provided an ethical and cultural legitimation for the Western expansionary role. For instance, Aron, in *The Industrial Society,* asserted that "universal society is coming into being" and in the future the West will be the centre of a "universal society" (Aron 1967:74).

> European culture was a particular, yet at the same time it was the expression (no longer the incarnation) of universal human essence (in the same sense that the Soviet Union was later considered the motherland of socialism). Crucial here is that there was no way to distinguish between European particularism and the universal functions it was supposed to incarnate, given that European universalism had constructed its identity through the cancellation of the logic of incarnation and, as a result, of the universalization of its own particularism (Laclau 1992:86).

One of the most striking global features of modernity is the belief in human agency--human control over historicity and nature. The creation of the nation as a primary organizational unit legitimates an order or modernist social project by rationalizing the origin of its particularist construction or its cultural forms as conforming to general, abstract principles, conceptions and notions. Through the constructive influences, modern cultural practices impose on individuals ways of seeing, feeling and acting which they could not express spontaneously. From the very beginning of the formation of the subject, modern cultural practices direct each individual how to eat, drink, speak or think; to obey rules, customs, manners; and establish codes of self control within the frameworks of poise, embarrassment and shame.[7] Through social constructive processes of individualization, the subject first is divided within itself and later from others (Foucault 1983). Foucault's analysis in *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1977) concentrates on modern culture and the ways in which people are subjected to discipline within the frameworks of identity, roles, meanings and status, and how they are disintegrated in their self-contained units of individuality. Foucault's work on the construction of the subject helps us to specify the identify of national culture as not only a kind of macrosocial power aimed at constructing the totality of nation, but also a microsocial power organized around individualization and within the identities of individuals.

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[7] Elias has interpreted the civilizing process in the West from the perspectives of the continuous advance of the threshold of self-control in the context of shame and embarrassment (Elias 1978:51-204, 1982:292).

In the realm of Foucault's disciplinized world and the formation of self, modernist culture represents a transition from primitive desires or passion to so-called civilized behaviour--from spontaneity to self-control. The notion of spontaneity, which is an interaction within the culture, appears as a reflection and self-reflexivity that determines potential conditions of emotional expressions and differentiations (Heller 1990:79-92). The impact of modern culture on "self-reflexivity" takes the form of the "self-reflection" (moral norms, rules or ethics of rational logic). On the other hand, self-reflection helps self-actualization of nationalism as the source of meanings that maintains "ontological security" and brings superficial emotional wealth to fill out the metaphysical emptiness of life with new codes of nationalism (Giddens 1987:178).

The increasing metaphysical emptiness of life becomes an important site for the development of powerful nationalist attachments in modern politics. This is because the nature of nationalism develops within the potential manipulation of impulse, feelings and emotions among individuals. Every nation, within the nationalist ideology, certainly attempts to intervene in the emotional development and potential feelings of individuals through a calculative logic; it constructs them in such a way that national identity becomes a potential cause of tension and hatred against the *other* facing *us*.

The striking point here is the schizophrenic development of modernity as reflected by cultural dialectics or inconsistencies and contradictions defining our modern sociation.[8] In other words, the globalization of modernity contributes to the maintenance and adjustment of national structures, and closer economic, political, and cultural relations may produce more intense conflicts than ever before. For example, there have been two trends, one towards internationalism and homogenization and another towards particularism and distinctions. From these two tendencies a desire for cultural change as well as cultural resistance against modernist development have arisen. In practical life, cultural contradictions seem to be quite obvious in that different aspects of the modern system are inseparable from conflictual manifestations of past and present, old and new, traditional and modern, national and international, particular and universal, individual and societal. However these dualist structures in the case of these opposing terms nation and international, particular and universal, seem to produce necessary relations because they mutually determine each other. They are the conceptual structure for the emergence of new discourses, power relations, values and norms which re-establish unity and the cohesion of individuals.

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[8] Simmel views society not as a separate entity, autonomous from the individual, but as a structure in which individuals develop together as a unity. Thus society consists of sociated individuals and a system of interactions. He prefers to use sociation to describe great collective interactions that form individuals. According to Simmel there is "sociation all the way from momentary getting together for a walk to the founding of a family, from relations maintained 'until further notice', to membership in a state, from the temporary aggregation of hotel guests to the intimate bond of medieval guilt". In other words, for Simmel, sociation is everything that is present in individuals (Simmel 1971:6-36).

So not only do the possible structures of the nationalist discourse depend on that from which they are inscribed, but nationalism also exists as a universalized particularism or internationalized nationalism. Thus, in this reciprocal bonding, the possibility of new discourse is already inscribed in the structures of nationalism within or about internationalism.[9] Simmel puts it: "Conflict itself resolves the tension between contrasts" (Simmel 1971:71). In this sense, social conflicts and contradictions are important mechanisms for readjusting life forms compatible with new conditions. A flexible social structure through such mechanisms is able to produce new systems of values, and to assure its continuance under changed conditions. Such readjustment of life forms is hardly available in more rigid national or international systems where conflicts and contradictions give rise to the catastrophic breakdowns of particular systems. For this reason, the institutionalization of tolerance of differences maintains continuous development through equilibration of social and national relations. Thus, nowadays, balances among international, national, societal and individual levels of identity critically depend upon the mobilization of resources for the management of contradictions in a peaceful and tolerant manner rather than in violent and repressive ways.

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[9] According to Alexander Nehamas, similar ways of thinking are made manifest in Nietzsche's book *The Gay Science*:

> Nietzsche wants to claim that truth and error, knowledge and ignorance, good and evil are not to be opposed to one another; on the contrary, he imagines them as points along a single continuum. This sweeping monism, the view that not only opposites but all things in general are essentially interrelated and derive their character from their interrelations (Nehamas 1985:44-45).

Parallel points also appear in Derrida's concept of *differance* as a critique of metaphysics or logocentrism. According to Derrida, metaphysics always serve an implicit development of positions within the permanent hierarchies, rigid boundaries and inclusion and exclusion because of their boundary fixing philosophy. Derrida repeatedly tells us that:

> The gram as *differance*, then, is a structure and a movement no longer conceivable on the basis of the opposition presence/absence. *Differance* is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the *spacing* by means of which elements are related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the *a* of *differance* indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals without which the "full" terms would not signify, would not function (Derrida 1981b:27; Culler 1982:89-110).

NATIONALISM: A DISCOURSE OF DEMOCRACY AND OTHERNESS

Viewing modernity as a unique way of organizing the relations of individuals and their surrounding environment requires, besides economics and culture, a discussion of politics. At a very general level, the concept of politics in modernity is associated with the illusionary competition of ideas and the abstract concept of equality which are called democracy, as well as with national political institutional frameworks for citizens and state. Whereas traditional politics were often based on explicitly hierarchical principles and more visible practices of power, modern political systems appeal to secularism and individualism, which are regarded by Marx as processes of abstraction and by Weber as a process of bureaucratic discipline with specialization (Sayer 1990:72-144). Nationalism provides the single nexus linking these fundamental components of the modern political system.

In the modern political framework, the nation as an "imagined community" becomes the only legitimate source for ultimate authority in the political order. At the same time the imagined existence of a nation produces new fixed relationships between the ideally defined and distinguished political components of citizen, state and civil society. The idealized status of nation as an ideology, first refers to distinctly moralized, rational, sentimental, patriotic and obedient citizens. Secondly, it consists of the constant reiteration of state power (for the organization of particular social goals), in which the state finds legitimacy for control, continuing registration, perpetual assessment, classification, identification and punishment (Foucault 1977:220-221). That is to say, the development of national ideology within a territory requires a process of unification achieved by coordinated control mechanisms or in Foucault's words *governmentality* or the state as *conduct of conduct* (Foucault 1979).

Today, it is clear that state power is closely associated with bureaucratic organization as well as mechanisms of control. According to Weber, the bureaucratic organization of the state is based on the control of information as well as the monopoly of political and military power within its territories or sometimes beyond (Weber 1946). As a bureaucratic power, the nation state co-ordinates its functions through receiving certain information about its citizens and their organizations.[10] The dissemination or control of information is legitimated by the various beneficial activities of the state such as welfare. Eventually the nation state establishes its totalizing power for the transformation of human life through continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms.

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[10] For example, Anthony Giddens makes similar points about massive expansion of the surveillance activities of the nation-state in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Giddens 1987:174).

Consequently, in the designated territory of the nation state, relations are constituted by complex notions of repressive, restrictive, aggressive, beneficial and protective authority, which Thomas Hobbes cumulatively called the *mortall god* of the godless modern society. The new *mortall god* becomes the singular moral authority, not simply by ad hoc bureaucratic justifications and regulations (modes of control), but in the obscure forms of belief that underlie mundane routines and rationalizations of life. Thus, the state is an imaginary unit and the creator of its representations influencing every belief and action within the moral significations of law, values, norms and qualities. As Sayer mentions, the modern state, as an abstract impersonal unity, should be searched for within us everywhere and all the time, in the various ways and forms that produce and regulate those social relationships that form us (Sayer 1985:179).

Being a subject within a nation state means citizenship which is defined within a range of legal rights and duties. The institutionalization of citizenship rights is directly related to issues of individual autonomy, freedom and justice. On the one hand, the rights of political citizenship are needed by individuals to maximize benefits from the modern state, i.e., rights as consumers in the economic sense of the term. On the other hand, the citizens become subject to an authority which forces them to comply with rules and regulations, i.e., the individual *qua* citizen proper. So citizenship signifies a split of the unity of the individual, reflected in the constitution of rights as liberty *versus* obedience, exclusion *versus* inclusion.

The major problem with political citizenship is that it justifies and practises social inequalities and hierarchies at two distinct levels. First, citizenship, as a set of rules and practices, constructs a specific social hierarchy e.g., immigrant, refugee and foreigner statuses. A foreigner is not, in this perspective, someone who is the active recipient of rights but someone who may be abstractly formed and treated discriminately by the law. In every nation, "foreigner" is a common political identity of "being an other" one who is theoretically formed and treated with discrimination or exclusion on the basis of assumed differences but who obeys certain authoritative rules of conduct. What is important here is that every nation state directly supports racism and discrimination based on definitions of citizenship according to blood and territory. As Julia Kristeva nicely puts the problem of modern foreigners within the borders of nation states:

> The difficulty engendered by the matter of foreigners would be completely contained in the deadlock caused by the distinction that sets *citizen* apart from *man*: is it not true that, in order to found the rights are specific to the men of a civilization or a nation ... one has to withdraw such rights from those that are not citizens, that is, other men? The process means ... that one can be more or less a man to the extent that one is more or less a citizen, that he who is not a citizen is not fully a man. Between the man and the citizen there is a scar: the foreigner. Is he fully a man if he is not a citizen? Not enjoying the rights of citizenship, does he possess his rights of man? if, consciously, one grants foreigners all the rights of man, what is actually left of such rights when one takes away from them the rights of the citizen?" (Kristeva 1991:97-98).

The second level of hierarchy is related ironically to that conception of citizenship which is a principle of democratic equivalence. The democratic equality for minorities (immigrant, refugees, women and ethnical and religiously differentiated cultural groups) in a national order is sometimes formally, and sometimes informally defined as equality understood in terms of access to qualities and privileges reserved for particular group of national citizens, (while the abstract principle of equality is the most important basis of legitimacy of national authority). While the nation-state organizes the conditions of minorities within the particular territory, it does not contest the function of discrimination itself and, in fact, it ends up reinforcing new segregatory power relations because the existence of minorities in the nation produces a reflective support for group unity or national definitions of identities in the terms of "we" against others. In other words, the construction of national identities are a response to the existence of *another*; they are only constituted on bases of "immutable differences" from others (Tajfel 1978:18). For this reason, it should be stressed that such abstract equivalence only conceals discourses of difference which marginalise, oppress, and discriminate against particular groups or individuals such as the black or latino inhabitants in the U.S.A, or East indian and Pakistani immigrants in Britain. The national and abstract return of equality in fact disguises various inequalities with totalitarianism and may further legitimate the use of power against minorities which have cultural distinctiveness.[11] Despite the abstract principles of equality, the domination of a particular cultural community as a self-defined nation, necessarily means that excluded individuals or groups have the status of *qua citizens* or *qua individuals* in the nation (Mouffe 1992:32).

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[11] Here, the national abstraction which is exercised upon social agents; is a symbolic power to constitute identity in the abstract conceptual categories. It acts upon representations of the world for naming and classifications; it produces subject identity in the hierarchical conditions of subjective realities; and it superficially refers to principles of equality to legitimate its systemic operations of classification, representation, or naming. In other words, the abstract equality principle of nation creates its subjects in the legitimacy of the representations.

Qua status citizenship entails an ambivalence regarding individuals' belonging to the nation state. This creates a potential for disassociation, and a chain of reaction against the policies of the nation state as the sovereign authority in the designated territory. At this point, options develop in the politics of nationalism. Either the marginalised cultural groups and dominant national community coexist within a tension that can never be reconciled, or the minorities are integrated and assimilated into the mainstream of the national community; otherwise, the nation fragments. The means for encouraging or demanding integration and assimilation can be peaceful or violent. If the integration and assimilation are accepted by representatives of the minority groups, they may seek self-determination for a new exclusionary nation and a new nation state within a designated territory. Then there may be immediate problems such as coming to terms with violence. At the same time, national self-determination, which is a highly ambiguous demand, seeks realization through the creation of nations, as each "invented nation" (Gellner, 1983) and each invented nationality paves the way for new inventions.

With the intensification of national difference and "international" relations, national military power and violence become one of the important dimensions of nationalism as well as national order (Giddens 1987:167-182; Elias 1978:229-251; Nugent 1989:206-239). In other words, in national order, the nation state is the only legitimate user of the means of violence or threats to assure the obedience of its citizens, and that of subordinated classes and minorities.[12] From this point of view, every nation state first ideologically attempts to convince its citizens to obey the rules and the authoritative status of the state. Then, only when its citizens reject the authority of the state, does it practise power relations in a more direct sense: namely the practice of coercive power. In that sense, military coercion is the functional embodiment of formal sovereign violence; its latency ensures the obedience of citizens.

As illustrated by Derrida's study of *differance*, violence is the product of traces and marks that are also the mimetic result of another's violence (McKenna 1992:83-84). The possibility of nationalism as a movement is inscribed as traces and marks from the other's violence; it is then produced and traced for the violence against an other, that is to say, nationalism serves as a cause as well as an effect of violence. In the exchange of violence among societies, nationalism is a reciprocal object or link passed from one community to another. Through the violence of two societies, nationalism not only parallels a correlative structure between the two, but traces the path of violence for the future. Nothing gives rise to nationalist movements like an act of violence or a threat by another nation. The exchange of violence between societies unites people along nationalist lines. In other words, the discourse of nationalism reveals and channels the violence into representational forms by being violence of all against the other all. When the violence produced is a violence of all against all, the movement of nationalism is likely produced in the other nation (which is ravaged) within the systemic causal traces of violence. In effect, the movements of nationalism are duplicative and simulative forms which are produced and reproduced one to another through each other's violence, (i.e., the I.R.A. and the state of Britain, or the Palestinians and the state of Israel).

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[12] For example Giddens characterizes nation-state as integrally associated with the use of violence and administrative control in the conditions of modernity (Giddens 1981).

SUMMARY

Weber mentions in his essay "Science as Vocation" (Weber 1946:129-156) that our understanding and explanation of immediate reality rests significantly on how we think or rather feel about existing relations, institutions and trends. Theoretical explanations or understandings none of which are free from subjective perceptions, presuppositions, or normative implications are the means of communicating our political, philosophical and ideal aspirations to a wider population, transcending the boundaries of academies. My rather limited review of the structures and discourses which "make humans" and are unmade or transformed by humans should be read as an attempt to understand the paradoxical relationship between modernism and nationalism.[13]

In brief, in this section, I have focused on the following major arguments:

First, the particularist component of nationalism (the creation of a nation by policy makers or a nationalist elite through "rediscovery" of tradition, customs and unique past and national culture) is imposed on individuals. Individuals, by internalizing national culture, are both "homogenized" and split into us/others. The nationalist development of societies is centred in state apparatuses which eventually produce a general order and framework for formalized, privileged national discourses "fixed" by national language, collective faiths and sacred shrines. National discourse aims to maintain a politically and culturally homogenized unity that may lead either to racial and cultural assimilation or to resistance and conflicts or both. Moreover, in the political process of nation building, as a tool for the control and discipline of people, national discourse carries values and belief systems which directly involve the production of new faiths or destinies. These diminish individuals' "freedom of choice" with regard to statuses, roles, ethnicity, race, citizenship or nationality.

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[13] In 1861, the former prime minister of Italy, Massimo d'Azzeglio commented: "We have made Italy; now we have to make Italians" (quoted in Alter 1989:23; Seton-Watson 1977:107).

Second, I argued that today, nationalist discourse is operative in the different realms of the state structure and political system. The organization of the nation as a dominant social formation is based upon the monopoly and standardization of the political system for the functions of certification, counting, reporting, registration, classification and identification. National discourse which seeks to legitimate an instrumental state structure as the ultimate authority, is also an attempt to produce rational, moralized, patriotic, sensible, productive, obedient and law abiding citizens. In this state of organizing and controlling, the rights of individuals are historically bound up with the abstract categories of national citizenship. The civil and political rights of the individual are in effect the rights of juridic personality or citizenship within the national discourse. Thus, in the abstract categories of citizenship, the individual existence rests upon national particularism which is constituted and organized by the nation state's registration projects. Citizenship for every individual is a form of political identity and it is namely a claim to a common identification through membership of the nation which is based on incorporation within a common language, and racial, cultural and religious affiliations.

Third, I argue that what movements for "national liberation" often obscure on irreconcilable differences. The demands for social equality and justice may not address the substantive subordination of members of particular ethnic and religious groups in the nation. The claims of substantive justice for minority groups is often necessarily stated in terms of localised struggles for the autonomy from the organizing structure of nation-state. Thus, national liberation movements are frequently replicate of the other's nationalism through the prevention of the civil and political rights of minority groups within the territorially bounded nation. However, claims for particular and substantive rights can sometimes become acceptable if claimants give up their distinctiveness in terms of language, culture or religion (such as German, Greek, Italian, Polish immigrants in U.S.A.). Thus, the political systems of nationalism encountered the ideal of the "melting pot" or adaptation and assimilation.

Fourth, I argue that the discourse of nationalism exists in hierarchical binary differences, the relation between privileged and subordinated. The hierarchical binary differences arises through planned "nation-building" and the fragmented constitution of the subject within the exclusionary or inclusionary mechanism, for a nationalism without binary differences that can be defended and enlarged is impossible. The disciplinary power of nationalism must facilitate the reproduction of political and social differentiation within the nation while at the same time perpetuating unity of the nation through the repression of particular differences. Nationalism also insures the reproduction of difference as an "other" in the frameworks of social and political inequality. This "other" (i.e., marginal groups: blacks in U.S.A., foreigners and immigrants) which is constructed as having inferior status, is also desired as a cultural and social entity, or more specifically as in oppositionary power which helps the ideologies of nationalism integrate individual subjects around collective entity of nation and define their identity with positive terms in the face of negative "other" (Pease 1992). Thus this dualistic construction of national identities (in both their positivist and interpretative modes), plays an important role increasing societal and individual conflicts, and it also ensures the legitimacy of the regimes of colonialism (by introducing positive qualities to that inferior "other").

While nationalism increases binary differences and explosive or destructive interventions in people's lives in many parts of the world, it is important to ask the question: What can we imply or suggest as a replacement for nationalist ideas if these are illusory and inadequate for the creation of peaceful solidarities? I think the best answer comes from Montesquieu who lived almost two hundred years ago: "If I knew something useful to myself and detrimental to my family, I would reject it from my mind. If I knew something useful to my family but not to my homeland, I would try to forget it. If I knew something useful to my homeland and detrimental to Europe, or else useful to Europe and detrimental to mankind, I would consider it a crime" (cited in Kristeva 1991:130). Montesquieu in this remark very well illustrates the complex ambivalence of in the relationship between particular and universal identities. At the same time, he reminds us of the continuing tension between national and universal identities. This tension is reflected in cultural, social and individual spheres of life as well as in political actions. In this statement, universalism as an ideology is supported against nationalist or particularist interests. Correspondingly, in various deconstructionist discourses through neutralization of the specific opposition, the search for universalistic principles or universal solidarities offers the greatest hope for the development of peace at the global level.

CHAPTER THREE

CULTURE AS A FOUNDATION OF NATIONALISM

For the freedom in question is not the freedom 'to be Irish' or 'to be women' what ever that might mean, but simply the freedom enjoyed by certain other groups to determine their identity as they may wish.

(Terry Eagleton 1990:30)

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I attempt to situate the structures of nationalism--the way it functions and is produced--with respect to differentiation in social relations, the symbolic worlds of culture, and the inner domain of the individual which make up the imaginary elements of shared culture. I argue that a shared distinct culture (including religious beliefs) together with a common language are the most important determining factors for the intersubjectively shared constitution of nationalism. A shared culture helps to constitute a distinctiveness and awareness for a particular group of people to differentiate itself from others, and creates a basis for possible unification or separation from others within the structures of the nation-state. In many parts of the world, the ruling elites of nation-states attempt to reinvent social formations (to rejuvenate forgotten traditions and various other cultural elements) and national identities in the name of a shared distinctiveness. Thus, cultural nationalism refers to the determination of facts, things, values, and the continuous spread of their representations from the centres of national life to other parts of social existence through mass media and socialization processes (e.g., family). Particularly with the development of information societies, intellectuals through mass media inculcate their version of nationalism (standards of justifications, determinate meanings, shared references and conceptual schemes). For the foundationalist elites of modernity in a particular society, there is only one true ideal and one reference relation; the reference relations of nationalism, or orders of nationalism. To put it another way, in the view of modern foundationalism, there is a continuous and powerful awareness of, as well as a desire to establish national culture as source of one reference and one true construction.

The very foundation of national culture through differences and distinctiveness in the intersubjectively shared worlds, paradoxically produces national differences, contradictions and oppositeness within the nation in terms of new contingent determinate references endorsed on the independent reality of national culture. In other words, nationalism with its aim to inscribe culture in a foundationalist or essentialist ideology produces its own opposition. Today, it appears that we live in regimes that modernity and nationalism grounded in the principles of foundationalism and essentialism, which give rise to various social and national movements of resistance, oppositeness and revolt. Likewise, Foucault tells us: "where there is power, there is resistance" (Foucault 1980:95).

At present, what one understands by "individual" and "society" is determined to a large extent not only by the organizational conditions which characterized modernity, but also by the intersubjectively shared cultural differentiation expressed by national ideologies. In terms of modernity this means that in addition to global similarities and national differences, there exists a global mundane reasoning in the regimes of nationalism which has significant influence. The difference in cultural worlds resides in the potential for the foundation and continuity of the regimes of nationalism.

This chapter attempts to explore various effects of the immediate or spontaneous representations of nationalism at the individual and societal levels. Within the developmental processes of nationalism, the cognitive self also becomes the subject controlled by the national order which primarily requires individuals to be spontaneous, and to have a reflective sensitivity in variable social and national situations (e.g., support of the national case or national army in international conflicts). The effective power of nationalism in the individual's identity is manifested largely in the individual's exposure to lived intensity of national experience within social situations. For instance, in international sports events, nationalism emerges within the consciousness as well as in one's unconscious through support of the national team in international competitions.

Nationalism as a part of individuals' intersubjectivity appears to be the a/one medium of one's thought, action and communication with others. Intersubjectivity can be considered as a habitual context within which one's relations to others are actuated in experience. In other words, the national experiential qualities exist as an internalized disclosure. Nationalism is submerged inside the psyche as well as revealed outside in the symbolic environment.

Before moving on to a discussion of the cultural aspects of nationalist experience, however, cultural conditions must be questioned at the level of the habitual texture of reflective experience, or, sensibility of the shared and the divided world. National sensibility embodies habituality and the historicity of the subjective entanglement of self and environment. That is to say, the sense of national sensibility is nothing but a dialectic between the social or national environment, social action and the subject.

One version of such an attempt to explain the manifestations of national and personal histories or settings that individuals inhabit is provided in the analysis of what Pierre Bourdieu calls *habitus*.[1] In this chapter I will use Bourdieu's theory of *habitus* to develop an understanding of the problem of national worlds as developed through intersubjectivity and through individuals' reflective sensitivity (as individual engagement with historically and subjectively given national structures in social practice). Similarly I emphasize that nationalism is functional for individuals through social structuration of perception, appreciation and action. Here the concept of *habitus* is useful because it encompasses shared as well as inherited dispositions (i.e., cognitive structures, common sense and perception) of nationalism or culture. For this reason, in this section I argue that the basis of national sensitivity and reflection is not isolated, but is structured by the diffused forms of national power within the everyday life in which nationalism functions only through such determinations of social and individual identities. Consequently, the foundations of nationalism exist within a world that has already structured subjectivities through the structures of *habitus*.

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[1] Bourdieu defines *habitus* as a system of durable and transposable dispositions that represent both a system of schemes of cognitive production of practices, a transposable and durable structure of perceptions, appreciation, action and production of common sense, which comes out as consensus on the meaning of practices. At the same time, *habitus* provides continuous reinforcement to produce regularities and representations that are available as significant tools for distinctions or classifications. Consequently, *habitus* is perceived as the characteristics of the code for a sense of one's belonging as well as a sense of the others (Bourdieu 1977:72-87).

In the last part of this chapter, I identify discourses of nationalism as dialogic processes, or communication in action which serve to be subordinated and divided from each other. Nationalism's greatest strength lies in the metaphysical contemplation of symbols, myths and icons. Nationalism is not only a cultural, economic and political product, but also an illusion. It sets up mystifying enchantments which are confirmed in the spirit of the people. Nationalism appears to people as the spirit of salvation, exclusiveness, glory and heroism.

CULTURAL ACTION, SYMBOLS AND CONTROL OF NATIONALISM

Two interesting works on nationalism (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983) are centred around the idea that nationalism devises "imaginary" and "inventionary" socio-cultural constructs of "the people" (or national identity). Benedict Anderson calls the formation of the nation in the historical cultural process an "imagined community" in time and space. In Anderson's theory of nation as an "imagined community", nation is a particularistic connection of culture within the context of shared language. A shared language links individuals' religious, multilingual and local identities to forms of unilingual "imagined community" and nation state. Anderson argues that the rise of industrial capitalism, the invention of new technologies (e.g. printing), and vernacular languages, play the most significant roles in the transformation of local and religious identities into new identities of nationalism. The development of "printing capitalism" and shared languages first diminished the monopolizing role of religion on thought. These new developments enabled the intelligentsia to distribute complex ideas to remote regions through the creation of the "vernacular culture". Indeed, the growth of notions of national consciousness and character resulted in the definitions of the vernacular cultures as solidary "imagined communities".

A similar argument is developed by Ernest Gellner in *Nations and Nationalism* (Gellner 1983) with regard to theories of language. According to Gellner, the development of modern rational society gives rise to the character of the formal, context-free and universal communication, (i.e., non-local, impersonal, non-sectional, shared culture). The growth of a shared cultural identity, the same language, the modern state, the professional armed forces and administrators, and the emergence of commercial capitalism are all central to the development of several varieties of modern nationalism.

The insights provided by Gellner and Anderson give us a substantial theoretical means for conceptualizing the contemporary rise of nationalism within modernisation processes. In Anderson's and Gellner's formulations of nationalism, nationalism develops through three important structural components, labelled respectively shared culture, society and identity. Shared culture represents a reservoir of shared knowledge, symbols and imaginary systems; shared society represents a fabric of values, norms and the "stamping power" of habits; and shared identity represents a set of subjectively-oriented faculties enabling individuals to express and act within the same frame of behavioral reference. In terms of the generative potential of nationalism, the three structural components are surrounded with the processes of continuous reproduction, group and solidarity structuration, and individual nationalization. Here, the discourse on nationalism renews shared traditions and cultural knowledge under the guise of rational organization and coordination. It promotes national integration and homogenization and the establishment of imaginary national solidarity. Finally, nationalization supports new meaning patterns for subjective constructions of individual identities.

Explaining how nationalism as a state of consciousness (the replacement of implicit by explicit meaning patterns), becomes so popular among the masses of modernity, draws our attention to the roles of communications technology, bureaucracies, state agencies, language, and intellectuals in spatially and temporally constructing the structural components (culture, society and identity) of nationalism.

The proliferation of modern communicative practices through media (through television in the postmodern world) has very important effects on the reproduction of human subjectivity which has previously been determined in various forms by given hegemonic cultures. What people see or read in the media produces national and international discourses which enforce and deploy the projects of modernity through the development of new identities. In the postmodern world, electronic media mediate between individuals and their lives, creating assemblies of images in which the viewers interpret the meaning of life. Therefore, electronic media act upon both culture and features of collective identity in ways which affect nationalist and modern values (Gergen 1991). The institutionalization of modern communicative practices through culture, and through media, is powerfully linked to the rapid rise of nationalist movements. Modern communicative practices outline a new way of being (national) in the world; it continuously producing oneself in the mirror of the "Other" and in a social dialogue that also revealing the further destination of national discourses. In other words, within modern communicative practices, nationalism, with its discourses of "Other", produces a specific kind of power relation which fabricates individuals as subjects acting upon others. Thus, nationalist discourses construct power relations, in the construction of national traits, they always represent externality as a coercive force and internality as a diffused form which produces national space of meanings, images and values.

The restructuration of human identities is closely associated with ideologically and sentimentally rooted dichotomies, e.g. international/national and us/them. What is new and qualitatively different in postmodern cultural production by the electronic media is a narrative presentation of living space and time in which people live first in unity through globalization then national cultural structuration with fragmentation. Later, segmented or national cultural structuration also gives rise to binary differences within the context of us/them. In fact, differentiating cognitions, values and forms in the culture reduce direct manifestations of life to ironies, conflicts, tensions and identity crises which emerge as the inevitable results of fragmented differentiating constructions. For example, the broadcasting of the Gulf War in North America was developed in the genre of the new mode of ideological nationalism that is marketed and produced as "show business". The Gulf War provided the American media with the opportunity to celebrate national identity by morally condemning others. Extensive broadcasting guaranteed American viewers an opportunity to enforce their nationalist consciousness. Media circulation made what was distant close, so that people who had never met and who had no direct or particularistic ties became linked as enemies. Advances in media technologies have created powerful mechanisms for the control and circulation of the localized national images. Developments in electronic mass media have enhanced enormously the potential of nationalist ideologies to transform actual experiences into imaginary ones.

On the one hand, nationalism develops through popular mass media, and on the other hand, nationalism is a rationally calculated social goal and humanist enthusiasm in the philosophical elements of the modern intelligentsia. The intellectuals of our times remain the narrative authors of nationalism. The ideologies of nationalism contain the ambiguity of particularism through representations, interests and intentions that are hidden through "philosophical nationalism" (Derrida 1992b:3-23).

In Western philosophy, universal humanism (a key ideological apparatus) contradicts the national representation of writers and their desire for particularist reproduction of national subjects. But for most writers and readers, the globally subjugated representations go unnoticed in the wrap of universal humanism.

Nationalist representations are an invisible part of the majority of western texts, however this invisibility constantly signals the obvious that it attempts to veil. It is commonplace to use the universal assumptions of humanism, especially the Weberian "ideal type" versions in the place of obvious.[2] In other words, Western scholars conceptualize the "ideal type" modern as the model of natural or general type while they remain ignorant of its subjective construction and its consequences for the subordination of others.

This politics of "ideal types", too often, is problematic. It is easily reduced to axiomatic opposition created by abstract categorization and generalization, within which a particular collective entity such as the West or a particular nation such as Germany have been put in a superior position over others because of the fundamental dogma of missionary activity (introducing civilization to those considered backward or barbarians). Through axiomatic categories of "ideal type" in the discourse of nationalism, Germany is falsely presented as the example *par excellence* of civilization, and would insofar as it articulates this very logic of essentialism, be the "ideal type" of civilization to those remaining outside Germany or Europe.

By articulating both this exemplarily logic of "ideal type" and its spread, by not granting to others the right to be different, the discourse of nationalism necessitates comparison between binary oppositeness (West *versus* East and civilized

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[2] "Ideal types" as analytical categories were developed by Max Weber. An "ideal type" which represents an abstraction from a wide range of individual or cultural characteristics, is intended to clarify what is typical of given cultural or individual phenomena. In Weber, the characteristics of Western and Eastern cultures are particularly used in connection to "ideal type" models of rationality (Weber 1949).

versus primitive).[3] Since roots of nation are implied in the very logic of exemplarly or ideal type of civilization, in European societies, the objectives of nationalism are organized as a construction of a nation in the context of the "right to be different" but they also exemplify denial of "right to be different" for those who remain outside and inside (minorities) of the national territory, because of its privileging or hierarchical nature revealed by the exemplarly logic of a nation as *par excellence* of civilization.[4] Such notions *par excellence* never function as an unbiased or neutral model for general discourse or thought because the model necessitates other societies to standardize, homologize and resemble in the character of example or ideal type. Thus nationalism constructs its nation as the example *par excellence* of civilization, using the logic of ideal type for orientation. Nationalism functions, in a sense, like the highest authority to determine what is good or bad, right or wrong in comparison to the ideal of civilization. Western theoretical or practical action upon the other (East) is unreflexively ethnocentric; it claims to be a general model.

It is this orientation, this complicity between nationalism and the universal which is an important part of the Western (particularly the German) philosophical discourses. As Derrida puts it:

> Nationalism never presents itself as a particularism but as a universal

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[3] According to Derrida, Western philosophy examines the world in terms of binary opposition: mind *versus* body, good *versus* evil, man *versus* women etc. Each of these pairs has been structured hierarchically: the first term is better then second term. Derrida calls this privileging one term over the other "logocentrism" (Culler 1982:93).

[4] See for exemplarly logic Derrida (1992a) and exemplification in Goodman (1968).

> philosophical model, a philosophical **telos**, is why it is always philosophical in essence, even its worst and most sinister manifestations, those that are the most imperialistic and most vulgarly violent (Derrida 1992b:11).

For example, in German literature, the works of various intellectuals such as Goethe, Schiller, Fichte, Herder, Hegel, Wagner and Weber quite clearly agree with notions of Germany as the example *par excellence* of civilization; in this case, German nationalism is the premise of universality (Elias 1978:8-29 and Derrida 1992b:11-23). The notions of nationalism, implicitly or explicitly express their desire for expansion of the German nation throughout the world as an introducer of civilization. For German philosophers (i.e., Herder, Hegel, Fichte, Weber, and so on), Germanization and humanization are complementary.[5] German nationalists are also convinced that their culture of modernity and civilization contributes important qualities to the process of humanization, and it is also good for everybody's interest and progressive development. As a missionary activity, many a scholar believed that the nation of Germany had been doing a great favour to the primitive cultures by bringing to them the benefits of civilization or of superior society. In fact since the eighteenth century, German philosophy has provide a necessary base for the development of nationalism as well as to the expansion of Germanism, whose extremes were manifested in Adolf Hitler.

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[5] In German philosophy, the politics of modernism are often articulated within the frameworks of us *versus* others. In this framework the others seem to be offered an alternative of either being Germanized or, the other is necessarily defined as a being outside knowledge, incapable of civilization, and a creature of mysticism and pleasure (orientalism). For example Hegel expresses:

> All our observations of African man show him as living in a state of savagery and barbarism, and he remains in this state to the present day. The Negro is an example of animal man in all his savagery and lawlessness, and if we wish to understand at all, we must put aside European attitudes.... (quoted in Wamba Dia Wamba 1991:232)

Beetham also pointed out that there is an inherent tendency of hidden German nationalism in Max Weber's writings. This German nationalism is often integrated with the desire of universalized particularism (Beetham 1985:119-151).

Once nationalism became a dogma, a dogma for forming the state structures of Europe and for convincing people of the greatness of their cultures, then it became an agency of colonial or imperialist European expansion in other regions of the world (Hobson 1902). As nationalism has been carried from one region to the other, each new national formation has prompted fears and ambitions in others, and has given rise to similar nationalism among others. Feelings of superiority based on a particular nation became an expression of love of humanity and introduction of excellence. Third World's modernizing elites (represented by such leaders as Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Reza Pahlavi in Iran and Abdul Nasser in Egypt) have encouraged the destruction or reconstruction of traditional societies for receiving for "European excellence".

Along the same lines, Derrida argues that nationalism is "essentially and thoroughly philosophical" and it is the bearer of an exemplary philosophy. He writes:

> [A] national identity is never posited as an empirical, natural character, of the type: such and such a people or such and such a race has black hair or is of the dolicephalic type, or else we recognise ourselves by the presence of such and such a characteristic. The self-positing or self-identification of the nation always has the form of a *philosophy* which, although better represented by such and such a nation, is none the less a certain relation to the universality of the philosophical. This philosophy, as structure of nationality, does not necessarily take the form or the representation of a system stated by professional philosophers in philosophical institutions; it can show up as spontaneous

> philosophy, an implicit philosophy but one that is very constitutive of a non empirical relationship with the world and a sort of potentially universal discourse, "embodied", "represented", "localised" (all problematic words) by a particular nation (Derrida 1992b:10).

The construction of modern nationalism also involves the reconstruction or re-invention of the pre-existing, historically inherited culture as a "chosen people" (with cultural homogeneity in the present) (Gellner, 1983). Nationalist construction uses very selectively pre-existing life forms, or cultural wealth, as it sometimes transforms them according to the logic of a rational end. Shared national culture becomes a central element in the socialization of people and in the creation of collective solidarity, as well as in the establishment of the central authority of the nation state. For example, as a case in point, Richard Handler suggests that the content of culture as a revived form, past or imaginary, and as an illusionary creation has become identical with the promotion of national identity and nation in the province of Quebec (Handler; 1984:58).[6]

However, the hereditary life of national identities continuously reconceptualizes changed ideological power centres. Within conditions of modernity, nationalism has become a new way of articulating the relationship between universality and particularity in distinct territories and unique historical periods. Three notions, territory as love of homeland (Smith 1983; Sack 1986; Agnew 1987; Chisholm 1990; Malkki 1992), time as the past, present and future (Alonso 1988), and particularity as the chosen people (Comaroff 1987), are important corner stones in the articulation of nationalism. They are continually constructed and deconstructed by conscious minds to re-enforce nationalism as well as other modern projects.

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[6] According to Handler, in Quebec, nationalism refers to a particular symbolic code for the construction of nation and culture, and it has penetrated almost all aspects of life with the revival of traditional folk dance, food, handcrafts, and songs. As he writes:

> Upon entering, one of our party compliments the host on the tastefully rustic ambience of his restaurant. "Another beautiful spot in Quebec", replies the host. "Think of that referendum time. Every Place like this helps in the creation of an independent country" The restaurant is decorated with Quebecois handcrafts, some old and not for sale, others new, but in the old style and ticketed for sale. We eat traditional food--rabbit pie, among other things--and listen a young folk singer in the manner of a traditional balladeer (Hand 1984:55-71).

The ideology of nationalism plays with cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences among the people; it emphasizes what is distinct to particular groups and, formally and informally constructs relationships in the dichotomic framework "us/them". Every nation state implicitly or explicitly uses notions of particularism to legitimate policies of inclusion and exclusion (based on race, religion and ethnicity) (Schlesinger 1987:219-264). In its composite structure, nationalism posits a historical distinctiveness. The close political and cultural identification of the people with their nationality (as distinctiveness) is often equated with superiority of that nation over other nations and peoples. Since the real world is constantly changing, what is relevant to the politics of distinctiveness is a continuously changing perception. For example, yesterday's Soviet or Yugoslavian state identities rapidly are becoming Bosnian, Croatian, and Ukrainian, and today's Germanness, Frenchness or Greekness perhaps may become Europeanness in the future.

Nationalism, in brief, requires a constant process of readjustments, improvisations and adaptations. For instance, citizens of nationalized societies have often been driven towards the establishment of new identities as newly introduced modern life. First, the historic transformation of populations resulting in unity or homogenization eventually led to the construction of national discourses formalized and privileged on the basis of a national language thereby marginalizing various aboriginal languages or local dialects. Significantly, the process of unification created linguistic homogeneity of a given country's population.[7] The development of nationality among individuals who spoke a single common language provided new extended tools to the state's institutionalized capacity to exercise power in existing territorial boundaries.

It is precisely the terms of cultural embodiment of the imagined community that correspond to individual subjects as determined and determining. In effect, one carries the cultural formations of imagined community within oneself; one belongs to it by virtue of its deeply internal constitutions of one's being in the imagined community. Every individual member of an imagined community perceives the other as a subject of cultural experience. Societal culture provides settings for one's consciousness and unconsciousness associations with the idea of imagined community or "we relations". In other words, in an imagined community, through mutual activities of attending and being attended to by another, individual signs of consciousness and unconsciousness are mutually constituted from one member to another. Through this mutual constitution, the notion of nationalism is intersubjectively constituted within the individual conditions of experience as well as the societal forces of culture. At the same time, national consciousness develops within every individual only within a reflective cultural and social environment.

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[7] In *Peasants Into Frenchmen*, (1976) Eugene Weber employs helpful analogy for French national unification or cultural homogenization in comparison to nineteenth century's official figures on diversity of languages. As Weber demonstrates:

> In 1863, according to official figures, 8381 of France's 37,510 communes spoke no French: about a quarter of the country's population .... In 24 of the country's 89 departments, more than half of the communes did not speak French, and in six others a significant proportion of the communes were in the same position. In short, French was a foreign tongue for a substantial number of Frenchmen, including almost half the children who would reach adulthood in the last quarter of the century (Quoted in Segal 1988:309).

The self becomes a subject of nationalism through its reflective engagement with social circumstances. For these reasons, nationalism cannot be regarded as a separate, subjective realm of human life; rather it can be differentiated and distinguished only through social and individual reflections. Through intersubjective habituality, every individual also feels the social pressures of the national forces that come in and through the situations that the individual confronts in various social and cultural circumstances. And within the knot of nationality, one inescapably becomes sensitive to the national circumstances of social interaction processes in which one's nationality is produced, not only through official registration (i.e., passports) but also through the distinctive internalization of the culture of an imaginary community. With the development of national reflective sensitivity one also is subjectively oriented to the presence of others as well as disconnected from them through distinctively constituted national structures of perception in the interpretation of the reality.

The national forms of culture represent a subjective closure in the internal structures (i.e., consciousness and unconsciousness) of the individual. Thus national culture a distinct, collectively shared intersubjectivity and the subjective agent of communication and of social actions, determines the status of social sensitivity within the national practices of everyday lives as well as in the general order of the international environment. From this point of view, the subjective construction of the socially structured cognitive structures in the nationally-ordered world provides a spontaneous social form in which to directly perceive, express and act in the daily practices of life. The individual's social sensitivity to particular international and national problems is determined by the acting or motivating structures of intersubjective worlds or systems of the *habitus*. *Habitus*, as a durably installed generative principle is conceived here as instantaneous reflection of social sensitivity and the intersubjective preparedness of individuals to interpret various national and social situations. *Habitus* is the necessary basis for our immediate intersubjective understanding and responses to various situations.

In the work *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Bourdieu (1977) argues that it is necessary to understand the *modus operandi* which informs all thought and action and practical logic, as an *modus operandi* of habits and predispositions arising from, and in turn producing the practices of daily life (Bourdieu 1977:18-19). In the syntheses of identity and practices (what Bourdieu calls *habitus* or *opus operatum* of habits) socially-constructed systems of cognitive and motivating structures play a crucial role.

With the theory of *habitus*, Bourdieu attempts to understand social action in repetitive spheres. For Bourdieu, *habitus* is an important part of identity which is constituted by socialisation. According to Bourdieu, in the socialization process, *habitus* is the internalisation of a series of instructions that must be continually adjusted in particular conditions. In this sense *habitus* is long-lived but also pliable. From this point of view, Bourdieu's analysis of *habitus* deals with the conditions which determine durability or plasticity of the *habitus*.[8] Bourdieu also argues that social positions or status are coded by the *habitus*.

> [T]he habitus produces practices and representations which are available for classification, which are objectively differentiated; but they are immediately perceived as such only in the case of agents who possess the code, the classificatory models necessary to understand their social meaning. Thus, the habitus implies a "sense of one's place" but also a "sense of the other's place" (Bourdieu 1990:131).

Thus, *habitus* as internalised and operationalized by particular people refers to family, class, ethnicity and national phenomena; it is a logic derived from a common set of historical, cultural and material conditions of life, and governs the practice of a group of people in common response to those conditions. What is important in Bourdieu's theory of *habitus* is the attempt to explain the moment of its intervention between ideology and practice, structure and individual, and idea and agent.

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[8] For Bourdieu *habitus*, which is a structuring mechanism operates in two ways: conditioning and cognitive construction. He writes:

> Habitus as a system of dispositions to a certain practice, is an objective basis for a regular mode of behaviour, and thus for the regularity of modes of practice, and if practices can be predicted, ... this is because the effect of the habitus is that agents who are equipped with it will behave in a certain way in certain circumstances. That being said, this tendency to act in a regular manner which, when its principle is explicitly constituted, can act as the basis of a forecast ... is not based on an explicit rule or law. This means that the modes of behaviour created by the habitus do not have fine regularity of the modes of behaviour deduced from a legislative principle: the habitus goes hand in glove with vagueness and indeterminacy as a generative spontaneity which asserts itself in an improvised confrontation with ever-renewed situations, it obeys practical logic, that of vagueness, of the more-or-less, which defines one's ordinary relation to the world (Bourdieu 1990:77-78).

From this point of view, the theory of *habitus* helps us to understand nationalism through delineation of the self which interacts within its national universe and the continuous survival of national experiences and it's influence on changing particular identities. For example, being French, German or English also represents a form of intersubjective habituality. Whatever nationalism represents for an individual it is inescapably a matter of *habitus*, where one opens oneself to an inherently determining national world along with its ensuing autonomy and limits. Within these imagined communities, though the development of self in terms of the dispositions of habitus, every individual lives within the subjectively demarcated limits and options set by and through identities within which one's sense of reality is conditioned. These internal dispositions or identities with their limits and options are equally habitual reminders of self-control.

Without these highly stable and deeply rooted associations and attachments *habitus* as a practical logic guiding practices there would be greater mobility, insecurity and anxiety in the national life situation. The disruption of *habitus* directs individuals into situations where they must make decisions or choices without customary guidelines. By doing so, the individual gains substantially more autonomy and freedom from the nationalization processes.

The other important point here is that the nation is significant for individuals in their internal existence. The existence of others in the nation is intrinsic to one's existence because coexistence with others requires a prior abstract conceptual separation between oneself and the nation. Under the constructive ideologies of nationalism, every member of a particular nation is habitually sensitive and reflective to certain situations. Within the habitual world of subjective closure in which cultural elements of nationalism are significant motivating factors, one can affirm or negate the other's identity or explanations.

Political and cultural integration leading to the creation of a nation begins with a rational order yet sustains an irrational order based on a mystical integration. Nationalism constructs legitimacy through certain virtues, emotions, impulses and daily practices in the lives of individuals. As members of a nation, individuals relate to the territorial dimension of the nation, to the rules of the nation-state, and to the sanctified existence of the nation. Thus, belonging to a nation is preeminently a moral phenomenon which brings new meanings and solidarity to those suffering from the strains and conflicts of modernity.

Besides the construction of national elements manifested in spontaneous action or reflexive sensitivity, nationalism also refers, in specific ways, to a divine presence or sanctified possession. In other words, the modern formation of nationalism consists precisely of those irrational elements--beliefs, sentiments and practices--which have become essential parts of our national politics, economy, culture and morality. Modern culture--which is synonymous with sacrificial crisis, emptiness, and the dissolution of authentic existence--substitutes nationalism as the new religion and the sacred or divine presence binding a community together. Yet, nationalism as a simultaneous reference to a new religion and to rationality becomes contradictory and antithetical. With nationalism, the new modality of the sacred is a pervasive illusion that an imagined community sustains about its order, credibility and durability, and which in turn constitutes the citizen in ritual and sacrificial practices.

The point here is that what appears to us as an eternal general social order (concrete set of rules, practices, and expression of rite or sentiments) is actually based on the ideas of nationalism. In other words, what was once the general order authorized by a specific tradition or universalized religion, has been abstracted, routinized and embodied as national practices.

Similar arguments regarding the irrational construction of nationalism have been developed by Carleton J. Hayes. He argued that nationalism, like any belief or religion addresses not simply the reason but the spirit, will, imagination and emotions.[9] In Hayes' view, nationalism as a religious belief prescribes national

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[9] Hayes interpreted people's intense national loyalty in the religious sense. For him nationalist ideology among the masses of modernity is faith, rather than reason. He found extraordinary similarities between Christianity and the ideology of nationalism. For example he argues:

> The individual is born into the national state, and secular registration of birth is the national rite of baptism. Thenceforth the state solicitously follows him through life, tutoring him a national catechism, teaching him by pious schooling and precept the beauties of national holiness, fitting him for a life of service (no matter how exalted or how menial) to the state, and commemorating his vital crises by formal registration (with fee) not only of his birth but likewise his marriage, of the birth of his children, and of his death. If he has been a crusader on behalf of nationalism, his place of entombment is marked with the ensign of his service. The funerals of national heroes, potentates are celebrated with magnificent pomp and circumstance, while, since World War I a most

modes for art, general codes of thought and values of conduct. From Hayes point of view, nationalism increases the docility and unwillingness of the masses to tolerate contrary or different beliefs or opinions because nationalism rarely problematizes the providential character of their nationality, nation-state and society. Hayes presented nationalism as an exclusive docile nature based on mania or a kind of extremist particularism, a clamouring intolerance, xenophobia, and conflict aggression or wars (Hayes 1926).

The intelligentsia or bureaucrats consciously construct the systemic order of nationalism as a new mythology as well as theology. The nation state calls upon people to worship privately and publicly the new religion in the name of love of country. The nation state, like catholicism, claims in various ways that it will bring salvation for the daily problems of the whole nation soon. The symbols of this process are the national flag, national anthem, the birth and burial places of national heroes which become sacred shrines, and new mythologies which bring new meanings to the meaningless world of modernism. Nationalism as an irrational mythology is a driving force for the development of common faith that is linked to the goal of collective salvation, as well as to national eternity (Hayes 1960:164-170). The main point is that religious, irrational and rational state structures are exploited side by side, in the same rhetorical construction of nationalism. Presently people who enter the world must understand which of these Gods (national or religious) they would

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sacred shrine in a nation's capital city is the "Tomb of the Unknown Soldier". Here shine perpetual lights. Here floral offerings ever repose (Hayes 1960:160).

serve. Nationalism, as a form of irrational and rational constitution, restores to modern life pre-modern loyalty or a central authority, and a sense of social membership of belonging which provides order and meaning to individual existence.

Nationalism cannot easily assimilate or change cultural proliferation altogether. That is why nationalism, as a product of ideas, can be seen as an astonishingly weak ideology, because like most ideas about nature and novelty, the notion of nationalism is subject to articulations of both particularism and universal solidarity. Nationalism, which is considered to be a response to the problems of modernity, has not been able to prevent the new problems of modernism. The inadequacy of membership in the nation state as an identity of belonging, is manifested by the profound crises of identity and meaning suffered by so many individuals. The nation-state does not replace past communities. In this sense, it is truly an "imagined community", in the absence of meaningful social identities some individuals may adopt sub-national, ethnic, social, or other collective identities. In specific contexts, (of articulation to other discursive elements) these identities may be opposed to each other. In the modern world, many individuals deeply feel loneliness and insecurity within the imagined nation. In the face of such deepening contradictions, nationalism may become a powerful mobilizing force and a particular form of expression of the crisis of modern systems.

Under the conditions of postmodern politics--viewed as the ending of one era and the beginning of another--movements for social change have been increasingly concerned with freedom, autonomy, and as critics of the modern and national order.

In the new popular-nationalistic movements, the rhetoric of modernity has incorporated the nuances of liberation and freedom. However, the increasing nationalization of societies reduces the possibilities for an alternative collective to enhance individual and societal freedom and autonomy. In fact, nationalism typically develops in conjunction with a centralizing authority which decreases individual capacities for freedom of choice. Ironically, despite its modernist rhetoric of liberation, nationalism has often masked the reality of abuses of the "other's" freedom and has established rules and regulations for exclusion, division, and domination.

The nationalist reactionary expression against the problems of modernism such as increasing inequality in the conditions of life, limitations on freedom, or increasing crime, takes two opposite directions. On the one hand, the reaction can be pro-modernist opposing deviation from the project of modernity and in this sense, nationalism becomes a modernization strategy for crises in systems and social integration (Sonnert 1988:46-47). For example, current nationalist movements in East Europe (i.e., Czechs, Slovakians and former East Germany) and in the former Soviet republics express the desire to develop along Western paths of modernity. In the cases of (the former socialist republic of) Yugoslavia, Georgia, and Azerbajian, nationalism (initially articulated as a vehicle for the rapid development of Western style consumerist capitalism) has degenerated into ugly, ethnic wars, genocides, ethnic cleansing and massive systemic rapes.

On the other hand, in other cases such as Algeria, Iran or some Central Asian republics, the ideology of nationalism becomes an anti-modern response to the crises of modernity and favours a return to traditional conditions or life systems. This nationalism rejects the modernist ideal of individual autonomy and it emphasizes pre-capitalist collective identities on the bases of history, religion and tradition (Sonnert 1988:47-48). For example the rising nationalist fundamental religious social movements in many countries came about as a reaction to modern cultural developments. The dialectic of the reactive nationalist movements is rooted in the contradictions between traditional mythical world views and modernization.

In confronting new kinds of social relations within "modern" or "national" structures, individuals tend to become parts of a functional national totality. To be free, the individual must become very aware of the limiting and alienating logic of the great modern and national structures which systematically regulate impulses, emotions, aspirations, manners of life, and ways of thinking in the course of everyday lives.

SUMMARY

In this chapter, I argued that the possible meanings of nationalism are inscribed within the structures of culture. The development of nationalist discourse has recently been linked convincingly to the growth of vernacular culture by Benedict Anderson. The development of vernacular culture is an important phenomenon not only because it is an organizing force of nationalism but also because it reflects the operative structures of the modern state and civil society. In rising vernacular culture, nationalism is connected with the new mass information technologies. That is to say, the modern construction of the centrality of nationalism (of imagined communities) is continuously posited by the mass media through the production of nationally sensitive identities. The postmodern era's so-called massive development of new information and knowledge, encompasses the discourses of nationalism (which include structures of distinctiveness), and carry them to transitional mass culture in which the idea of nation has so often been rejuvenated with reference to a history supposedly belonging to nationals. Thus, in the new information societies, nationalism is a framework for information, and for the cultural products of modern elites who seek to expand their potential control over the mobilization of the masses in particular territories (Bauman 1992b: 675-701).

I also argued that the ensemble of beliefs, values, and norms that constitute a given distinct culture of nationalism operates as a reflective sensitivity or pervasive internal control, a set of limits and options within which social interactions and practices are contained, a *habitus* as a learned cultural disposition to which the self must comply. The subjective complexity of being in national culture includes a tacit agreement between the national conditioning of the social practices and the individual's positions and dispositions. One carries social positions of nationalism within oneself. One belongs to a particular nation by virtue of a distinct culture belonging to a part of one's internal subjective constitution. I mentioned that nationalism also construct the *habitus* or the subjective dispositions and practices that encroach upon one's authenticity. Whatever one's social, economic or political positions are, one is inherently sensitive to the particular national world in which one's limits and freedoms are determined by the habitation of nationalism.

It is here that the inner experience of nationalism also becomes a place for new religious premises of worshipping. The discourse of nationalism compels the masses of modernity with echoing narrative stories of symbolic and mythical figures that essentially recreate nationalism as a "divine-right", or the nation as an object of worship. The Christian, Muslim and Jew who have religious salvation in mind, are now transformed into worshippers of new myths of nation, whose continuous imaginary presences constitute divine desire. In the divine order of nationalism, citizens as abstract objects of power are like things. And sometimes citizens have to be sacrificed, i.e., (national wars) in order for the people to achieve salvation. The masses who are sacrificed in national wars help to reproduce their nations as instruments of a divine and imaginary salvation.

CHAPTER FOUR

NATIONALISM: AS A VOICE OF DIFFERENTIATION

Identity offered by the postulated membership of the inner circle of friends is circumscribed...by the non-identity relationship to the outer circle of enemies. The 'we-ness' of friends owes its materiality to the 'they-ness' of the enemies. ... Always made-up, almost always contested, [identity] tends to be fragile and unsure of itself; this is why the we-talk can seldom stop. Identity stands and falls by the security of its borders, and the borders are ineffective unless guarded.

(Zygmunt Bauman 1992b:678-679)

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will examine further the contemporary condition of nationalism. Specifically, I wish to identify some structuring features at the core of modernity which interact with the reflective, cognitive and emotive structures of the self. Nationalism consists of psychological, sociological and cultural phenomena, invented and supported by the elites of modernity to gain control of the masses through the subjective constitution of the self and collective identities. By the same token, nationalism becomes more than a thing, object or representation; it becomes a new locus of power.

Nationalism first dissolves traditional identities within the modern abstraction, and then reconstitutes them as an exclusionary difference and as its own affirmation. The power of nationalism also reflects the ability of the intelligentsia to recapture and to project the images and representations with which individual citizens identify. Nationalism is the desire of the elites that reproduces itself outside of ourselves in the reconstitution of subjective reality as a imperative order within the nationally defined terms; it is through this foundationalist desire that one's sense of being is under subjection, in which one's representations and relationship with the other/self (the reflected image of the Other) is determined. One's relationship to and representation of the conditions of differentiation are in effect a constituted part of subjectivity. A signifying operation for subjectivity is also founded on the functional structure of nationalism, in terms of a discourse/text that inscribes the multitude of signs from ones' identity to another.

In light of the above reflections, this chapter treats the phenomenon of nationalism as a text/discourse marked by the absence of any concrete and definable content. It cannot be arranged as a field of knowledge with a centre or fixed foundation for there is no single meaning and signification inherent to the discourse of nationalism; rather, meanings reside in the interaction between the text/discourse of nationalism, and the individual.[1] Both are products o interactional processes which are continuously inter-referential. In these processes, the discourse of nationalism functions to attach the individual to discursively positioned interactions. In effect, nationalist subjectivity is part of the power struggle to discursively construct subject positions.

Based on the foregoing approach which draws upon work by Erikson, Lacan, Foucault, Levinas, Barthes and Derrida, this chapter discusses the formation of identities and expressive acts through the national symbolic and imaginary order, and the interior and external relational ensembles of meanings as understood within dialogues of the self.[2] Furthermore, the interactions of reciprocally constituted individuals within the ideologies of nationalism are here understood as the ultimate expression of the collective national subjectivity of the individuals. Nationalism in relation to this collective subjectivity represents an externality (national regime) as well as an internality (national identity). These produce the collective recognition by individuals of interrelatedness, and underpin collective action or expression *vis-a-vis* "others".

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[1] Foundationalism inscribes general accounts and specific guides for/to certainty, truth, correctness, validity and centre. Intertexuality, on the other hand, refers to complex interwoven relationships in which one discourse or subject relates to another (see Derrida 1981b:59-61; Barthes 1980:73-82).

In this approach, the nation is not an external force that coerces previously isolated individuals; rather it is *internal* to these individuals, determining their interrelatedness, and playing a significant role in forming who they are. Put another way, the nation is implicitly and explicitly related to the internal constitution of self. The citizen exists by virtue of the nation, and the nation is only possible as long as individuals continue to apprehend themselves and each other in reference to it.

I discussed the discourse of nationalism in relation to the individual's social conditioning and cognitive construction in the conditions of modernity. Thus, I foregrounded nationalism in the collective identities of the individual and in the economic, cultural and political discourses of modernity (i.e., industrialism, capitalism and colonialism). I will now examine, in the psychological realm, the ways in which nationalism has specifically gone about situating a "we" identity as an object of nation building by defining the individual in dialogical relation to other individuals or to the nation itself. Here, the discourse of nationalism defines the characteristics of the nation *par excellence*, and thus orients individual subjects towards it. While the nation presents itself as the example *par excellence* among many, the identity of the individual also reflects normative patterns of a particular nation in the logic of likeness or resemblance. Thus, the identity of an individual necessarily interacts with the nation's symbolic constructions of virtue, superiority, inferiority, and so on.

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[2] Dialogues of the self refers to a relation between consciousness, unconsciousness, acting individual subject and the surrounding environment. Structuralist and poststructuralist scholars such as, Lacan, Foucault and Derrida portrayed the subject as a de-centred and dislocated transformative interplay of "differences". Dialogues of the self also refers to the inter personal relation between "I" and "the Other" (between natural, human components and the alien, non human components; between consciousness and unconsciousness) and between subject and fellow-subjects. In this view, the self is a simultaneous dialogue between intersubjectivity with "the Other" and an authentic experience with the "I" in the structures of unconsciousness and consciousness ("the Other" and "I") (see, Levinas 1981; Theunissen 1984; Derrida 1978:79-154; Lacan 1977a:292-326).

Later, with regard to the national order, I will examine the collective identities of the individual and his/her national differentiation from others. However, national identity (which may also be considered an experience and experiment in the impossible) is produced by chance, and is experienced as a limit or boundary of oneself. In other words, the reference of nationalism to the individual subject transforms chance into destiny.

NATIONALISM AND *WE* IDENTITY

Every nation develops its existence through constituted collective identities that are also significant parts of one's subjective knowledge of dialogical selves. These national collective identities not only ensure radical alterity of individuals (i.e., that they will be in certain respects separated from themselves) but also individual reactions to their experiences of the life-world on the bases of subjective knowledge and behavioral patterns proper to objective and subjective reality. Whatever individual's national roots, their subjective knowledge of life arises through individual socialization and is maintained in consciousness and unconsciousness as multiple selves (I and "the Other" relationship) by virtue of social processes. While the subjective knowledge of nationalism is firmly installed in time and space, the identities of nationalism are temporally and spatially discontinuous--characteristics deriving from their exclusiveness on the other identities and lack of permanent fixity.

Individual experience can be understood as taking place within a national world that also dwells within others, and which interacts with others. At the same time, this new national world, through the institutionalization of communicative practices, aims to create false "we" identities in which commonality is not really shared but is violently imposed through the homogenization of culture. As a consequence, in the modern era the self becomes both a subject through the foundation of the national discourse and an agent for the instrumentality and construction of reality.

As a basis for self-constitution, new political, cultural and social images facilitate a fictitious common bond in the context of a standardized national culture, joint territorial association (the homeland), collective differentiation (along the lines of national languages, heroes, myths, flags, anthem, historical origin and memories), and the shared experience of a unified national system of common legal rights and duties under common national laws and institutions. The structures of national identity also evolve with incessant activities of conceptualization, abstractions, redefinitions and reclassification of various political, cultural and social images through the self-constitutions of the individual (i.e., enemy, citizen, immigrant, refugee, foreigner, tourist, international businessman). The central feature of national identities has always been understood in terms of differences (what divides nationals from others) and commonality (what connects them). In this sense, national identities are essential parts of the individual's sense of self; the integral definitions of belongingness "I", "we", and "them", manifest themselves in both defensive and offensive, or inclusive and exclusive patterns.

Generally, national identity is a broader concept than national role or orientation, just as human is a broader concept than identity. The value of distinctions in identity becomes clear when we ask, who we are, what we have been, and what we will be. At first sight it may appear that, despite the familiarity and popularity of these terms, in answering these questions one lacks precise definitions, understandings and answers. The answers depend on the intelligible differences among individuals' beliefs, cultures and histories. One's answers can be engaged within the interest and meaning relative to the scope of a national ideology or within national subjective identities. The limits of one's comprehension are coextensive with subjective identity structures (i.e., beliefs, norms and habitus) partially implicated in a national language, culture, and history. That is to say, there are certainly national constraints on the interpretation of reality and life processes.

Interpretations are certainly constrained by national interests and by the national means available for the realization of those interests. In general, one may say that, on the one hand, identity represents the appearance of a discontinuous self, and, on the other hand, the relation between identity and the self manifests itself as continuous means, codes, interests and values (society as a part of "the Other" exists within every socialized individual).

There is an ongoing dialectic of socialization which comes into being in the very first phases of childhood and continues to unfold throughout the individual's existence in society. At the same time, identity is the multiple dimensions of an individual within her/himself and within the total system of signification engaged among layers of the subject and "the Other" (Lacan 1979:67-136).[3] According to Lacan, multiple performances by the individual are also coextensive symbolic orders of a particular language. The symbolic order of language encompasses the structural symbols which have a discursive, bipolar function of sign (signifier and signified). Lacan believes that each subject, as an image, accomplishes its unique identity through its differences from other images in the symbolic order. There is no subject or image isolated as a thing-in-itself meaning. In this context, Lacan maintains the idea that every subject or every image is always already in the positions of signifier and signified. However, in Lacanian terms, despite the changeability of the structural and symbolic conditions of the subject as signifier and signified, every individual subject is born into a pre-established order which is symbolic in nature--the world of language and the systems of symbolic exchange between one's parents. This pre-established symbolic world is also a fixed centre point for one's subjective identity and its subjective place in the world. To put it another way, with birth, one inherits a symbolic map to guide one's understanding and a fixed point for one's subjective positions in society. This pre-established symbolic order represents determining and closed possibilities for every individual. Birth in a pre-established world outlines for one a destiny or impossibility to choose one's subjective position. The pre-established symbolic order signifies contingency for one's personality, identity and status within the order of impossibility.

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[3] According to Lacan the dimension of people's experience lies beyond conscious and rational discourse. One of his principal theses is that "the unconscious is a part of our concrete discourse, in so far it is trans-individual, that is not at the disposal of subjects in re-establishing the continuity of their conscious discourses. Taking this as a starting point, then, Lacan concludes that "the Other" (with a capital *O*) can be understood within the unconscious and he also indicates that recognition of the unconscious is the recognition of the discourse of "the Other". In other words "the Other", is not noticeable in life styles, traditions, customs and characters. It is a dimension of human experience but beyond the apprehension of individual subjects (see Lacan 1977a:49-53; 1977b:131).

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND LIVING WITH THE IMPOSSIBLE[4]

One experiences national identification or social differentiation as something which springs from a chance outcome of birth. Nationality is thus experienced as a fixed reference or destiny impossible to change. Following the global expansion of nationalism, after birth, "every being" is destined to become a member of a chosen people of a particular nation e.g., a German as someone who by chance was born in Germany and who speaks German. One could just as well have been a gipsy. This fate, however, determines a great deal of an individual's life experience, in a way which one has little power to alter. National identification as a destiny has impoverished life by connecting chance to impossibility. Because of nationalism, geography and language are destiny.

National identification is one's destiny and it can be as impoverishing as living with the impossible. Individuals are inevitably different from what national identification authorizes them to be or obliges them to believe they are. National identification is an experience of borders that limits experience; it is also integral to the idea of fluid and changing form. In other words, one's experience of life and identity are always in a process of permanent transformation within a movement of transfixion and loss. Through the identity process, nationality is a reflection of an illusion that measures "beingness" as an experience of impossibility.

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[4] I conceive nationalism here as an experience of a fixed point within impossibility, because it is like physical characteristics such as skin colour, height and gender impossible to erase, change or determine in the context of identity or belongingness. Nationalism is exercised not in the order of the possible, but as an experience of the impossible in reference to destiny or chance.

Through birth, one's identity is delineated within immutable borders. Birth by chance defines identities through sex, race and nationality in a pre-established symbolic order and, as a result, it is also a key for one's opportunities in future life processes. After birth, the functions of identity are first rooted in the self in the closed system of spatiality and then, in temporality through the communication with things, family, state and a particular society or community as a clearly demarcated group. Through these functions of identity, the individual can define himself first as a "being in itself" and second (in relation to society through the frame of a socially recognizable identity of a belongingness) as "being for themselves". In other words, one can conceptualize the general structure of identity within the two simultaneous representations of singularity and collectivity. The first representation is self-representation as a mind set, sensibility, and emotion, as felt and lived by individuals. The second representation is reproduced in identification with others based on difference and resemblance. Thus, identity is a representational relationship which presents itself as self-understanding, self-presentation and orientation toward other people and community. From this perspective, in the politics of nationalism, identity functions according to a representational relationship based on fabricated likeness and difference.

In fact, national identification in general is not identification with oneself or relation to oneself, but it is the imaginary formation and affirmation of identity based on likeness. It is in this aspect that somebody's national identification represents difference to itself and difference with self that is maintained in various political discourses through likeness and difference with others; exclusion of those without and homogenization of those within. Furthermore, through patterns of national relations, identity carries not only the sense of belonging, directed towards the context of imaginary cooperation and solidarity, but it also exists within a resistance and reactionary relation of one's cultural identity to another. The value of nationalism here capitalizes on singularity through self-representation, since it must be linked to the discourse of the collectivity that inscribes the universal in the body of the particular.

Identity politics, through the national, cultural and sexual constitutions of the individual, is one of the most vexing issues of our time. One's identity or identification is not a stable truth with which one is born, but is the function of a mutable internalization of "the Other" through the symbolic world of culture. Therefore, it is always a function of the social interaction system. Identity is not an internalized single and united entity apart from the world; it is infinite in its variety of formations which are necessarily made within the various experiences of cultural codes, races, nations, genders and belief systems. In short, to conceive the very nature of one's existence, one has to attempt interrupt an impossibility or a destiny that is governed by national identification. Therefore, in essence, the effort of being otherwise than subject is linked to the very nature of freedom as a break from the determinism of subjectivity or the constructions of nationalism.

DIALOGUES OF SELF AND NATIONALISM

Identity develops in the very core of the cultural and natural worlds in which we live and it defines us wholly within the common yet divided worlds of others as we take various roles ourselves in the place of "the Other". Cultural codes and meaning systems remain as the very structuring elements of one's identity; their presence requires continuity through self-transformation. In other words, the cultural codes both enable and limit us as we live without being capable of seeing ourselves as "what" and "who" we are.

From this perspective, one's subjective identity not only refers to the ultimate role "the Other" as a representative condition of one's own subjective life-world experience but it also refers to a physical organism and to a constructed sense of the body (see Theunissen 1984:59-70). The combining structures of identity, physical and constructed body first begin to take shape with one's birth and later they are developed within the culture. For example, in the modern cultural spheres of daily life, some features of the body, i.e, colour and gender are implicitly and explicitly coded onto one's subjective identity as articulation of positive and negative qualities or differences.

Identities are perpetually incomplete and de-centred representations: they always exist within a process of differentiation and continual formation through symbolic and imaginary practices. In this process, identity as a bodily and worldly appearance situated in a spatial world is experienced chiefly through social actions and expressions, social actions and expressions also undergo continual change and adjustments, while identity imposes order, repetitions, stability, differentiations and continuity on the subjective constitutions of the world.

The constitutive functions of identity rely on external and internal dialogues and relations. The internal dialogue of identity relates to a communicative self that derives structures either from an original, repressed structure of the "I" such as instinct and desire, or from various intersubjective constructions of "the Other". The external relations of identity represent a dialogue between the subject's identity, the surrounding natural environment (reality), and the societal and cultural environment. These external and internal dialogues of identity constitute the subject as dislocated and de-centred representations.

The dialogues of identity are dependent on social engagements within internal and external dialogues throughout the life of the subject and, implicity or explicitly, relate to anything that might apply to them. At the beginning of the social identification process, one's identity is primarily shaped by one's mother who constitutes the reflective world within which every sign and image becomes important for the signification of primary identification. The mother, who speaks, moves or caresses, signifies to the subject how to recognize him/herself and relate to others. In the term coined by Lacan, the other becomes a mirror for the self.[5] According to

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[5] In Lacanian analysis, the identity of an individual develops within a series of mirror stages. In the first six months of life, the infant's experience of itself is united since it draws no difference between self and other. This also represents a perceptual gap between the inside world and the outside world. During this period, the infant merges with various elemental instincts such as sucking milk from the mother's breast. In the second stage, between six and eighteen months of age, a difference between self and the other develops. By seeing its own body image in the mirror, the

Lacan, in the process of mirroring, the infant becomes aware of itself in the perceptual gap between the "I" which looks and the "I" which is seen; in the second stage, the unified is continuous with the other reflected as an image from the mirror. Thus, the self is transformed from an indigenous to an illusionary identification by the reflected mirror image and the self becomes more or less a fragmented unity created by the reflections from mirror image. In the Lacanian view, this stage of the identity process is a turning point, for after this stage, the individuals' relation to him/herself is always mediated through a totalizing image that comes from outside. The reflected image becomes a unified ideal that organizes and replaces the inherent original self. But since the self is necessarily a totalized structure of reflected images, it is also

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infant begins to recognize the gap between the *I*--the body image reflected in a mirror--and the *I*--which looks to the image. This gap is immediately recovered by the subject's identification and unification with its own image in a mirror. In other words, by seeing its own image the infant cognitively transfers its mirror image to the self or "the Other" (Other with a capital *O*). It appears to have control and unity within itself through its reflected image. Although such unity is imaginary, the subject identifies with it and the subject as a relation to its image is constituted by both the position of seeing and the object of seeing. Lacan calls this stage the mirror stage. Later, in the post-mirror stage, with the infant's entry of symbolic order such as language, the infant is introduced to a subject position within the symbolic world in which the subject is both created in language and exposed to the signifier of a symbolic world which is pre-established. The subject's identity which is produced in the pre-established symbolic world, also links the indigenous self and the alien "Other" through with reflections at the mirror stage. That is to say, imaginary identity which is constituted conjunction with visual perceptum and language, relies on both the difference between the self and the other, and consists of the participation process for subjective the "I" position within the discourse or language. In other words, the development of the infant's identity through, pre-mirror, mirror-stage, and post-mirror stage, and the subject's relation to him/herself is always mediated by a totalizing image that has come from outside. Therefore both the subject and its image is accompanied by a totalizing ideal of the mirror image that organizes and orients the self in the dialogical line of illusion and alienation (see Lacan 1977a:1-8).

divided or split between outside and inside, between absence and presence.

Thus, the national identity formed through dialogues of self are contingent and de-centred; it is ambiguously known, systematically elusive; it is not simply in the self being observed between the "I" and "the Other". National identities are not independent from the outside world within the processes of imaginary signification; we do not have control over them, despite the operative notion that as rational beings we do control them.

Through the unifying concept of image, and its symbolic interaction with national, cultural and real space, identity essentially gives form to the subject in the sense of direction, seeing, understanding and perceptions. Identity is a multitude of images which guide the development of acts that simulate the social structure in which symbolic signifiers develop. In this sense, not only is each individual's identification, perception and world view defined and redefined by others, but also literally the individual interacts in the roles of object or subject.

National discourse as a web of interactions functions in various ways for the signification of the identities of individuals. At the same time, the flow of symbolic signifiers within the national discourse is also blended with differentiating signifiers which implicitly or explicitly relate the notions of time, space and national culture. In other words, individual identities operate in the system of national and social interactions as the contingent consequences of the acts, representations, and images constructed by the signifying environment of national culture.

In the relation of symbolic interchange between societal structure as signifier and the individual as signified, the various meanings, associations and conflictual fragmentation are also continuously installed in the process of communicative action. The flow of symbolic signifiers plays an essential role for the formation of external and internal identities. Among these signifiers are the symbols of universalism and particularism, ethnicity and nationalism. The formation of individual identities in the dialogical forms of self: the "I" and "the Other", is what particularly concerns our analysis of nationalism.

In various forms of national life, there is a tremendous diffusion of symbolic signifiers that force national subjects to develop new conceptions of themselves and the world. These diffuse symbolic signifiers of nationalism rest upon the capacity to develop one's imaginary identity by constructing new life forms through the destruction of prior qualities and alternative life programs. What emerges is a national cultivation of identities that yields the constitution of difference within the forms of likeness. In other words, identity represents a kind of mould that takes form within global cultural homogenization and distinct cultural heterogenization. However, within this continuously changing world, some relations, entities and constructions are more stable than others. From this point of view, the continuing interactions of individuals within a nation is likely create a dialogue between individual and nation. This dialogue is a social given in the human condition and manifests itself in the social process of interaction through which people are developing their own meaning, concepts, values and actions in regard to one another.

In the continuously changing nature of life, the national processes of interaction involve both the subjective construction and constant reformation of identities. In the realm of the ongoing dialogue of nationalization, nation exercises its power over individuals and their lives through the signification of imaginary national identities. In this sense, the structuring elements of the nation penetrate one's functioning and, most importantly, they create the differentiation and uniqueness of various collective and individual identity types with respect to specific cultures, economics, politics, time and space. In other words, national identity is a social product and it is specifically founded upon those cultural values, beliefs, and ideals that develop through the constantly changing dialogues of individual existence and the social or natural environment.

In the social aspect, identity gives us our fundamental orientation to conceptualize what is significant and valuable to us and what is not. Identity--the answer to the question: who am I?--is an imaginary construction that depends upon various symbolic significations. On this point, a similar argument was made by the philosopher David Hume in his work *A Treatise of Human Nature*: "the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one ...[it] depends on the relations of ideas; and these relations produce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion" (Hume 1964:540-543). These symbolic reference points constantly change through the dialectics of history. The differentiation of interactions with various symbolic reference points maintains the development of specific identities in the general process of history, time and space.

Identities in the so-called postmodern era represent a necessary feature of all forms of life and core systems of meanings. The identity of an individual or a nation is not given but is a relational and authoritative construction by which fellow individuals attribute differences to each other. National language, tradition, culture, history and territorial attachments are all determinants of the content of national identities and social interactions. The phenomenon of national identity is critical because it has both spatial and temporal dimensions through its relevance to circumstances, ideas, and events.

Erik Erikson who, above all others, laid the foundations of psychoanalytical identity theory and the identity crisis of modernization and nationalization, demonstrates identity's genetic continuity with reference to self representations through life's successive stages--infancy, early childhood, play age, school age, adolescence, young adult, adulthood and mature age (see Erikson 1963; 1975). Erikson claims that identity, which is a part of the individual and an important element of group coherence and solidarity, is an ongoing process from infancy to old age.

Erikson describes the function of identity in three levels: "identity-diffusion", "identity-foreclosure" and "identity-play" (see Erikson 1960:37-38). According to him, personal identity is based on "the immediate perception of one's self-sameness and continuity in time; and the simultaneous perception of the fact that others recognize one's sameness and continuity".[6] In Erikson's view, identity formation is an "evolving configuration" resting upon inner motives and upon social interactions that alter it in the different stages of the life cycle.[7] Erikson interprets self-representations within the discourse of a number of identities that exist within the connotations of self. Then he specifies these connotations: the first is "a conscious *sense of individual identity*", the second is "an unconscious striving for a *continuity of personal character*", the third is "a criterion for the silent doings of *ego synthesis*", and the fourth is "a maintenance of an inner *solidarity* with a group's ideal and identity" (Erikson 1960:38). In short, what is important in Erikson's works on identity formation is the maintenance of a framework for identity as a work of the inner and the outer, or genetical and social forces, and it is an exposition of the sources of identity crisis within genetic and social stages of life and negative social identity which is developed through orientation of life as a member of society (Erikson 1959:161-164, 1960:44-54). It is in this way that, nationalism, while retaining its signifying meanings as symbolic and cultural discourse, takes on another specific psychological meaning expressed as crises of identity.

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[6] Erikson referred to personal identity as ego identity or ego. He underlined genetic continuity with reference to ego (Erikson 1959:23).

From this point of view, through generalized identifications in the regimes of nationalism, a crisis in national culture is a crisis of identity; or vice versa, and the rise of nationalism boosts the egocentric side of individual identities. That is to say, any change, chaos, or turmoil in the national cultural order or standards of life will eventually affect the individual's sense of identity at the psychological level through a rise in anxieties or feelings of insecurity. One's sense of identity develops in the notions of permanence and change, or trace and erasure.

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[7] For Erikson identity formation is "successive ego syntheses and resyntheses throughout childhood" and it gradually integrates "constitutional givens, idiosyncratic libidinal needs, favoured capacities, significant identifications, effective defenses, successful sublimations, and consistent roles" (Erikson 1959:116).

Permanence in identity represents a continuity between past and present, or the durability of affiliations and associations of the individual with his/her surrounding social and natural environment. Removing or altering stability and durability of particular reference points (national) in one's life will eventually spark anxiety and crises of identity. Identity crises may further provoke dynamic social and individual actions for the defense and reinforcement of already held national or group identities. Strengthened social affiliations or reaction to new identifications may result from changing national and social circumstances. Likewise, the individual will actively seek to find new reference points in order to establish new social identifications. An attempt to secure or to make new social identifications can easily allow various interest, religious and ethnic groups to divide the nation in order to make new syntheses of identifications.

In sum, change in the general economic, cultural and political circumstances of a particular nation, and its nationalized identification, confronts the identity of each individual within the nation. Under the unconscious motivations of anxiety and crises in identity, individuals will seek either reinforcement of their former identity or the creation of new identifications. Thus, in the regimes of nationalism, identity politics replace representation with essentiality and virtue with necessity.

At this point, the considerations of national identity formation can be applied directly to one of the main conceptualizations of identification and sources of self on two distinct levels: inner-self and outer-self. These two aspects of identity constitute the totality of the self and its identity. In identity formation, there is a continuous silent imaginary (internal) and symbolic (external) signification which are analytically separable aspects of self: the "I" and "the Other".

The internal identity or inner-self is essentially a functional aspect of the national structure of values, morals, intentions, motives, feelings and priorities. The inner-identity also relates the mental process that refer to national meanings, representations and understanding, to the symbolic interactions of nationalism. The inner-identity within the cognitive framework evaluates, monitors, constructs and audits the action of subjects and its representations, perceptions, and images that allows men and women to "see" their specific positions in the national formation as inevitable, natural and as an essential operation of experience and "reality". The internal identity of nationalism does not represent an objective existence but that of a subjective construction which consists of various representative meanings, marks and traces. Internal identity also contains characteristics of national individuality in a more stable and constant sense across different social time periods and space. In short, the national subject's relation to nationalism constantly produces problems of self-fulfilment and self-actualization.

The functional internal aspect of the national identity of the self is a split structuration between consciousness (as a accessible psyche) and unconsciousness (the concealed and repressed series of drives and forces in psyches). Consciousness is too often misleadingly recognized as the only determinate force on the psychic activity of the individual. However, Lacan supports the view that the subject is guided by the situational factors of the other, or the unconscious, of which people are scarcely aware (Lacan; 1979:17-53). The unconscious for the subject is that which represents often inaccessible and unknown subjective structures of the self-identity (although it is a key). The contents of the unconscious are structured and they are signified by that part of the symbolic order that carries the function of being in itself. The unconscious part of self identity is not based on particular values or norms but that of repressed and concealed representations, structures, traces and discourses which are independently operational from the functioning of consciousness. The unconscious produces a chain of signifiers or an invisible system of energy that allows to conceal the very existence of nationalism in one's conscious action.

In the life process, the self appears as a persona, a role, an appearance which is essentially interpreted within the boundaries of consciousness rather than as unconsciousness or subjectivity. For this reason, people are in a position to posit their subjective identity or "the Other" in a context of self consciousness. However, despite its concealed status, the unconscious is in fact, the fundamental actor upon which the consciousness or social action and expression is really dependent.

There is a close relationship between the discourse of nationalism and the unconsciousness through the internalization of nationally imposed representations, divisions and differences in the structures of "the Other". The discourse of nationalism sustains the national subject not only as a set of political and cultural ideas, but as fundamental structures for his or her subjective identity in which unconsciousness is forced into a position where it is characterized as a fundamental and inaccessible ideological site for the national representation and reproduction of the nationalized subject. The processes of subjection in the nationalist discourse largely works through and in construction of unconsciousness as internalized sets of power relation or the weaving of national traces and marks. The formation of unconsciousness by nationalism too often goes unnoticed in the social practices, because unconsciousness is the unsaid part of social practices. But it is an unsaid that is continually spoken in the social practices that conceal it. At this point, what is important is Lacan's conception of the unconscious as "the discourse of the other" because it carries the intersubjective continuity of national discourse into the identity of self (Lacan 1977:255, 265 and 1979:131).

In postmodern politics, nation effectively provides the contextual representation, status and role for the subject. This is the so-called outer-self, or external part of identity, in which, as an imaginative view, one stays in positions or roles which are usually constituted by formal standards of conduct and achievement relevant to actual everyday performances. Outer-self is the active agent of the consciousness: it can be understood as the performer of nationally or socially constructed roles and statuses. In other words, external identity represents one's formative view of oneself in the group, society or the nation as one thinks of being and acting as the occupant of particular positions or roles. In this sense, external identity represents one's more corporeal performances in everyday life. For the maintenance of group solidarity and coherence and for the acceptance of individual participation, every individual has to stay within the socially constructed contents of roles and statuses. Under these circumstances, outer-identity provides the formal site for the performative functions of the regimes of nationalism.

More generally, within the totality of self, there is a double existence: public and private life. In that sense, the problems of identity reflect a continuous conflict within the self. The conception of identity on the one hand involves socially or formally imposed roles and statuses; on the other hand, it consists of an unseeable system of drives, forces (unconsciousness) and individually differentiated meaning systems (irrationality) that attempt to determine the physical activity of the individual. When the identities of individuals are confirmed by the roles and norms available in the social and national order, the role players have to repress some side of their disoriented internal identity.

From this point of view, there is a double edge to individual psychology. On the one hand, national identity is manifested outside of the individual in a set of positions, statuses, and roles performed for social recognition and the acceptance. On the other hand, national identity is at the core of social self and represents social practices in everyday life. National identity that we are striving to conceptualize is constructed by discourses which define likenesses within the nation and differences with those outside of the nation. In other words, in the social and cultural realm of nation, national identity based on a representational relationship also refers to a national character in the context of resemblance and likeness among the members of nation.[8] In fact, if many people honour the superiority of the nation, and if their systematic conformity with it correlates with the assumption of being a better human being, it is only because they have transformed a representational relationship into a relationship of identity. Thus through the discourse of nationalism, by way of a double representation (superior nation and superior people), an imaginary relationship of likeness is transformed into the essence of identity for a hierarchical constitution of reality. The people believe in the nation, as their superior entity according to the political and cultural model of imaginary illusions, which becomes a definitive parts of their lives. In political terms, this means that so-called superior beings of a particular nation have natural title to what they posses, and occupy, be it a superior, a ruler or an oppressor. National character, or sameness, which is continuously invested through identities and is unconsciously or consciously manifested in action, expressions and understandings is one of the most significant bases of group coherence and distinctiveness as well as of the individual expression of racism and discrimination.

If one conceptualizes the general structures of national representations, one can present duplicated representations or two simultaneous functions of substitution between the idea of a nation and self-identity through the instrumentality of national symbols. In the functions of substitutions, the idea of nation is reproduced in the form of a self-identity and a chain of signifying symbols (represented/representing or likeness to the elements of a nation). But then, self-identity begins to substitute itself for the idea of nation. Thus, nationalism constantly indicates the ideological function of representations by which the idea of nation, its reproduced identity, is taken for self.

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[8] Within the framework of national identity formation, national character can be conceptualized as a particular set of national conventions and cultural values which, in social interaction processes, are mutually internalized by the members of nation (Erikson 1963:285-324, 1975; Duijaker and Fridja 1960).

National identity as a socio-cultural and political phenomenon represents a constant diffusion of meanings, ideals and values, and receives a specific psychosocial and psychoanalytical meaning within the self. National ideologies continuously support such meanings to the extent that they channel people at each stage from childhood to old age, to adopt life-styles in which particular roles, statuses and social ideals are expressed. The constructive concepts of national identities act as codes which transform the self and its actions, expressions and attitudes. Individuals participate in social action not as purely autonomous beings but as bearers of special statuses or roles. In short, under the nationalist rhetoric, the self is transformed into a national phenomenon and transcendentally reduced to the dialogues of "the Other". Then our social environment represents constructed reflective activity in which it is difficult to find undistributed, united, consistent and non-transformative self-identities. Indeed, in the apparatus of the nation-state, intellectuals and various elite groups fabricate images, roles and statuses which transform and differentiate the self. Nationalism like gender or other social identities carries representations in which people become prisoners of particular modes of thought and desire .

NATIONALISM IN IMAGINARY AND SYMBOLIC WORLDS

Nationalism is an imaginary and symbolic product of modern communicative practices (Anderson 1983). It is an imaginary story in which people tell themselves who they are, where they live, and how they came to be there. As such, modern communicative practices create fictitious stories of nationalism that gain access to the inner and deeper operational imperatives of the individual, leaving determinate traces in their imaginary worlds where realities are redefined and recreated. In Lacan's terms, one's real world is continuously built upon the operative interaction of the imaginary and the symbolic.[9] The real order as a world of things is controlled and determined by the subjective system of relations and the signifying practices of the symbolic and the imaginary.[10] One can say that nationalism, which is a multifarious constellation of symbolic and imaginary is superimposed upon the real order, and operates in social interaction processes.

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[9] According to Lacan, the symbolic is the sphere of culture and language, ability to name things, codifies, and legalizes, social and economic and cultural exchange, and signification on the intersubjectivity. On the contrary, the real is the world of things, experiences and objects. Real order stands outside of symbolic and imaginary order. However, while real is signifying on symbolic and imaginary order, they step on it for reconstitution. Lacan also points out the fundamental quality of symbols and language in order to formulate what he calls "murder of the thing" in the discourse. For him there can never be a perfect dialogue between symbols and a real world of objects; for such dialogue through language essentially requires the establishment of absent presence. Lastly, in murdering the real world of objects and constructing life as inherently structured by systems of symbols or language, the self experiences a transformation from an authentic being with needs to an unsatisfied human being with fundamentally frustrating desires (Lacan 1977a:63-65, 30-114; 1977b:104, 319, 320).

[10] Here I use the concept of imaginary in the Lacanian sense of order where intersubjective structures are covered with images reflected by mirroring or significations of the symbolic order. The self is constituted in relation to "the Other". Imaginary represents identificatory relations of symbolic images, illusions and perceptions within the subject and interaction relationship. It is best illustrated in Lacan's view of the "mirror stage" (Lacan 1997a:1-8, 180-197).

The symbolic order of nationalism is not only signification in the imaginary worlds which always blocks one from apprehending the real, but is also the site for the cultural and social struggle of social interest groups over symbolic signification, subjectivity and organization of the imaginary order. Because, in any national regime, symbolic order produces a brute, illusory activity of binding and division as "I", "we" and "them", which is defended on contested by historically specific organizations or groups (Pearse 1992:1-13). Thus in the symbolic order of nationalism, imaginary identities which are objects of fusion and reflections are ideologically produced and politically motivated in the arena of symbolic signification for a cultural and social struggle.

In the regimes of nationalism, the symbolic registration of images and codes represents structuring projects for the production of national affiliation. In the symbolic order, each national affinity is reproduced upon fabrication of a distinct constant combination of cultural codes and images that are registered in the subject's imagination as part of the unconsciousness that preferentially orients the way in which the subject understands or associates the other members of a particular nation. Such imaginary existences often represent essential parts of identities within individuals, defining the procedures of life in terms of the imaginary divisions of "us" against "them". The problem here is that it is a difficult task to give up or replace these images with better ones because they are already repressed in unconsciousness such that one is unaware of how they will affect one's action and expression in the future. In fact, nationalism's symbolic order and its relation to the signifying status of its image within individuals is conceptualized in terms of differences that will continue to play an important role in the discourse through the division and diminishment of the constellations of individuals. Here, it is essential to recognize that nationalism exists through cognitive similarities and differences that are structured by symbolic order, images and intersubjectivity (particularly unconsciousness).

Nationalism's task in the imaginary is pure disclosure of the symbolic order which also signifies the hidden world of intersubjective structures. This hidden world is the discourse of "the Other", externally reproduced through the operations of symbolic signifiers (Lacan 1991b:107-110). The imaginary world is the site of perceptions and it customarily accounts for the relationship of concepts, thoughts and things, and their involvement in truth claims (Lacan 1991b:176-179; Goodman 1968:76-80 and 262-265). It is this world (gaze) that determines what one can see and think; this world makes one believe that one vision is "true". Seeing and understanding is a dialogical outcome of eye (organic structure) and the gaze (imaginary), and seeing is relative to one's organic and the imaginary worlds (Goodman 1968:6-10). And as the world (reality) goes, so goes the imaginary world as the bearer of determinate meaning to which one's interpretative visions and perceptions are constantly being adjusted and against which one's opinions are tested for truth and objectivity.

Therefore, through this imaginary world, various meanings, facts and references are subject to and prior constraint, prior justifications and understandings. These perceptions or registered understandings continuously determine what we are seeing and grasping as truth in the life processes. In other words, meanings, concepts and statements within a primarily symbolic scheme (economics, politics, culture) are made true by the facts of another schema in the imaginary world (Goodman 1968:196-205). If one's views and explanation are treated as "right", "correct" or "true", because they suit the previously registered standards of one's imaginary world, then one's standard of what is true is simultaneously relative to one's values and imaginary registration.

In contemporary life, issues of nationalism are integral to the imaginary worlds that fix general reasoning and that are involved in the making of truth or justifications. What these discourses contribute, is a context for the qualification of various images as truth. Truth is as imaginary-laden as it is reality-laden. And if one interacts in the national discourse, one is guided by such truth-oriented national criteria of reasoning. If one lose the national guidance of reasoning for truth, one will lose the justifiable conditions of nationalism. In summary, the outcome of reasoning, objectivity, truth, justification or valid understanding depends not just on reality but also on the imaginary world that is constituted by the national communicative practices.

Nationalism is a form of foundationalism and essentialism. The social practices of nationalism allegedly determine what it is possible to think and say about the social codes and cultural symbols operating on intersubjectivity and giving rise to the same forms of nationalism with all their diverse artifacts and cultural and political products. Discourse of nationalism is wittingly or unwittingly implicated in the flow of values, and the foundations of power paradigms, social formations and communities of interpretative understandings. Nationalism exists as a constitutive power not only in social institutions but also through the domains of actions, facts, values, knowledge and social being in which we construct ourselves and others. What keeps nationalism moving is the "will to power" in spheres of knowledge and the spheres of individuals.

Consequently, nationalism takes a dual form: first, it is an externality as a coercive force; second, it is an internality as a diffused form that, through identity, fabricates certain systems of meanings, discourses and desires. In diffuse forms, power transforms one and one's positions for the further constitution of others. In turn, in becoming interchangeable with diffused forms of power, one simultaneously carries the burden of being. With the full weight of a nationally experienced world, the rise of subjectivity is intelligently translated into the schematic framework of responsibility as described by Emmanuel Levinas. One's responsibility is to put oneself in the place of another or to be constantly responsible for the other and one's very alterity in a relationship which arises through proximity rather than from freedom (Levinas 1981:8, 175-185). In short, the self is both a product and an instrument of power relations.[11] Thus nationalism, which is generally seen as

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[11] Foucault expresses a significant point in the conception of the individual which derives its identity from power:

> The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a

exercising power in coercive and diffused forms over free subjects, is identical to itself as well as to the identity of "the Other". Nationalism's discourse is one of the most powerful means our societies have for the shaping, constraining and constituting of us as "subjects" acting on others (Foucault 1984:351).

In addressing the discursive practices of power relations in the field of nationalism, Foucault puts forth the concept of "discursive truth" as an essential or necessary factor for the operation of power in the constitution of the individual as subject:

> There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth. This is the case for every society, but I believe that in ours the relationship between power, right and truth is organised in a highly specific fashion (Foucault 1980a:93).

Indeed, national exercise of power makes us subjects and it also subjects us to the continuous game of truth which maintains its continuous conduct of us in order to organize a national system for the possible rational outcomes. That is to say, in the modernization process, certain groups such as the intelligentsia, or the ruling modern elites who introduce a nation and regime of nationalism as a truth also determine what

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> primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the *vis-a-vis* of power; it is I believe, one of its prime effects (Foucault 1980a:98).

is to serve as truth and which theories, forms and techniques can be used to display it.[12] For this reason, truth is the effect of a national discourse which imposes itself upon us. In modern and postmodern national societies, truth is thus a performative concept and the object or apparatus of the national game.

Each national discourse fabricates its own standards, or "regime of truth", upon which universal and particular claims are made about what is good and right. As subjects we name reality and history through this truth regime that empowers us through the same discourses in which we also experience ourselves. The link between claims of truth, the subject, and experience is made in the discourses of nationalism. For this reason, the truth claims of a particular nation appear on the one hand, as markers of its identity, and on the other hand, as locaters of others as discredited, excluded or, at least as that which must be rigorously controlled in the production of knowledge.

All claims to truth are addressed and produced from our subject positions which have been collectively constructed and invented in the national regimes of power/knowledge. Every member of a particular nation can learn to conceptualize and see the world from the perspectives of experiences and lives that link subjective experiences with truth claims that are essentially invented by the power holders. Subjectivity, the nation, and the individual are all entrenched in truth claims. As Foucault explains:

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[12] Bauman has argued that the "truth of the nation is simultaneously absolute and relative" and thus "it will always need to be defended and thus need and respect and reward its defenders" (Bauman 1992b:686-687).

> Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; and the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault 1980a:131).

Knowledge is a form of power and it is certainly within the range of nationalist ambition to want to define and control life and meanings and to determine what does and does not count as truth. In this way, national discourse is the foundation of certainty and the absolute and is the basis of the regime of truth. For the individuals it is their points of reference to the nation as a centre or to particular knowledge. In other words, there can be neither social concepts nor facts without reference to national values. Every nation produces its knowledge in its own certain ways of division, identification and categorization, because the products (i.e., knowledge, truth claims, and history-writing) have value for the development of the nation or the nation-state. To be right is to be justified to act or justified to use coercive power. From this point of view, nationally situated subjectivity with its truth claims not only threatens to overwhelm or pollute knowledge but also to become a system of justification and a legitimatizing source for international and national conflicts.

For example, through the differentiated truth claims registered in the imaginary worlds, a contemporary controversial conflict is the one between Macedonia and Greece. The central subject of this dispute is the difference between the truth claims of Macedonia and those of Greece with respect to the history of a particular region. Truth claims through history-writing here are not free-standing. History, (the claims of nationalism), is constantly in the process of being reinvented and rewritten. Each nation, through its truth claims about history, transmits a sense of representation, a pattern of belonging, a legitimation for its fixed identities. In this sense, alternative claims on history and particular conceptualizations of it are felt as a threat to one's identity as well as one's existence. The government of Israel, for example, refuses citizenship rights to those Jews who believe that Jesus Christ was the Messiah. Because of their differential writing of history, the messianic Jews are conceived of as a threat and are deported from Israel (Haberman 1993:A5).

In these examples, national regimes of truths are constructed by excluding others; all truth or myth in the national discourse is fabricated as part of the collective identity through difference and uniqueness with respect to others. National truth regimes become a significant factor for the internal and external conflicts within the nation, polity or geographical enclave. National truth regimes produce nationalistic views which divide people into various sects, races or categories. In this sense, one's national myths and truths consist of a reason for possible conflicts with those who do not share one's beliefs and truths. Today, in our nationally divided world, what we need is to share not only justification of our beliefs but also those of others. In this sense, national and international institutions could be directed towards experiments of cooperation and solidarity rather than to the manifestation of one particular order as a universal and objective truth.

For this reason, in *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth*, Richard Rorty opposes the modernist view which he sees as an attempt to found solidarity on general and objective truth rather than on solidarity for itself. He makes a strong case for developing the truth of solidarity rather than the alienating concepts of objective truth.[13] Rorty recognizes that the desire for solidarity within the community is a vital element for continuation of human civilization, and he refuses establishment projects, foundationalism and quantitative truths. Rorty's extreme relativist approach is a celebration of diversity that disturbs many academic scholars who have for so long regarded themselves as searching for objective truth and universality. However, ironically, their attempts at objective truth have legitimated with colonial expansions, ethnocentrism, massacres and oppression. Consequently, the national community that is produced by the scholars of modernity has become exclusionary and oppressive in the name of objective truth.

Within the politics of nationalism, what we have come to recognize is that foundations in words, emotions, beliefs, thoughts and concepts only correspond to things through systems of justification and regimes of truths. In national politics, when the "regime of truth" is absorbed by the masses, it becomes an important part of belief systems. A belief is an immediate, spontaneous attachment and reference to the imaginary world--necessary for the national regime of truths to be what it is.

Through multiple national references to the regimes of truth, individuals are chained to impossibilities through their bodies, identities and representations. Consequently, the refusal of power, and its regime of truth, represents an escape or emancipation *from oneself.* The regime of truth is no longer something that resides outside of one who is able to view it; instead, it carries multiple stages in which one becomes one's self performer (Goffman 1959). It is under the burden of one's whole life, which contains types of truth and facts in one's subjective existence that there is almost no ability for somebody to say yes or no to one's claims of authenticity. In such a subjectively shaped world, as a national individual, one loses one's contact with true associations to the ideas, emotions and desire which come from being anchored in blood, flesh and spirit.

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[13] For Rorty, objectivity represents the collective grounds for agreement and solidarity that the community recognizes as its constituting basis. In other words, in Rorty's view, truth is what is good us for us to believe (Rorty 1991a:20-29; 1991b:119-120).

SUMMARY

The central theme of these pages is differentiation and nationalism. The discourse of nationalism, through its signifying practices on the imaginary identity, represents a loss of both autonomy and of access to the registered meanings in intersubjectivity. It produces divisive, national subject positions in the socialization processes which control very our nature of existence and unites our self identity with the illusionary image of "the Other". In symbolic signifying practices, nationalism is a representation constituted in a self-identical and a self-differentiating totality of the imaginary identity where the self itself has been shattered and fragmented.

I employed Foucault's concept of power to conceptualize the symbolic order as the arena of the signifying operation of nationalism (or of the nation-state) controlling the subjective representations of reality of the individuals. In the power relations of nationalism, the symbolic order also is a site for cultural and social struggle for signification, for the organization of life that Foucault calls "a battle 'for truth', or at least 'around truth'".[14] Thus the imaginary world of the individual also becomes the locus of struggles for possible meanings which are constantly registered as constitutions of identities. Thus, in national discourse, the individual will always be in an ongoing transformative process in which the individual's imaginary identity will never be complete.

The imaginary identities of individuals are produced through the diffusion of the symbolic order in discursive fields of power relations. They are politically motivated for in the interests of specific forms of power. Around this "battle for truth", particular discourses of nationalism attempt to maintain the authority to produce an historically unique organization of the symbolic order through the nation-state and the imaginary identities which serve as the agency for the regimes of nationalism. However, while particular discourses of nationalism can produce national forms of imaginary identity, their very formation also implies the development of other subjective positions and with them the potential for opposition to the dominant national organization of symbolic order. Therefore, the symbolic order of a particular nation can change over time, and nationalism can serve the interests of different national groups within the nation. For this reason, a particular symbolic order can never be guaranteed and may be open to change from those outside the powers of national discourse.

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[14] For Foucault truth is not as a "'the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted', but rather the 'ensembles of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true', it being understood also that it's not a matter of a battle 'on behalf' of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays (Foucault 1980a:132).

In power relations, the formation of national identity involves a continuous regime of legitimacy used to enhance the sense of identification, solidarity and group coherence in which necessary psychological conditions are created to counter anxiety and to maintain inner-security. Following Lacan's theory of the internalization of the (external the image and signifier) as the means of constituting the self's identity, the national discourse constitutes the self as corresponding to the symbolic order of the nation and provides the cement for the imaginary identification and imaginary impression of the sense of well-being. The symbolic existence of a nation interacts with individuals through its stamp upon individual identities, changing individuals' reflection from communal association to societal association and their integration into distinct national ideals and symbolic affinities. The identity politics of nationalism represents sense of a belonging, and mirroring the structuration of subjective realities of identities. This mirroring and the act of reflecting is a part of the permanent economy of the disciplinary ideology of nationalism which intends to master representations, thereby creating contradictions and producing opposition. In the national discourse, the formation of identities resolves the threat to the national order by containing and incorporating the most disruptive and contradictory elements of the individual's sense of being.

CHAPTER FIVE

NATIONALISM: PRESENT IN ITS ABSENCE

INTRODUCTION

An important characteristic of nationalism, is that it does not exist "in itself" rather it exists in a multilineal, complex relationship, a peculiar interlacing of individuals' psychic drives and cultural contexts, inner-selves and social institutions or norms. In other words, the self and the nation are inextricably interwoven entities within a process of sociation in which specific forms of self are continually constituted in a symbolic and imaginary order which is imposed on reality. The relationship between nation and self is dialectical because the self, once constituted within dominant forms, may in turn act back upon the nation and the organizing, operational logic of the national discourse that shaped the individual self.

A further aim of this chapter is to describe some of the intertextual structures and codes responsible for the continuous production of nationalism in the plurality of social discourses and interactive processes, as well as in the conditions of subjectivity. Nationalism, as an "open" and "differential" text (to use Derrida's terms), enters people's daily activities as political codes, meaning systems, responsibilities and obligations, which we cannot really know or control in our interactions with others.[1]

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[1] According to Derrida, all phenomena, all events, are also realms of open and differential texts and there is nothing beyond the text. Derrida has become more explicit and insistent on stressing the political consequences of texts. He writes:

> It is precisely for strategic reasons ... that I found it necessary to recast the concept of text by generalizing it almost without any limit that *is*. That's why there is nothing *beyond* the text." That's why South Africa and *apartheid* are, like you and me, part of this general text, which is

Each time we interact, the elements of nationalism carry different meanings within a chain of signification. This is because these meanings are only relative to previous traces and marks within us, as well as to the other elements of the chain that produce its differences and transformations through us. Thus, the meanings of nationalism cannot exist without referring to our already differently constituted identities and to other discourses in a system of differences. The operation of nationalism through the economic, cultural and political discourses and our interaction with these, allows its structures to transform not only its integrant elements but also the features of its participatory discourse and our very nature. Consequently, my argument is that there are no fixed boundaries between the text/discourse of nationalism and its institutional and individual contexts nor between its theoretical and practical domains.

It is because of the play of differences in or through structure that the movement of signification is possible with alterity of structural qualities. For this reason, larger units of meanings such as nationalism, are never found in unity or as a presence in itself. As Derrida has succinctly stated: "Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces" (Derrida, 1981:26). In the

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> not to say that it can be read the way one reads a book. That's why the text is always a field of forces: heterogeneous, differential, open, and so on. That's why deconstructive readings and writings are concerned not only with library books, with discourses, with conceptual and semantic contents. They are not simply analyses of discourse .... They are also effective or active (as one says) interventions that transform contexts without limiting themselves to theoretical or constative utterances even though they must also produce such utterances (Derrida 1986:167-168).

process of signification, the present structure of nationalism is not only inscribed under erasure and continuous signification or differentiation, but also in the marking or the tracing of a relation to the past and to the future. Thus the elements of nationalist discourse do not include modified presence (before or after) but only represent an ambiguity between presence and absence, between temporalization and spatialization, present and future.

From a poststructuralist perspective, reader and text, knowledge and power, discourse and subject may be analytically distinguished but in practical experience they are inseparable entities of a single totality. Neither the reader as a self, nor nationalism as a text, are god-given, fixed, singular entities, shapes, forms or meanings. Instead they have a multitude of autonomous meanings and ambiguous forms within the interactional processes of signification and in the relationship of differentiation with the-one-for-the-other.[2] In today's world of plural constructions and diverse realities, with its absence of certainty, one has to pursue the sources of knowledge, meanings and representations, not as separate characteristics or qualities of the discourse, but as the result of interactions within the unity of reader and text, of subject and discourse.

This interactional analysis also leaves open the question of the subjective consequences of nationalism within the fields of the individual's internalized cognitive and emotive structures. Nationalism is undeniably a social invention and is a part of these cognitive and emotive structures. It cannot be granted an ontological autonomous status apart from the individual and the society where it was invented and developed. Nevertheless, individuals interact with and in this text/discourse and they learn some part of their social perceptions, views and meaning systems through this "objective reality". They can shift the status of the text but they cannot change it at will. Individuals must comply with its coercive and dominant power. For these reasons, many people are unable to conceive of either their life or their world except through the forms, categories and modalities which national texts/discourses provided.

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[2] Levinas says that signification is the-one-for-the-other and the relationship with alterity (Levinas 1981:184).

In this respect, what I want to explore is not the single truth of nationalist discourse but its plurality. Therefore the task is not only to discover the plurality of meanings, codes and structures within the discourse of nationalism, but also to deconstruct the rules governing the production of meanings, codes and structures. Upon observation the problematic of nationalism is not clear and unified, but fragmentary like the images in a kaleidoscope. I agree with Derrida, who invites plural understandings or explanations and denies logocentric, ethnocentric and phallocentric views based on the linear, propositional and privileging reasoning.[3]

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[3] According to Derrida, logocentric systems of thought claims self-referenial, circular and self satisfying status which derives self constituted logic. Derrida also uses the concept of "differance in opposition to logocentrism. According to Derrida, deconstruction of logocentric systems bring openness towards the other and marginal. From this point of view, in the meanings of nationalism, logocentrism implies a power to impose restrictions and limits on the mobility of nationalism because of the linear, methodological and propositional reasoning employed for analysis and description of the principles, definition and paraphrasing for what nationalism embodies. That is conceptualization of nationalism are the only simulacrum intellectuals can write and discuss in the journals and one another. The use of such conceptualization suggests the presence of nationalism within borders is never and

The latter kind of approach is employed by various traditional theorists who view nationalism as a centred, closed totality. It is clear in many cases that scholars conveniently attempt to build foundations of definition or categories of nationalism in order to make it "present".[4]

Above all, the multiple manifestations of nationalism in the symbolic order (as borders and limits) mean that it cannot be defined simply in terms of the visible or the real and therefore cannot be categorized as ethnic, emancipatory, formal and informal. This categorization of nationalism necessitates a definition and foundation within ontological borders, whereas nationalism is actually a set of relations with *alterity* which may be revealed only through reflection. Therefore, nationalism is not a thing or a subject confined by a definition of categories; rather it is an ambiguity within the operation of marking and tracing and its functions shift from one subject position to another or from one discourse to another. In fact, neither nationalism nor the self use stable phenomena, because neither are exempt from dialectical change or,

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nowhere found (Derrida 1984 114-115; Culler 1982:92-93).

[4] For example, Louis L. Snyder, one of the (so called) expert scholars of modern nationalism, has attempted to develop a scientific or objective definition of nationalism. He writes:

> Nationalism is that sentiment of a group or body of people living within a compact or a noncontagious territory, using a single language or related dialects as a vehicle for common thoughts and feelings, holding a common religious belief, possessing common institutions, traditions, and customs acquired and transmitted during the course of a common history, venerating national heroes, cherishing a common will for social homogeneity (Snyder 1976:25).

This is typical example of logocentrism reflects the desire to establish foundationalist certainty, to find ultimate truth and to privilege presence over absence as self-present meaning.

to use Derrida's notion from *differance*.[5]

The objective of the present chapter is an interpretation of the category of subjectivity and an establishment of the importance of intertextuality on understandings of nationalism. The development of a nationally structured modern world cannot adequately be explained as long as we attempt to understand the self and its identity simply in terms of subjectivity and signification. This is because what is important for the development of the subject is the constitution of the subjective world, a form of representation which helps to secure the continuous existence of nationalism as something different than it has been previously.

DE-CENTRING NATIONALISM AND ITS IDENTITIES

The fact is that whatever comes to be in and through representation, continuously differentiates itself and transforms its surrounding environment in the forms of new social, political and cultural structures which are developed as the products of new times in contrast to previous ones. As the Greek philosopher Heraclitus pointed out in reference to the continuously changing conditions of the environment, one cannot step into the same river twice. Differentiation is thus the key essence of objects; and it is a consequence of the dialectical relationships among objects and their surrounding environment. Differentiation is an interpretation of the living process and it is an ongoing activity in which participants exist within various lines of action through the endless situations and circumstances they encounter.

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[5] Derrida characterizes the term "differance" as a main principle of every structure in which the meaning of the text changes over time but these changes develop positive (to differ) and negative (deferral) references to other texts or readers. *Differance* which is a non unitary origin of meaning, relates movements of signification for both difference and deferrai: that meaning is distinct from the other structured elements of the text or system; it is never present (fully formed) in the signifier but it exists in the text and out of the text where it is produced through a series of differences; that meaning is temporally deferred, altering under the chain of signifiers which has no end (Derrida 1982:1-29; 1981b:23-34).

From this point of view, today, the activities of a world being transforming look like a moving picture in which our positions, and surrounding physical and social environment are rapidly and continuously differentiated in such a way that we no longer have a clear image of what we have seen. So any attempt to draw stable borders, lines and definitions in order to capture movement of differentiation is possibly misleading.

This comes into view most clearly, perhaps, in old photographs. One says to friends: Here I am at age two, here are pictures from my high school years! But if one looks carefully at these old photographs; one immediately recognizes the differences and likenesses. So in what sense do the old photographs represent the person? Sometimes one might feel that the person in the photographs no longer exists. Or, looking at the photographs again, one might find some of one's same expressions, images or a structural relationship from one photograph to another through a lifetime of transformations. In the end, it turns out that our existence is located somewhere between permanence and change, here and there, "fort!" and "da!", presence and absence.[6] One's identity is never just the present itself and but represents a continuous dialogue between "I", "the Other" and the surrounding environment. Identity represents the incomplete traces and constructions which are inscribed in the repression or in the erasure of original and the past traces and constructions. Identity is also related to the future throughout the traces of the past and the present. Like every signifying process, one's identity represents a sense of the present as future and past with respect to itself, never as the present of itself. It is engaged in internal and external dialogue in the symbolic orders of absence of presence and presence of absence. As Derrida explains:

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[6] Freud analyses his grandson's *fort* and *da* game to show the symbolic disappearance and reappearance of a child's mother. In this game, Freud's grandson plays at making wooden reel disappear and reappear, at the same time uttering expressive cries *fort* and

> It is because of differance that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-called 'present' element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element, this trace being related no less to what is called the future than to what is called the past, and constituting what is called the present by means of this very relation to what it is not: what it absolutely is not, not even a

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da (gone and there). According to Freud, the child's *fort da* game marks the beginning of self awareness. The a wooden reel, which the child would make disappear under his bed, was the taking position of his mother, and the play of making a wooden reel disappear was also represented the act of making his mother disappear. In the position of mother--constituting a presence in her absence--the child calls *fort*!, a sound picked up from the parents. In doing this, the child participates in a discourse with surrounding environment.

The child's *fort da* game with a wooden reel as interplay of presence and absence sketch the genesis of the symbolic order. The *fort da* game becomes paradigmatic for the connection between the symbol and its functions and it reinforces the idea of the symbol not in brute presence, but presence in absence. For this reason, the *fort* and *da* example is not just an isolated case but is operative in all human experience and at all levels of symbolic order or language that sets motion between presence and absence. Within this motion of symbolic order and language, symbols and words become autonomous and people lose sight of representative function (i.e., metonymy and metaphor). Through the utilization of language, absence is made possible in the symbolization of presence (Freud 1971:14-15; Lacan 1991a:172-178; 1977a:319, 103).

past or a future as a modified present (Derrida 1982:13).

In other words, being in the present is quite a different thing from being in the past. What differentiates our existence in the past is not only our shape but also our views, perceptions and the systems of meaning.

One's totality of past images does not literally exist, although it occupies one's fundamental core of existence through its absence. To put it another way, the past leaves various traces and imprints that define the very core of one's identity. Identities endure through traces and imprints that might not directly be present and perhaps remain, as it were to come. (such as in the Balkans, nationalism can be described not only as by product of modern transformations but also as a rejuvenation of past traces of communal hatred) Traces or imprints of the past, through identity, stand as an invariant that signifies later transformations and differentiations of the individual as identity becomes expression of both sameness and difference, both continuity and change. In that sense self is a transreferential function in that it corresponds not only to the newness of experiences in the present, but it also revives the past and makes it present in its absence. In the subject, the articulation of the past and the present go hand in hand; their expression depend upon the transreferential function of identity in which the past dissolves in the present to create differences and change. In that sense, the subject is a decentralized structure that develops between permanence and change, between likeness and difference, while simultaneously standing both inside and outside the present.[7]

Today, the modern, national subject has become painfully aware of the fact self transformation *versus* inner continuity. This may be experienced as specific anxieties and identity crises. Furthermore, the multilevelled existence of national subject through past and present may also be one of the psychological reasons which give rise to individual anxieties and insecurity through the clash of past and present elements in terms of communal and continuity or transformation.

In the modern and national developmental process, the metamorphoses of the subject contain the relinquishment of human identity as well as its replacement. In the modernization process, some metamorphoses are planned, or at least fostered, by social and institutional structures i.e., identity of military personnel or national identities in newly constituted nations. But beyond the regulatory transformation of identities, others take place contingently and develop at the margins of social structures although not necessarily unrelated to membership within them. For example, disturbing notions of transformation and differentiation are captured very well within Kafka's stories. In the story *Metamorphosis*, with the transformation of Gregor Samsa into an insect, Kafka poignantly portrays changing personality with its attendant feelings of anxiety, and extreme alienation as entrapment in a dehumanizing process (Kafka 1971: 89-139). In the story of Gregor's change into an insect, Kafka provides an illustration of the distorted self that may be the deepest horror a human can experience: two oppositionary existence within one. From its own derivation, Kafka has two opponents: the first is his organic and alien body which presses him for change. The second is the conscious self, frustrated with an alien organic body, attempting to stop the process of metamorphosis.[8] But it is not only the opponents who are there; Gregor himself struggles against these differentiated and hostile sides of himself (body and self-identity). Thus Gregor simultaneously lives within unity and fragmentation. This bi-polar existence or fragmented unity creates deep anxiety and insecurity for Gregor Samsa. But what is important here is the description of modern identities as fragmented, and hostile fractured along past and present, national and international, public and private, subjectivity (constructed nature) and objectivity (inherent nature), citizen and human being.

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[7] Derrida characterizes this dec-centred subject in the active and passive movement of the of *differance*, "trace" and "mark". As he explains:

> Subjectivity--like objectivity--is an effect of *differance*, an effect inscribed in a system of *differance*. This is why the *a* of *differance* also recalls that spacing is temporalization, the detour and postponement by means of which intuition, perception, consummation--in a word, the relationship to the present, the reference to a present reality, to a *being*--are always *deferred*. Deferred by virtue of the very principle of difference which holds that an element functions and signifies, takes on or conveys meaning, only by referring to another past or future element in an economy of traces. This economic aspect of *differance*, which brings into play a certain not conscious calculation in a field of forces, is inseparable from the more narrowly semiotic aspect of *differance*. It confirms that the subject, first of all the conscious and speaking subject, depends upon the system of differences and the movement of *differance*, that the subject is constituted only in being divided from itself, in becoming space, in temporalizing, in deferral (Derrida 1981b:28-29).

In today's nationally formed world, it is not possible to view the life of men or women separate from the psychological reality of fragmented, hostile and binary differences; for there are few people whose life has not been shaped or determined from birth to death by the various matrices of differentiation of national ideologies. The nationalist text/discourse makes a space both for hostile opposition or fragmentation to develop and for the self to be born. Once in modern world, national identification was produced by reference to charming notions of liberty, solidarity and freedom but it has often led to repressive action and tensions between individual and nation, between one member of imaginary community and other, between the abstracted political role of the citizen and the role of the human being as a system of multiple cognitive and emotive structures. Accordingly, we are addressed by nationalism each time in a different, particular and fragmenting way that is never final.

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[8] For example, on the same course, socially constructed individual identities is also represent a battle between universal and national constructions.

INTERTEXUALITY OR INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF NATIONALIST DISCOURSE/TEXT

First, the study of the structure of nationalism is not only discernible in terms of specificity or difference as a system of signs, but through the signified meaning and the functions of the signifier created the relations between various texts/discourses. For this reason, the interpretation of nationalism is not possible without the recognition of its "intertexuality", by which its meanings are regulated by other texts/discourses. The symbolic system of nationalism, in terms of intertexuality can only operate as a reference relation on the territory of identities. Nationalism is not an autonomous entity, but is always determined through intertexuality and its relation to the identity of the subject. Therefore, the traditional notion of nationalism as a unified and centred structure is misperceived because nationalism is continuously being de-centred by the operations of signifiers i.e.,intertexuality. The endless activity of signification and the transformation of the nationalist text/discourse through intertexuality in territories of identity and subjectivity is stressed in the famous dictum of Roland Barthes: "Every text, being itself the intertext of another, text belongs to the intertextual" (Barthes 1980:77).[9]

The outcome of every interaction or confrontation between nation and self invokes significations in which the self and the text are constructed through unique and temporary meanings and representations. At the beginning of the process of interaction, the subject may constitute a text of nationalism; however, in turn, the nationalist text controls the encounter and recreates the subject. What is actually going on is an interaction between individuals and nationalism, the subject and the discourse of nationalism, and between the text/discourse of nationalism and other texts/discourses. Because there is no single meaning for any nationalist text, there is no final interaction between subject and intertexuality in relation to national subjectivity.

In the same way, Derrida's argues for intertexuality, plurality and the alterity of the text and subject in the "economy of *differance*". Derrida's discussion of the economy of *differance* represents the movement of signification in both difference and deferral: meanings are never present or (fully constituted) in each signifier but are formed through a chain of differences; and meanings are always temporally deferred to and differentiated by a series of signifiers that has no limit or end. The politics of *differance* represents a chain of traces and active forces of differentiation from particular representational system and defers indefinitely the foundation of totality. In Derrida's view, the economy of *differance* implies temporizing power on the presentation of the reality by disruption of full presence (Derrida 1982:1-29).

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[9] This argument occurred in Roland Barthes' writings in various places. According to Barthes, there is no singular text but every text is connected with every other text. This so-called intertextuality implies a multiplicity of meanings (see also, Barthes 1977).

Derrida's view of *differance* is an essential part of the poststructuralist approach. The poststructuralist emphasis of Derrida does not provide a concentric form of organization with a centred organizing agent. Instead, he prefers to use the concept of structure as movement of signification. This provides a view of structure as being open-ended. Thus there is no particular origin for subjectivity and objectivity in the structured systems which are themselves places of transformation and interchangeability permitted by "internal free play and fundamental immobility" (Derrida 1978:280).[10]

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[10] Derrida writes:

> The event I called a rupture, the disruption I alluded to at the beginning of this paper, presumably would have come about when the structurality of structure had to begin to be thought, that is to say, repeated, and this is why I said that this disruption was repetition in every sense of the word. Henceforth, it became necessary to think both the law which somehow governed the desire for a center in the constitution of structure, and the process of signification which orders the displacements and substitutions for this law of central presence--but a central presence which has never been itself, has always already been exiled from itself into its own substitute. The substitute does not

Recognizing that the foregoing may seem very general and abstract, we might, at this point, ask how Derrida's view might be relevant for the conceptualization of nationalism. First, Derrida's view of structure allows us to describe the structure of nationalism within the temporary conditions without the traditional theoretical distinctions between inside and outside, centre and margins or base and superstructure.

In light of the foregoing discussion, the national concern is to create uniformity through homogenization of self identities. It is not possible to create a subject with a solid, integrated self-identity, because self-identity is the meeting site of interactions within the subject as well as with its social and national environment. Finally, the national discourse is almost everywhere present in the psychosocial identity of the self within the signification of guiding metaphors and metonymy, or imaginary, and symbolic.[11]

> substitute itself for anything which has somehow existed before it. Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no centre, that the center could not be thought in the form of a present-being, that the center had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse--provided that we can agree on this word--that is to say, a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely (Derrida 1978:280).

[11] According to Lacan, in language metonymy is connection from one signifier to signifier, or relation word by word which creates phallic situation for lack-of-being. Metonymy is a transfer of signification without addressing the subject's desire or

Lacan dismisses the notion that the totality of the subject can be arranged around a centre and be complete in itself or find all points of reference therein (Lacan 1977:92-114, 401-436). Lacanian realization of a de-centred subject has recaptured self-identity as a contingent, multilevelled, fluid, discontinuous, unreliable and dynamic entity. Self-identity is imaginary and formed by an external world within a network of interactions and linguistic relations which for the individual corresponds to a demand for recognition. In other words, self-identity is essentially bound up in the existence of "the Other". As Lacan has put it: "Man's desire is the desire of the Other" (Lacan; 1979:115). "The Other" is the agent of a subjectivity that continuously enforces and rejuvenates the order and identities of nationalism.

In this context, the idea of self can be understood as a temporal and spatial being through the relational internal unity of a subject which is continuously differentiated and restated by sets of signifying chains. This occurs through language and the existing network of interactions between self and other. The self reflects significations in personality and individuality and also signifies the other, i.e., perceives other in terms of its own mimetic identities and produces significations in its own image. The self is constituted by layers of successive identifications or fusions--that of the relationships subject/object, object/object and subject/subject and that of language--by which the self attempts to constitute life and its objects.

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without reproducing the meaning of a original symbol (word). Metaphor is replacement of one symbol (word) for another, one signifier for another. Metonymy offers servitude, subjugation while metaphor represents partial autonomy, authenticity, heights of poetry and creation (Lacan 1977a:156-164; 1977b:154-188, 247-249).

However, in life, the self does not stand as a whole, or as complete totality of subject, but reflects the stages of transcendental transference and differentiation due to the determining characteristics of interactions. By the same token, within the symbolic play of language and interactions, in the imaginary the self also appears united as a sign between symbol and function, and between signifier and signified.

The socially available definitions of the world appear to provide supportive grounds for the development of nationalism in that they maintain various conceptual modalities and distinct representations which reduce self to an evaporating point that can never be present. The self has fragmented between indigenous and alien (the "I" and "the Other"). Ironically, it is because of this lack of unity of the self, that national conceptual modalities are able to provide a kind of cement in the form of collective representations of particularistic and hereditary notions. The subjective consequence is that selves find themselves persuasively replaced in the social world and also in nature. Nationalism has no place for the fullness of solid life contents, for the authenticity of community relations, since nation is the formal bond of abstract relations (among the citizens). Its basis is impersonal and distant relations bridged by formal categorization and the dominance of forms, symbols and images.

As the individual is socialized in the nation, this national subjective knowledge is continuously internalized through the development of national identities. This national subjective knowledge not only becomes a new code for the constitution of objective reality "out there", but also an inevitable inner structure of people's own consciousness and unconsciousness--"Who I am, What I am, Who I am to you...etc".

In this way objective reality is subjectively reconstructed within the self by nation-society. The individual or citizen of the nation then no longer feels the necessity to turn outside himself/herself for new "knowledge" concerning the essence of beingness and one's relation to the environment. Individuals have an internal tendency to know who they are and they feel and act accordingly. The individual realize him/herself through interactions within the nation-society and one recognizes one's identity in the collectively constituted structures which become a part of the subjective reality of life as he remains in the nation-society. This is to say, individuals can experience the ongoing subjective conduct of themselves spontaneously, because the socially internalized conscious and unconscious structures make it unnecessary or even impossible for them to reflect on alternative possibilities of life.

From this point of view, having grown up within national systems of meanings, values, relations and institutional practices, the self has disappeared as an authentic object and has appeared as the de-centred cultural subject of national discourses which replace its fundamental nature with an absent presence.

SUMMARY

Now, I wish to return to my central argument. I wish to suggest, quite simply, that nationalism is an intertextual construct--the meanings of nationalism can be derived by a trace of the *other* discourses and the *other* registered meanings and traces in imaginary identities. The existence of nationalist discourse itself holds traces of the *other* discourses (i.e.,capitalism, colonialism, catholicism, and particularism).

It is a trace of presence and absence only perceived within a difference and never-ending chain of symbolic signifiers. What is present in nationalist discourse is present in terms of its traces on the imaginary order. What is absent in nationalist discourse emerges from a context of what is present in the imaginary order.

In the intertextual interplay of symbolic order, the discourse of nationalism is not an operation of a single symbolic signifier for constitutions of a single registration of national meaning on subject, but it is a multitude of symbolic signifiers that blend and clash in different registered meanings in imaginary identity. Thus, imaginary identities as a web of symbolic meanings drawn from innumerable social and cultural discourses are only sites for the transformation of the meanings of nationalism. Therefore, within the wide-ranging structures of intertextuality in the imaginary order, the subject plays an important role to shape the structures, and meanings of nationalism. However, through registration of national symbolic signifiers in imaginary, nationalism serves as a context for alteration of the very nature of self-identity and interpretation of life processes. In effect, in the imaginary identity, the discourse of nationalism appeals to both dialogues of the consciousness and unconsciousness and to structures or systems of values and norms functioning in the discursive fields of social and cultural practices.

Among the imaginary identities, nationalism is a system of signs which carries the operations of its two constituents signifier and signified in the same unity. In other words the meaning of nationalism is a purely relational one in which the very nature of individual existence appears to itself other than as itself. Through relation or signification, the meanings of nationalism can never be fully present (fully formed) in the imaginary identities, and remain incomplete across a past, present, and continuous with a future, because its meaning is produced through a play of differences; that meaning is also temporally deferred, moving a under chain of signifiers which have no end (Derrida 1976:44-73). For this reason, nationalism can only be explained not in itself but rather in its differentiating operation and temporal constitution of the subject and in the other discourses of symbolic order.

CONCLUSION: NATIONALISM WITHOUT ENDING

I have argued that nationalism does not have a single definable content either in practice or in theory, because the limitations or boundaries of its structures are determined by its relations to *other* discourses. Its references to or its traces in, various discourses are limitless. Therefore, this is my starting point for the explanations of the possible meanings of nationalism. I stated that nationalism is a many-headed offspring of modernity, and has its origins everywhere: it is an object in symbolic exchange relations, it is a play of differences in the functional system of *differance*, and it carries the marks of both the past and the present. In other words, today, what we have, primarily, is the continuous construction of nationalism as an integral part of modern economics, politics and culture. Its distinctions are controlled by the differentiation marks of various discourses.

Nationalism has become a globally rising sentiment, but it arises in intensely local circumstances, and its distinctive forms and structures are shaped by the traces of the wider crisis of modernity. Nationalism is the regime of the conflictual constitution of the current landscape of power/knowledge through the meanings of ethics and morality. Therefore nationalism is a representative ideology of the current crisis and is produced by the divisive structural contradictions of modernity. Its distinctive and divisive characteristics become expressive agents and agency of aggressive particularism, ethnic feelings, religious fundamentalism and sectarianism.

In the preceding discussion of nationalism, I have also focused on a series of contradictory and, inconsistent constructive notions of nationalism, which I have linked to distinctiveness in the discourses of modernity and to the conscious and the unconscious aspects of identity, beginning with the assumptions about the distinctiveness of national discourses from other discourses such as traditional, communal and religious ones. This has expressed the discourse of nationalism as an implicit or explicit messenger of hierarchical categorization and binary oppositions (e.g., individual/state, national/universal, culture/nature, us/them, we/other). These dichotomous and/or hierarchical categories proclaim themselves openly in the discourses of nationalism. Thus, our search for solutions to today's problems has to start with the deconstruction of these dichotomous and dominating oppositions of reciprocal relations. To accomplish this deconstruction of binary opposition to make possible reciprocal bonding, a change of focus or emphasis in theory and practice is necessary: for example, the recognition of alterity from the national to universal, from male to female, from culture to nature, from reason to feeling, from centre to de-centre, from objectivity to relativism, from occident to orient, and from North to South.

Consequently, this thesis has also been an attempt to discuss the discourse of nationalism in terms of permutational and relational constructions within frameworks of power or imaginary systems of significations. Nationalism was discussed in terms of principles of economic, cultural and political organization and in rational use, in motivations, in the claim of truth, in the conditions of dissatisfaction, and in the conditions of justifications and confirmation. Furthermore, this thesis has identified nationalism within the "invisible" structures of the identity and unconsciousness which reproduce the values, beliefs or *habitus* of various national ways of collective and individual action and expression.

By examining nationalism in terms of its internal system of justifications, and at the levels of functions and construction, I have stressed the problematic role of foundationalism, essentialism and objectivism in theory and practice. In functional terms, power holders (i.e., intelligentsia, state elites, and so on) use operative systems of rightness, or "truth". (What is known as "right" is also known as a "truth" What is called "truth" is also essential to justification and goodness.) Moreover, these foundationalist and essentialist correspondences of nationalism in theory and practice are both functional and consequential. I have argued that the essentialist and foundationalist worlds of nationalism support structures which shape one's identity in ways, and these structures have oppressive, subordinating and discriminating functions and consequences on the human development. Modern individuals have internalized elements of national constructions which lead them to systematically regulate their emotions, impulses, aspirations and life principles. The problem here is how essentialized principles of national conduct attempt to lawfully assert themselves on the imaginary order or on the construction of the very nature (identity) of human beings in a social space and time.

The relationship between nationalism and the world is a dialectical one, with important implications for the repertoire of identities available within a nation. This dialectic also concerns the relationships between the subjective and objective realities of the individual, and the worlds of nationalism. Individuals internalize symbols, images and representations which appear to them as givens outside themselves and, having internalized them as elements of their own identities, they externalize them again as they continue to live and act in the nation. Every national formation of reality takes place as a part of the overreaching formation of identities. In becoming a part of subjective reality nationalism assures its continuation through disclosure and representability in identities.

Thus, nationalism is essentially a dual phenomenon with its crucial loci in the organization of social life and the psychological structures of individuals. The organization of social life is connected with the modern organization of civil society and state, including bureaucratic organization and hierarchical ideology, cultural homogenization within borders, uniqueness with respect to these beyond the borders, and political consensus among inhabitants regarding the legitimate authority of the state. Psychological reality is connected through the *habitus*: structures of perceptions, value systems, emotions and conditioned elements of the conscious and unconscious. These loci of nationalism are inseparably intertwined. The organization of social life not only constrains but also creates the psychological realities of individuals. Individuals conceive themselves in the national organization of the life systems, that is, one sees oneself in nationally defined terms (e.g., citizenship or as an abstract subject of law) and these definitions become the basis for the social organization of life as they know it. Thus in national societies, two levels of individual subject or identities are created: one is an abstract individual subject which is created within the constitutional categories of a definite nation-state, and the other is a cultural individual subject which is created as a member of a culturally distinct imaginary community. The abstract and cultural nationality now dominates the very nature of human beings replacing the psychic split between the "I" and "the Other".

Most importantly, the relation between these two aspects of nationalism the psychological reality of the individual and the organization of social life, is premised upon their differentiation in their structural components. Nationalism simultaneously denotes an increasing differentiation in the subjective dimensions of the external and internal worlds. In the spheres of integration, or relations between identities and the organizations of social life, nationalism signifies the increasing abstractness of social relations and the formalism and rationality of identity structures. This occurs not only in substantive organizational social structures, but also in the individual.

The advent of a nationalized identity and all the themes of modernity underlie the whole of one's serious intellectual view and cause one's immediate intellectual particularism. In relation to the particularist construction of identities, nationalism represents the limitation and restriction of everyday life practices. Within the self-differentiated, disciplinary, and fragmented aspects of national life, the ultimate problem is the art of human-making which arises in nationalism's rational and irrational conduct of basic human nature and in the restriction of human freedom. Intellectually, it is a problem of the danger we face in the mass production of people who become automatically programmed to perform a number of mechanical, repetitive tasks in the nation. Through these programmed, mechanical, repetitive tasks, the nation in the modern era becomes the antithesis of the free society as well as of the free individual. In other words, the modern nation provides a closed framework internal/external for the robotic installation of social institutions and modern, national communicative practices.[1]

In the present conditions of the modern world, the discourse of nationalism carries primarily four connotations: particularism, rational conduct of action and expression, nation as a ideal type for civilization, and sanctified myths. Each of these four aspects of nationalism, (the dialectical achievements of modernity) present distinctive dangers and threats for the unity of human life. Particularism carried to an extreme form may produce racism, discrimination, and communal atomism in which all universal bonds are broken. The rational conduct of action and expression embodied in the national practices of disciplining is self-destructive and undermines the very nature of the human being. The modern nation-state, as an ideal container for civilization, can turn into a rage of destruction of the plurality of cultures and can give rise to the monopoly of a homogenized national culture (which demands of difference for itself, but does not repeat it for others). Sanctified national myths and images can degenerate into superficial beliefs in which oppositions become irreconcilable.

Thus, in the light of various observations on the fields of nationalism, this analysis suggests that one of the most urgent tasks of the intellectuals is to come to understand their implicit and explicit role in the construction of nationalist structures and discourse. Intellectuals cannot afford to stay bound to assumptions a presuppositions regarding the modern historical context of nationalism as "progress". The alternative discourses, or the deconstruction of nationalist structures, can replace commonality at the particularistic, national level with commonality at the universal level. The development of any alternative discourses needs to be open and to include the democratic participation of and subordinated members of the world community. Seeking to create a broader context for the universal meaning of participation and ethical responsibility, Habermas states: "When we ask what is good for me, or good for us, or good for them, we can't expect a generally binding answer; we should rather ask what is equally good for all" (Habermas 1990:96). Habermas' universal moral point of view of Habermas casts suspicion on particularist ideologies of nationalism and its supporters, who, as symbolic representatives of a particular nation-state, are oriented to ask what is good for me, or for us, even though their assumptions may also legitimate such acts as ethnic cleansing, genocide and massive systemic rapes (as is the case in Bosnia) or massive repression and oppression (as against the Palestinians in Israel). In other words, today uncritical celebration of nationalism and valorization of particularism harbours general threats and dangers to others when what is required is reconciliation of cultural and national differences and for opposition to the discriminatory, oppressive and violent regimes of nationalism. Thus, not all forms of differences or particularism have to be celebrated in the national rhetoric of emancipation, distinctiveness and belongingness. We can advocate differences, plurality and order within which there is a particularism which is non-violent, non-oppressive and non-discriminatory.

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[1] Such repetitive installations represent a duty, liability, obligation, and responsibilities for business, school, family.

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APPENDIX A



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